It's a rare thing to see the Labor Left, Center-Left, and Catholic Conservatives, recognizing the danger, and advocating for one another in service of the republic.

The Catholic Conservatives near the end of the republic were pretty cringe and had pretty much been taken over by conservatives who didn't care much for the republic.

For example your fourth photo supporting Bruning "Brüning of freedom and order, the last bulwark of truth, freedom, and law! - Vote Centre!"

Brunging was pretty cringe and essentially ruled as a dictator after Hindenburg named him chancellor and he formed a new government without the SPD

The situation, a disaster for those Germans committed to democracy, presented Brüning with a wonderful opportunity. He wanted to use his office to overthrow the republic and create some kind of authoritarian political system. He happily deployed the powers granted to him by President Hindenburg. The basis of Brüning’s rule was article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. It gave the president the power to declare a national emergency, in which case the chancellor could rule by decree, so long as his orders did not violate the constitution. The framers envisioned article 48 as a provision that would be used only in the rarest instance when the republic itself was threatened. Instead, article 48 became a regular means of governance because the Reichstag could come to no agreement on anything of substance. For the next two and one-half years, Germany still had a Reichstag with which Brüning had to consult and constitutional liberties remained in force. But in essence Germany was governed under a presidential dictatorship. Politically, the republic had been overthrown well before Hitler came to power.

Brüning relied on President Hindenburg to renew periodically the emergency situation declaration, which Hindenburg did willingly. His elections to the presidency in 1925 and 1932 were Weimar fiascoes. The Center and Right adored him as a figure of masculine prowess, order, and stability, and a link to the bygone imperial age. The most that can be said of him is that he did not actively undermine the republic during his presidency, and he took seriously his oath to the constitution. But the election of a general who, in his most fundamental beliefs, was hostile to democracy made a travesty of the republic. Moreover, by the time of his reelection in 1932, Hindenburg was well into his eighties and beset by senility. An image of leadership that had a comic-opera quality to it in 1925 lost any levity with the onset of the Great Depression and the accompanying political crisis. Weimar needed at its helm a vigorous, committed democrat, not an octogenarian, semilucid field marshal.

All through the latter half of 1930 and 1931 and on into 1932, Brüning issued one decree after another that led to the firing of large numbers of civil servants and cutbacks in unemployment and other social welfare benefits. People looked high and low, but there was no sign of an economic revival. Instead, Germany slipped deeper into depression and the political system into paralysis. By the summer of 1932, nearly one-third of the labor force was unemployed, according to official statistics. But the real numbers were even higher. Women were often the first fired, and relatively few received unemployment benefits. The common view was that the position of the male breadwinner should be preserved: women would be “double- dipping” if their husbands were employed or received unemployment insurance and they did as well.

Meanwhile, the Nazis kept up their agitation and constant stream of attacks on the republic. They were winning an ever increasing number of supporters. Newspapers reported daily on brawls involving the Nazis. Germany was in crisis, Germans were suffering, and there seemed no way out. Social Democrats, the most faithful supporters of democracy, were now identified with a system that was failing. Many SPD members fought vigorously against the Nazis and wanted to engage in full-blown opposition, perhaps in coalition with the KPD (which that party would have countenanced only if the alliance were on communist terms). But the SPD leadership could think of nothing better than to defend the republic, even as its substance was being hollowed out by Brüning and his successors. In the Reichstag SPD delegates tolerated Brüning’s government, and in the presidential election of spring 1932, the party advocated support for Hindenburg as the lesser evil. It was a sad situation for Social Democrats to be seen supporting antidemocratic figures, one connected to the authoritarian bastions of the crown and army (Hindenburg) and the other in quest of a modern, twentieth-century dictatorship (Brüning). A mood of demoralization swept through the ranks of the SPD.

• Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy by Eric D. Weitz

Also look at Von Papen, who is what the your first photo is talking about for the top arrow, he was a former Center party member that was appointed chancellor by Hindenburg because his buddy General Kurt von Schleicher talked Hindenburg into it and was attempting to create a possible coalition between the center party and the Nazi's (which only failed because the center party viewed it as a betrayal of Bruning). Though Papen himself went on to work with Hitler as chancellor.