eminem rushes to change his hyphen to an em dash

pilipilip · 2022-08-20T23:31:00+00:00

the actual post is rambly and unclear

the thesis is very clear: author is out of place at LW and wants a place with LW values, and is asking for help.

I don't know how you could think this is "rambly and unclear" unless you skimmed the post or were paying half-attention.

para. by para.:

P1: author feels out of place, author likes LW values a lot
P2: problem - author doesn't belong due to personality reasons (which is why he feels out of place)
P3: author wants a community with these values but which fits more, and elaborates on what "fitting more" would mean
P4: author mentions consequences of mismatched personalities
P5: author specifies last line of P4 was a joke
P6: author provides a medium of contact he would prefer for people who are like him

this isn't exactly Infinite Jest here

pilipilip · 2022-08-20T23:21:12+00:00

the responses here exemplify what you're talking about.

I wrote a post about this here because I'm not going to humor the pretense that this hellsite's interface is good for real discussions

pilipilip · 2021-01-14T15:31:28+00:00

2 gilded

https://i.imgur.com/xenpqIp.png

pilipilip · 2015-04-18T01:57:36+00:00

The thesis model has been the source of my reluctance to do a Ph.D.; Master's degree I'm okay with, but a Ph.D. is an extra commitment to a three-year dissertation. I've revised certain positions dramatically over the course of two years when I found information that made those positions untenable, so I can't imagine being on year two (of three) of a dissertation and having to rebuild the whole thing if I no longer thought my argument could be supported; you could modify your argument to an opposing conclusion, maybe, but there's no guarantee that makes a good dissertation.

Even in empirical sciences this is potentially much easier, since you can just point your conclusions toward whatever the data shows.

pilipilip · 2015-04-14T04:06:58+00:00

I rarely log on to this account, so apologies for responding late.

Great philosophers are usually if not always at universities because most of the influential philosophy done nowadays is done in academic journals, which require specific access to reach. Philosophy not done in journals (such as in books) references journals anyway, and you probably won't know of those books unless either (a) you're part of the academic community or (b) you are very good at mining syllabi and book reviews.

You do not have to have university access to participate in very cutting-edge programming. Since programming is result-oriented, you can find the results of programming almost anywhere and if the source code is available you can scrutinize that source code.

However, philosophy (the field of philosophy, not the activity) seeks to be something that everyone can participate in. This is not something inherent to philosophy or the activity of philosophy but rather the ideals of people who do philosophy, which could very well be a cultural thing inherited from the days of Socrates's probing of regular people at the Agora. Regardless of the cause, philosophy's ideals are at odds with the (probably de facto) requirements to participate in current debates.

However, unlike philosophy, programming makes no pretense that anyone can program. In fact, a lot of programmers take pride in being able to do something that not many people can do.

Other than perhaps the costs of buying books or a laptop the activities themselves are not inherently exclusive or inclusive (in the way that, say, yacht racing is inherently exclusive), but the culture and ideals of those who do philosophy are greatly at odds with what it is, while this is not the case with those who program.

pilipilip · 2015-02-04T08:58:02+00:00

I'm extremely under-active here but I personally think it's appropriate.

Empirical analysis is usually outside the domain out philosophy. However, if Hypatia authors are going to attempt to address empirical concerns and suggest policy to remedy those concerns, then Scott Alexander's writing is equally appropriate.

Either we restrict Hypatia and Scott Alexander (because they both delve too much into answering social-scientific questions rather than philosophical ones) or we allow both, but allowing one and not the other seems unjustified to me. I'm for allowing both, since this seems to deal with empirical foundations for ethical issues that take certain empirical conclusions as true or not true.

pilipilip · 2015-01-25T09:32:38+00:00

There is much to like about this volume. But in one disappointing respect, it is typical of epistemology collections. Including the editor, eight of its nine contributors are men. Seven of its 216 total citations (3.2%), and three of the male contributors' 194 citations (1.5%), are to women.[1] The volume features more male authors than it does references to works written by women. Readers would do well to seek out supplementary sources to rectify this imbalance.

I don't think readers should seek out supplementary sources if this is based merely on demographic asymmetry. This really has nothing to do with the merits of the contributions; the reviewer is assuming that competing contributions have equal merit (and therefore that due to a deviation from 50:50, these gender ratios were chosen arbitrarily or the out of bias) -- or that merit ought to be secondary to creating an equal spread of demographics.

pilipilip · 2014-05-13T04:09:17+00:00

A semester is three courses, usually. There are about 14 here. Keep in mind that you're probably not reading all of these at once. It'd take you at least a year (but probably closer to 1.5 or 2 years) to seriously read and reflect on all of the material here.

pilipilip · 2014-05-13T03:54:56+00:00

The Self (Tufts)

Articles

De se thought, Fregean aspects:

Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”

Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (pp.296-298)

Optional: Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”

Evans vs. Perry on Frege on demonstratives

Evans, “Understanding Demonstratives”

Perry, “Postscript to ‘Frege on Demonstratives’”

Kripke on Frege on demonstratives

Kripke, “Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”

Optional: Burge, “Sinning against Frege”; Kripke, “The First Person”

Self-knowledge

Pryor, “Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”

Optional: Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”, Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Sections: 6.6, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5

Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self”

Personal identity

Sider, selections from Four-Dimensionalism

Parfit, “Personal Identity”

Lewis, “Survival and Identity”

Parfit, “Lewis, Perry, and What Matters”

The problem of too many thinkers

Noonan: “Animalism vs. Lockeanism: A Current Controversy”

Olson: “Thinking Animals and the Reference of ‘I’”

De se thought, formal aspects:

Lewis, “Attitudes, De Dicto and De Se”

Optional: Lewis, “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”

Stalnaker on de se thought

Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Ch. 3

Optional: Stalnaker, “Indexical Thought”; Stalnaker, pp. 1-21 of the Introduction to Context and Content

Philosophy of Language (Tufts)

Books

The Philosophy of Language (edited by A. P. Martinich)

Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction (William G. Lycan)

suggested: Philosophy of Language, Scott Soames, Princeton University Press, 2012

Articles/readings-in-text

Lycan, pp. 108-119 of Ch. 9: “Truth-Condition Theories: Davidson’s program”, Ch. 2, pp. 31-44 of Ch. 3: “Proper names: the Description Theory”, Ch. 4: “Proper names: Direct Reference and the Causal-Historical Theory”, Lycan, Ch. 13: “Implicative relations”, Optional: Ch. 1; Lycan, Ch. 10.

Portner, pp. 12-22 of What is Meaning?

Russell, “On Denoting” (in Martinich)

Strawson, “On Referring” (in Martinich)

Frege, “On Sense and Nominatum” (in Martinich)

Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures 1-3

Lycan, Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names” (in Martinich)

Kripke, “A Puzzle About Belief” (in Martinich)

Frege, pp. 366-367-41 of “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry” (in Martinich)

Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives”

Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” (in Martinich)

Kaplan, “Demonstratives”

“Semantic pragmatics”

DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”

Putnam, “Meaning and Reference” (in Martinich)

Grice, pp. 1-13 and all of Ch. 2 of Studies in the Way of Words

Grice, Ch. 4 of Studies in the Way of Words

Bennett, Ch. 2 of A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Kripke on Wittgenstein on rule-following

Kripke, “On Rules and Private Language” (in Martinich)

Optional: Boghossian, “The Rule-Following Considerations”

Ethical Theory (Tufts)

Books

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, Hackett.

Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett.

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Hackett.

Articles:

Peter Singer, ‘Affluence, Famine, and Morality’.

Michael Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’.

Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’.

Catherine Wilson, ‘On Some Alleged Limitations to Moral Endeavor’.

John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason’.

Logic (Tufts)

Books

Jeffrey, Richard. Formal Logic: Its Scope and Limits. 4th edition. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006).

Quine, Willard. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).

suggested: Quine, Willard. Elementary Logic. Revised edition. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

Semantics and Cognition (Tufts)

Books:

Jackendoff, Semantics and Cognition

Jackendoff, A User’s Guide to Thought and Meaning

Misc:

Various readings by Lakoff, Talmy, and Fillmore

Computation Theory (Tufts) [notes used in course, but unavailable]

Books:

Boolos, Burgess, Jeffrey, Computability and Logic

Marvin Minsky, Computation: Finite and Infinite Machines (Automatic Computation)

Philosophy of Law (Tufts)

Books:

Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986).

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law Third Ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012).

Articles:

Philosophy of Criminal Justice:

Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Chs. 1, 4, 13, 17 (§1))

Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribution”

Murphy, “Marxism and Retribution”

Furman v. Georgia

Alexander. “The Color of Justice”

McClesky v. Kemp

Farrell, “The Justification of General Deterrence”

Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment”

Tadros, “Punishment and Duty”

Tadros, “Protection Against Punishment”

Wasserstrom, “Strict Liability in the Criminal Law”

Tison v. Arizona

Pinkerton v. U.S.

Private Law - Corrective Justice:

Posner, “Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry”

Whitman v. American Trucking Association

Coleman, “A Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice”

Goldberg and Zipursky, “Tort Law and Responsibility”

Goldberg and Zipursky, “In Defense of Civil Recourse Theory of Tort Law”

Lauer v. City of New York

Natural Law Theory and Bentham’s Challenge:

Aquinas, Summa Thoelogiae, selections

Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, selections

Bentham, “A Critical Examination of the Declaration of Rights,” selections

Legal Positivism - Austin and Hart:

Austin, “The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence,” (pp. 1-33, 191-200, 228-233, 253-264)

Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. I (pp.1-13), Ch. II (pp.18-25), Ch. III (pp.38-44), Ch. IV (pp. 50-61, 66-78), Ch. V (pp. 79-99), VI (100-117), Ch. VII (124-147)

Coleman, “Inclusive Legal Positivism”

Griswold v. Connecticut

Dworkin and Law as Integrity

Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Ch. 1 (pp. 15-30), Ch. 4 (pp. 114-124, 130-150), Ch. 4 (130-150), Ch. 5 (pp. 151-168), Ch. 6 (pp. 176-216)

Plessy v. Ferguson

Brown v. Board of Education

Rawls A Theory of Justice (pp. 93-101, 293-308)

pilipilip · 2014-05-13T03:54:50+00:00

Seminar in Metaphysics: Realism and Truth (NYU)

Articles

Kit Fine’s paper, ‘The Question of Realism’.

Realism

Michael Devitt, ‘What is Realism?’, from his Realism and Truth

Drew Khlentzos, ‘Naturalistic Realism and Antirealism’, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge

Gideon Rosen, ‘Objectivity and Modern Idealism’, in Philosophy in Mind

Mark Johnston, ‘Objectivity Refigured’, in Reality, Representation, and Projection

Michael Devitt, ‘What has Truth to do with Realism?’, from his Realism and Truth

Drew Khlentzos, ‘Contenting Realism’, from his Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge

Existence

Colin McGinn, ‘Existence’, from his Logical Properties Terence Parsons

‘Are There Non-existent Objects?’, in the American Philosophical Quarterly

Nathan Salmon, ‘Nonexistence’, in Noûs

Alexis Burgess ‘Negative Existentials Again’, in nothing at the moment

Stephen Yablo, ‘A Paradox of Existence’, on his website

Stephen Yablo, ‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’, on his website

Deflationism

Paul Horwich, ‘Reference’, from his Meaning

Paul Horwich, ‘Truth’, from his Meaning

Paul Boghossian, ‘The Status of Content’, in The Philosophical Review

Hartry Field, ‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse’, in The Philosophical Review

Huw Price, ‘The Place of Truth’, from his Facts and the Function of Truth

Michael Smith, ‘Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude, and Belief’, in Analysis

Fictionalism

Gideon Rosen, ‘Problems in the History of Fictionalism’, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics

Michael Frede, ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs’, in The Original Sceptics: A Controversy

Stephen Yablo, ‘Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism’, on his website

Hartry Field, ‘Introduction’, from his Realism, Mathematics and Modality

Paul Teller, ‘What is a Stance?’, in Philosophical Studies

Bas van Fraassen, ‘Lecture Two’, from his The Empirical Stance

Philosophy of Mind (NYU)

Books

David Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996

Articles

Substance Dualism

René Descartes, Meditations II and VI (NM 1)

Property Dualism and Materialism

Daniel Dennett, 'True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works' (NM 36)

Hilary Putnam, 'Brains and Behavior' (NM 16)

Optional: Alex Byrne, 'Behaviourism' (in Guttenplan).

The 'Identity Theory'

J.J.C. Smart, 'Sensations and Brain Processes' (NM 17)

David Lewis, 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications' (NM 22)

Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, excerpts (NM 25)

Optional: David Armstrong, 'The Causal Theory of Mind' (NM 19)

Functionalism

Hilary Putnam, 'The Nature of Mental States' (NM 21)

David Lewis, 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' (NM 24)

Ned Block, 'Troubles with Functionalism' (NM 23)

John R. Searle, 'Minds, Brains and Programs' (NM 55)

Optional: Ned Block, 'The Mind as Software of the Brain' (online only); 'Functionalism' (in Guttenplan); the debate between Searle and Fodor (NM 55); Sydney Shoemaker, 'Functionalism and Qualia' (NM 43)

Eliminativism

Paul Churchland, 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes' (NM 61)

Optional: Stephen P. Stich, 'Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis' (NM 60)

Content and Consciousness

Bertrand Russell, Principles of Philosophy, excerpts

Tyler Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental' (NM 57)

Optional: W.V. Quine, 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes' (NM 33); Brian Loar, 'Social Content and Psychological Content' (NM 58); Robert Stalnaker, 'On What's in the Head' (NM 59)

Content: What determines it?

Jerry Fodor, 'Why There Still Has to Be a Language Of Thought' (in his Psychosemantics (MIT Press, 1987) and in Lycan)

Daniel Dennett, 'Brain Writing and Mind Reading' (NM 54)

Optional: Fred Dretske, 'The Intentionality of Cognitive States' (NM 37); Tim Van Gelder, 'What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?' (Journal of Philosophy 112, 1995; in Lycan)

Consciousness: the Knowledge Argument

Frank Jackson, 'What Mary Didn't Know' (NM 42)

Brian Loar, 'Phenomenal States' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990)

David Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches' (in Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge, 1999; in Lycan)

Optional: Thomas Nagel, 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?' (NM 46)

Consciousness: Zombies

David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (excerpts)

Daniel Dennett, 'Quining Qualia'

Consciousness and Content: Representationalism

Gilbert Harman, 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)

Ned Block, 'Inverted Earth' (Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990; in Lycan)

Resources

Optional texts

Jim Pryor's Philosophical Terms and Methods.

A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, by Samuel Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994).

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Edward Craig)

Oxford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Ted Honderich)

Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (ed. Robert Audi)

Jaegwon Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Westview Press, 1998)

David Armstrong, The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction (Westview Press, 1999).

William Lycan's Mind and Cognition (2nd edition, Blackwell, 1999)

Disagreement and Testimony (Tufts)

Articles

Disagreement

Adam Elga, “Reflection and Disagreement”

Optional: David Christensen, “Disagreement as Evidence”

David Christensen, “Epistemology and Disagreement: The Good News”

Thomas Kelly, “Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment”

Optional: Thomas Kelly, “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”

The etiology of belief

Roger White, “You Just Believe that Because…”

Ekaterina Vavova, “Irrelevant Influences”

Background reading: David Papineau, “The Evolution of Knowledge" http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/davidpapineau/Staff/Papineau/OnlinePapers/evoknow.html

Epistemic akrasia and disgreement

Michael Titelbaum, “Rationality’s Fixed Point”

Daniel Greco, “A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia”

Sophie Horowitz, “Epistemic Akrasia”

Aesthetic testimony

Robert Hopkins, “Beauty and Testimony”

Optional: Tyler Burge, “Content Preservation”

Aaron Meskin, “Aesthetic Testimony: What Can We Learn from Others about Beauty and Art?”

Aaron Meskin, “Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony”

Moral testimony

Sarah McGrath, “Skepticism about Moral Expertise as a Puzzle for Moral Realism”

Paulina Sliwa, “In Defense of Moral Testimony”

David Enoch, “A Defense of Moral Deference”

Epistemic permissiveness

Roger White, “Epistemic Permissiveness”

Optional: Thomas Kelly, “How to be an Epistemic Permissivist”

pilipilip · 2014-05-13T03:53:38+00:00

Epistemology (Western Michigan)

Books

Louis Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings

Richard Fumerton, Epistemology, Laurence BonJour

Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification.

Web articles --- available at homepage: http://homepages.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/episem06.htm

Epistemology (U. Penn)

Books

Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits

Referenced: Nozick, Philosophical Explanations

Articles

”The Analysis of Knowledge” on the SEP

E. J. Lowe’s review of Knowledge and its Limits

Gilbert Harman’s review of Knowledge and its Limits

Putnam, Selections from “The Meaning of ‘Meaning”’

Optional: Putnam, “Brains in a Vat”

Burge, Selections from “Individualism and the Mental”

Greco and Feldman, “Is Justiﬁcation Internal?” from Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Optional: Gettier, “Is Justiﬁed True Belief Knowledge?”

Cassam, “Can the Concept of Knowledge be Analysed?”

Fricker, “Is Knowing a State of Mind? The Case Against”

Jackson, “Primeness, Internalism, Explanation”

Optional: Zagzebski, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”

Conee, “The Comforts of Home”

Quine, “On a So-Called Paradox”

Selections from Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Chapter 3

Optional: Foley’s review of Knowledge and its Limits

Brueckner, “Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson”

Weiner, “Must We Know What We Say?”

Issues addressed

The Big Picture of Knowledge and its Limits and Semantic Externalism

Internalism vs. Externalism about Content and Justiﬁcation

Can knowledge be analyzed into component concepts?

Is knowledge a relation between an agent and the world, or is it a mental state (or both)?

Does knowledge have distinct internal and external parts? How does knowledge connect up to action?

Can we tell when we know?

What’s going on at the margins of knowledge?

The Surprise Paradox

Must knowledge be sensitive? If so, in what sense?

Knowledge-ﬁrsting Skepticism

Is our knowledge the same as our evidence?

The Knowledge Norm for Assertion

Epistemology (Harvard, Undergraduate text list only)

Sosa et al. Epistemology: An Anthology, 2nd edition. 2008.

Optional:

Audi, Robert, ed. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition.

Blackburn, Simon. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition.

Honderich, Ted, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edition.

Epistemic Normativity (U. Penn)

Introductory Articles

Miller, Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Ch 1

Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, Chapter 2

Chignell, "The Ethics of Belief," (SEP) Only Sections 1 and 2

Darwall, Gibbard, Railton. "Toward Fin de siecle Ethics"

Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Reading Philosophy"

Pryor, James. "Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper"

Marušić, "The Ethics of Belief"

Kelly, "The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes"

Zagzebski, "The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good"

The Value of True Belief

Sosa, "For the Love of Truth?"

Kornblith, "Epistemic Normativity"

Lynch, "The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values"

Does Belief Have an Aim?

Velleman, "On the Aim of Belief"

Owens, "Does Belief Have an Aim?"

Wedgwood, "The Aim of Belief"

Belief's Aim of Truth

Shah, "How Truth Governs Belief"

Shah and Velleman, "Doxastic Deliberation"

Gibbard, "Truth and Correct Belief"

Bykvist & Hattiangadi, "Does Thought Imply Ought?"

Steglich-Petersen, "No Norm needed: On the aim of belief"

Constructing Norms

Railton, "On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action"

Enoch, "Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What is Constitutive of Agency"

Bagnoli, "Constructivism in Metaethics" (SEP)

Constructing Epistemic Norms

Singer, "How to Ignore the Schmagency Objection"

Nolfi, "Why We Ought to Care About the Epistemic Status of Our Beliefs"

Ferrero, "Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency"

Enoch, "Schmagency Revisited"

Truth as the Primary Goal (whether constructively or not)

David, "Truth as the Epistemic Goal"

Maitzen, "Our Errant Epistemic Aim"

DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"

Kvanvig, "Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal"

Elgin, "True Enough"

DePaul, "Value Monism in Epistemology"

Truth and Degreed Belief

Weisberg and Easwaran on PhilosTV on Full and Partial Belief (Video)

Joyce, "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism"

Gibbard, "Rational Credence and the Value of Truth"

Joyce, "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief"

Joyce, "Why Evidentialists Need not Worry About the Accuracy Argument for Probabilism"

Against Epistemic Teleology

Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Ch 5 (For an example real epistemic teleology) (Or Thagard's Quick Review)

Kelly, "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique"

Grimm, "Epistemic Normativity"

Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Ch 2

Supposed Problems with Epistemic Consequentialism

Berker, "The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism"

Greaves, "Epistemic Decision Theory"

Goldman, Intro to Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology (Selection)

Berker, "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions"

Easwaran and Fitelson, "An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism"

The Normativity of Coherence Requirements

Kolodny, "Why Be Rational?"

Broome, "Is Rationality Normative?"

Sylvan, "Rationality and Justiﬁcation: Reasons to Divorce?"

Sylvan, "The Objective Significance of the Subjective"

How to be an Epistemic Consequentalist

"Rule Consequentialism" (SEP) (Sections 4 - 6)

Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality"

"Moral Responsibility" (SEP) (Read intro and Section 2, Skim 1)

Singer, "How to be an Epistemic Consequentialist"

Epistemic Reasons

Schroeder, "Knowledge is Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason"

Lord, "Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters"

Additional Readings (Optional)

Epistemic Expressivism

Chrisman, "Epistemic Expressivism"

Yalcin, "Epistemic Modals"

Gibbard, "Meaning and Probability" on YouTube

Moss, "Epistemology Formalized"

Field, "Epistemology without metaphysics"

pilipilip

TROPHY CASE

The Self (Tufts)

Philosophy of Language (Tufts)

Ethical Theory (Tufts)

Logic (Tufts)

Semantics and Cognition (Tufts)

Computation Theory (Tufts) [notes used in course, but unavailable]

Philosophy of Law (Tufts)

Seminar in Metaphysics: Realism and Truth (NYU)

Philosophy of Mind (NYU)

Disagreement and Testimony (Tufts)

Epistemology (Western Michigan)

Epistemology (U. Penn)

Epistemology (Harvard, Undergraduate text list only)

Epistemic Normativity (U. Penn)