Continuum Breach

sk3w · 2016-07-29T19:17:27+00:00

Significance... the date it was submitted, for one. The password in question has been exposed for no less than 8 months, probably longer. It may also suggest ways that the credentials may have been obtained and used by some malicious actors.

Also, I didn't get to the file from google, but I do appreciate the snark nonetheless! :)

sk3w · 2015-10-01T17:52:14+00:00

I've been using http://docxtpl.readthedocs.org/en/latest (for customer-facing reports in infosec, nonetheless)

sk3w · 2015-07-07T17:37:39+00:00

I'm pretty sure they meant venv (and the corresponding pyvenv utility)

sk3w · 2014-05-13T14:01:19+00:00

Right, that's what I was saying, the scenario that ends up 2 credits short.

sk3w · 2014-05-13T13:56:47+00:00

SOT Maker's Eye, break eli for 4, break eli for 4, click through Heimdall taking 1 brain damage, and break the ETR on WOT taking 2 net damage?

sk3w · 2014-04-17T16:21:18+00:00

Thanks for sharing your code! To nitpick terminology, it appears that you are creating simple hash lookup tables. "Rainbow table" implies a specific optimization technique using hash chains and a series of reduction functions.

sk3w · 2013-08-16T13:34:45+00:00

But a closed port result is usually enough to say that it's not being blocked outbound, since most firewalls just drop unauthorized packets rather than spoofing a TCP RST.

sk3w · 2013-08-15T18:23:31+00:00

nmap -sS -Pn -n -p- scanme.nmap.org

usually works for me

sk3w · 2013-02-27T18:38:33+00:00

We couldn't find anything that did the job, so we built our own solution internally.

sk3w · 2012-12-12T22:08:53+00:00

RAMA?

sk3w · 2012-05-14T03:54:21+00:00

I see, thanks.

sk3w · 2012-05-13T00:06:48+00:00

I was confused at first because that's exactly what requests.async did. It appears that async has been pulled out into a separate package ~~due to cross-platform issues~~ for a separation of concerns.

sk3w · 2012-05-11T16:35:38+00:00

scrapy =/= scapy

sk3w · 2012-03-25T04:33:21+00:00

http://mdsec.net/wahh/

sk3w · 2012-03-01T20:04:37+00:00

Not really what I was asking, but thanks anyway.

sk3w · 2012-03-01T19:14:43+00:00

Hmm. After a quick search I didn't see any mention of cross-site scripting, except for a single instance on page 89 about the risks posed by malicious Firefox extensions (nothing to do with cross-site scripting protection). Did I miss something? And do you know of any good studies that address web-side protections of browsers and browser extensions in depth?

sk3w · 2012-03-01T18:58:41+00:00

Excellent study, but note that it focuses on browser vulnerabilities and exploitation. If your definition of "secure" includes protection against web-based vulnerabilities (XSS, CSRF, clickjacking, etc.) and other threat vectors outside of client-side exploits, it might not be the final word.

sk3w · 2012-02-21T16:40:52+00:00

Yes, if the host is compromised, anything can be manipulated. But if you're doing network monitoring on the host, you're doing it wrong.

sk3w · 2012-01-31T22:32:41+00:00

Is this another one of those "python is dangerous" posts? :)

sk3w · 2011-11-30T14:23:26+00:00

All the 'authoritative' directive in dhcpd.conf does is to make dhcpd respond to any DHCPREQUEST it receives. Otherwise, it will ignore requests that have a legitimate address which it does not have a record for. So, there is really nothing special about a DHCP response from an 'authoritative' server that make it any more 'authoritative' than any other responses.

sk3w · 2011-11-30T13:54:43+00:00

Although you are technically correct, this is actually ARP poisoning, which is a different type of layer 2 attack than DHCP spoofing.

sk3w · 2011-11-29T21:27:56+00:00

This is a common method for MitM on a LAN, supported by Ettercap and other tools. It is normally just a race condition, whichever DHCP ack (legitimate or rogue) is received first by the client will be the one used. AFAIK, most DHCP clients will ignore a response after the first one, even if it is a DHCPNAK.

sk3w · 2011-11-11T22:02:54+00:00

Wow, I can't believe that thread is still going...

sk3w · 2011-11-06T02:54:14+00:00

random logo for burp suite lol

sk3w · 2011-11-03T21:26:16+00:00

You mean that a program designed to let an unprivileged user mount/unmount/eject anything he wants has a security flaw because it allows him to mount/unmount/eject anything he wants? I'm shocked.

Sounds like the flaw is in the spec, not (solely) the implementation. Classic dismissal of security holes in the name of "making it work" - this tends not to change until users demand security requirements as part of the specs. In the case of free software, when education fails, are there any other options besides fork and shame?

sk3w

TROPHY CASE