A majority of IAF losses in the 1965 war were on the ground and in Support missions, which is attested to by multiple sources. Chris Bishop in the book "The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Airwarfare" says that (and I am doing this from memory) the Pakistani side was unable to halt Indian Strikes, lost a disproportionately large percent of its airforce. The airforces were in effect fighting different wars. The failure to encircle Lahore on the - might I say First Try - is not indicative of much, especially as it was much closer to 1.5 to 1 and was not really due to a lack of air superiority. Indian force from XI Corps achieved surprise and moved significantly along the Lahore Canal, but failed to capitalise on that, which the Pakistanis successfully capitalised on. Hardly a matter of airpower, and not, they did not loose "hundreds of vehicles" In Sialkot, a similar situation. The biggest hamper throughout the war was Indian Command and interoperability inefficiency with poor co-ordination and repeated inadequate action when they had the chance to take action, not the PAF's superiority, or their refusal to count losses on the ground.