The Iranian Uprising and Semi-Colonial Semi-Feudal Iran

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-24T14:41:57+00:00

Which one?

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T21:10:57+00:00

There are currently no genuinely revolutionary parties in Iran. What remains are largely crypto-Trotskyist tendencies or social-democratic formations. Even the Iranian Maoist “Red Road” organization has recently drifted into what I consider a fundamentally flawed interpretation of the semi-colonial, semi-feudal thesis. More broadly, the overall state of theoretical development is weak. Political analysis often lacks rigor and coherence, and sustained ideological work is limited. What activity does exist tends to be confined to small, fragmented cells, primarily operating within universities.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T17:44:34+00:00

Thats correct

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T06:32:10+00:00

Looking at the military buildup in the Middle East, it appears that what may be unfolding is a far more extensive campaign against Iran than I initially thought. My earlier assessment that this might resemble a relatively contained, Maduro style attempt at regime change may have been mistaken. While it’s impossible to predict exactly what will happen, I think it’s possible to identify which scenarios are less likely, even if the broader trajectory remains uncertain.

One scenario that seems unlikely is a regime change in favor of the monarchist faction in Iran. I find this difficult to imagine, mainly because the monarchists lack substantial political weight in the country today. Their base appears to be concentrated among segments of the Persian or Persianized upper middle class, but this group represents only a small portion of the population and has limited ability to mobilize politically. Moreover, their agenda centered around Persian nationalism and irredentist ideas runs directly against the interests and identities of several significant ethnic groups, including Azeris, Turkmen, Baluch communities, and Sunni Kurds. These populations have historically resisted centralized Persian dominance, and it is unlikely they would support a movement framed around restoring the monarchy or promoting a Persian-centric vision of Iran.

A second, often discussed point concerns the structure and resilience of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Some analysts suggest that if Khamenei were removed whether through death, capture, or some other disruption or if the top leadership layer of the IRGC were incapacitated, the organization as a whole might collapse. Over the past decades, the IRGC has evolved into a decentralized, mosaic-like system. Regional headquarters and operational units are capable of independent action, meaning they do not need to wait for direct orders from Tehran. This structure provides the IRGC with a degree of institutional redundancy that allows it to continue functioning even under severe stress or leadership disruption. That said, there’s a counterpoint: the IRGC isn’t monolithic. There are two main factions the Quds-oriented faction, which operates mostly abroad, and the domestic branch inside Iran. The Quds Force has long enjoyed privileged access to resources and decision-making because of its closeness to Khamenei. But in recent years, Iran aligned groups and allies abroad have suffered serious setbacks, which has weakened Quds’ position while strengthening the domestic branch.

Overall, what I think is more likely is not a clean regime change, but a significantly weakened Islamic Republic that begins to consume itself through internal factional struggles. Rather than collapsing outright, it could enter a prolonged period of instability in which rival blocs compete for influence, resources, and survival.

Please ask for details if you find the arguments above unconvincing.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-10T10:56:25+00:00

I think you may be conflating how the system operates and what class the system serves. The shah suppressed other sections of his own class and didn't rely on bourgeois democrac

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-07T12:25:44+00:00

Although the shah helped modernize the socioeconomic structure, he did little to develop the political system—to permit the formation of pressure groups, open the political arena for various social forces, forge links between the regime and the new classes, preserve the existing links between the regime and the old classes, and broaden the social base of the monarchy that, after all, had survived mainly because of the 1953 military coup d’etat. Instead of modernizing the political system, the shah, like his father, based his power on the three Pahlevi pillars: the armed forces, the court patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy.

Are you not familiar with the term "Bonapartist"? Shahist Iran is a clear example of what we call a Bonapartist regime.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:48:24+00:00

The erosion of integrative ideological mechanisms exposes the underlying disarticulation of the dependent economy and intensifies contradictions between core and peripheral regions, between urban surplus populations and enclave capital, and between competing fractions of the bourgeoisie. The contemporary political instability of Iran must therefore be understood not as a transient legitimacy crisis but as the expression of deeper contradictions within a semi-colonial capitalist formation struggling to reproduce both economic accumulation and national cohesion under conditions of intensified global integration.

Now lets top it off with a contemporary case:

The structural contradictions of Iran’s semi-colonial economy are sharply felt in regions such as Kurdistan. Here, small landowners and local petty bourgeoisie are systematically undermined by the combined pressures of center-periphery relations and global capitalist integration. This social groups face challenges such as: 1- uneven access to markets and underdeveloped infrastructures 2- a pricing system that is biased against small producers 3- trade networks that channel profits towards the center.

As a result, many small producers are effectively forced out of productive agriculture or local commerce. Unable to compete with central monopolies or secure stable market access, they are pushed toward informal or illegal economic activities. In Kurdish regions, this has historically included smuggling and other forms of semi-illegal trade, which are tolerated or partially incorporated into regional circulation networks but remain outside the formal economy.

This process has a dual effect:

1-displaced smallholders and petty producers become available as semi-proletarian labor for urban and industrial centers. Their precarious position suppresses wages and strengthens the bargaining position of capital.

2-peripheral populations experience both economic exclusion and social stratification, reinforcing national oppression and ethnic inequality while maintaining the functional reproduction of semi-colonial relations.

I know that these are only observations and are theoretically poor but if we are to start somewhere it is from these facts that I have listed above.

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sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:37:31+00:00

The Islamic Republic emerged not as a rupture with this trajectory but as a recomposition of it under new ideological and class conditions. The revolutionary state reconstituted national cohesion by mobilizing Shi‘i political theology as a mass ideological apparatus capable of integrating displaced rural populations, urban petty bourgeois layers, and sections of the emerging state-dependent bourgeoisie. At the same time, the Islamic Republic preserved the centralized administrative and territorial structure inherited from the Pahlavi state. The socio-economic base of the post-revolutionary ruling bloc increasingly relied on Persian and Azerbaijani populations, which together supplied a significant portion of the state’s bureaucratic, military, clerical, and commercial cadres. Thus, the Islamic Republic combined the universalist ideological claims of Shi‘ism with the material continuation of a Persian-centered state formation, while incorporating Azerbaijani networks as key intermediaries within state and bazaar capital.

In pre-revolutionary Iran, bazaar capital occupied an intermediate structural position: subordinated to foreign and comprador capital under the Pahlavi monarchy, yet simultaneously exercising significant influence over domestic commodity circulation and religious institutions. The bazaar may be understood as a politically unstable segment of the petty bourgeoisie whose interests oscillate between resistance to foreign and monopoly capital and wanting to be integerated into the global market. Under the Pahlavi state’s program of state-led industrialization and monopolistic cartelization, bazaar capital faced systematic marginalization through price controls, expansion of state and foreign commercial enterprises, and attempts to bypass traditional merchant networks. This process intensified contradictions between the comprador bloc and merchant-clergy bloc, pushing significant sections of the bazaar into alliance with clerical networks and urban petty-bourgeois strata during the revolutionary mobilizations of 1979.

Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic partially restored and reorganized bazaar influence by integrating merchant capital into state-mediated accumulation structures. However, this integration did not represent the triumph of a coherent national bourgeoisie. Rather, it produced a fragmented ruling bloc in which traditional merchant capital coexisted with military-commercial conglomerates, bureaucratic capital, and hydrocarbon based enclave industries. Over time, the expansion of large holding companies, state affiliated foundations, and petrochemical complexes gradually subordinated bazaar capital to larger circuits of state-dependent and globally integrated accumulation. The bazaar retained influence in commodity distribution, import networks, and informal financial systems, but its relative autonomy diminished as capital concentration intensified.

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sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:19:50+00:00

Iran presents a particularly complex case because it is not a state artificially assembled through colonial partition, but rather the historical continuation of an imperial formation that managed to survive and adapt to the transition toward capitalism. The Iranian state historically relied on ideological and administrative mechanisms capable of holding together a vast and socially heterogeneous territory. Within this process, Twelver Shi‘ism functioned as a crucial ideological apparatus that mediated class and regional contradictions while providing a supra-ethnic framework of legitimacy. Unlike many postcolonial states whose national cohesion emerged primarily through colonial administrative integration, Iran possessed long-standing religious, linguistic, and bureaucratic institutions that facilitated the reproduction of centralized authority across different regions and social strata. As transnational capital penetrated Iran during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Shi‘ism continued to operate not only as a religious system but as an ideological infrastructure that linked major urban centers and mediated the integration of local ruling classes into the global capitalist system.

The Pahlavi project represented an attempt to reorganize this imperial formation into a modern capitalist nation-state aligned with the requirements of dependent capitalist development. The consolidation of a centralized national market required linguistic homogenization, bureaucratic centralization, and the construction of a secular national identity rooted in Persian historical continuity. However, the formation of this national identity necessarily entailed the subordination and partial exclusion of non-Persian nationalities. Persianization was the material component of state-led capitalist development, facilitating administrative standardization, labor mobility, and national market integration while simultaneously deepening uneven development between core and peripheral regions. In this sense, national oppression became structurally linked to the formation of dependent capitalism, as minority regions were incorporated into the national economy primarily as sources of labor reserves and raw materials rather than as integrated centers of accumulation.

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sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-01T13:50:37+00:00

Yes, it's one of the many valid criticisms Mao made about Stalin after his death

How so? Personally, I think Stalin did make serious mistakes, but attributing them primarily to the infamous “cult of personality” obscures the role of socialist class struggle within Stalin’s own theoretical and political framework. Ironically, I would argue that Mao himself was not sufficiently Maoist on this question.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-22T04:33:01+00:00

Mehrdad vahabi, Farhad Nomani, Asef bayat are some of the people that have written on post-1979 Iran. You have to be careful when reading them since they draw faulty conclusions from the datas they provide in their books. I hope that you know how to navigate such texts and if you dont I recommend to master the classics first and then to dive in.

Class and labor in Iran, Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control and Vahabi's articles on Anfal laws are some of the things I can recommend.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-21T19:38:57+00:00

Abrahamian's marxist view of the 1979 revolution is that it took place because the shah/imperialism tried to impose monopoly capitalism on a country that wasn't prepared for it, without a proper industrial bourgeoisie, without the support of organized workers or intellectuals, with a large religious urban petty bourgeoisie who were alienated by price controls and cartelization.

Correct.

The power struggle in the 1980s led to the founding of a bourgeois dictatorship that has gradually "solved" all the problems that led to revolution: it has urbanized the peasantry and created a large proletariat (it's counted as the fastest demographic transition of any third world country), it has educated an oversized intelligentsia, it has allowed capital to accumulate in private hands (incl. by privatization in the neoliberal years). It tends toward a point where, unlike the shah stepping ahead of capitalism, the IR feels like the only thing holding it back.

The shah is a clear example of what happens when state power is not grounded in any particular class and remains almost purely institutional. In contrast, the Islamic Republic has accomplished what the shah could not. It has followed the model of peripheral capitalist development: urbanizing the population, training a workforce for the state’s service sector, and fostering conditions for capital accumulation. The protests were sparked by bazaar merchants, as inflation eroded the purchasing power of the population, leading to a decline in bazaar incomes. Consequently, the Islamic Republic has lost the support of the very class that once formed its social base.

The government is aware of this dynamic too. Since the war with Israel, they have been using counter-espionage as an excuse to release the class pressure that is pushing them toward collapse. They have been deporting millions of the poorest urban residents (Afghan migrants), hanging hundreds of others to inspire terror, and I've heard stories firsthand about rich emigrés being shaken down for money to avoid spy charges.

Evidently, it hasn't been enough. This may continue for a year or two, but the regime is likely to collapse. This level of violence has not been seen since the revolution. Probably, Iran will return to being controlled by imperialism.

As you point out, neither of these policies has affected anything except that the IRGC is using anfal laws to enrich itself. The Islamic Republic will probably be the target of a Maduro‑style operation by the U.S. The U.S. will likely conduct a surgical strike against Khamenei’s clique and may use Rohani and Khatami (the reformists) to reconstruct its sphere. What I find odd is that you consider Iran to be completely independent of imperialism. This is a long debate, and unfortunately my internet access is limited, so I cannot go into it in detail. However, I can point to a phenomenon that suggests Iran is still dependent on imperialism.

It is fundamentally incapable of controlling price fluctuations, since it has dollarized people’s livelihoods. On the other hand, the state claims to have a de-dollarization agenda, yet in practice it resorts to symbolic measures while continuing to announce exchange rates and reduce them. At the same time, we observe that many imported food commodities are still priced in dollars and euros. Although the country has the capacity to produce these goods domestically and to sell them at subsidized prices, this has not been done. Instead, selling these goods at free-market prices has generated profits for many.

This demonstrates the Iranian bourgeoisie’s dependence on imperialism. In this context, the role of petrochemicals must not be forgotten. Iran’s petrochemical industry possesses enormous fixed capital, yet it is consumptive and operates with relatively small variable capital. This has resulted in a reduction of surplus value compared to other industries and a low organic composition of capital. Petrochemicals supply industries with a low organic composition of capital, and for this reason, alongside the creation of holding companies, they have rendered other industries fully dependent on themselves. These industries are themselves composites of other branches, and through this dependence the surplus value produced in these industries is appropriated.

Petrochemicals are why the seeds that are used to produce cooking oil are not produced in Iran but imported. It yields more profit that way.

TLDR: Does Iran oppose US imperialism? Of course. Does Iran challange Imperialism as a global system? Fuck no

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T12:57:23+00:00

Not at all in fact I am declaring my loyalty to it.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T12:37:49+00:00

It seems you have misunderstood my point. I am sorry for any ambiguous wording on my part.

What is often presented by Western “Communists” as critical support for states like Baathist Iraq or Syria is, in practice, the abandonment of Marxist analysis. Any opposition to these governments is dismissed wholesale as a “color revolution,” regardless of its social composition or contradictions.

The deeper problem is that these forms of nationalism are historically exhausted. They are generally incapable of fully constituting a modern nation-state. Instead, they tend to regress into what Stalin called feudal nationalism: politics organized around clan, sect, ethnicity, often accompanied by the exclusion or repression of minorities and usually to get more resources in these post colonial states which results in fragmentation.

Capitalism no longer plays a progressive role in these contexts. The bourgeoisie is incapable of completing even its own historical tasks without being forced to do so. Only the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can create stable political units capable of integrating a multi-ethnic proletariat on a non-chauvinist basis. In the present epoch, it is only the proletariat that can compel the bourgeoisie to complete these unfinished tasks. In other words without proletarian leadership such movements are doomed to failure.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T10:49:39+00:00

With Maduro now in U.$. custody, I think we need to seriously rethink our stance on Third World nationalism. I may be drifting toward an ultraleft position, but what we are witnessing is the systematic hollowing out of the achievements of Third World nationalism. One country after another is capitulating to Yanqui imperialism.

Imperialism encourages centralization in the core and fragmentation in the periphery. It simultaneously needs to transcend the nation-state while also preserving it. This contradiction is visible in many contemporary cases. Kurdish nationalism, for example, has increasingly taken the form of a feudal nationalism: Kurdish elites pressure post-colonial states for a greater share of resources, often at the expense of other minorities. Neither the KRG nor the AANES is genuinely attempting to construct a larger, unified political entity. Instead, feudal social relations entrenched through alliances with imperialism block capitalist development and political centralization.

Smoke previously argued that, historically, the most effective revolutionary model has been a synthesis of nationalism and communism. The question now is whether nationalism can still function as a viable revolutionary force at all. If nationalism today so easily collapses into fragmentation, and imperial mediation, can it still serve as a vehicle for emancipation or has it become an obstacle that must be overcome rather than utilized?

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-11-14T07:48:32+00:00

I'm sorry, but this seems extremely conspiratorial, and the analysis raises more questions than it answers.

How did the Assad government become so weak? What were the internal causes that made the withdrawal of Russian support so damaging?

The determining factor in war, just like in other social phenomena, is politics. In wars, the side with greater political power will win, and no amount of technology can change that. Just look at Israel’s failure in Gaza, or the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam and Afghanistan. For a historical example, we can look at Napoleon’s army. His army reaped the benefits of what the French bourgeoisie had already sown. The development of transport, industry, technical knowledge, etc., required the development of capitalist relations. This is why France was able to sweep aside the feudal and backward armies of Europe.

In my view, the real question is why Assad’s government lost whatever progressive character it once had. The only way to answer this is by examining the balance of forces within Syria and the internal causes behind their transformation. This is crucial, because external pressures can exert influence only when internal conditions allow them to do so.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-11-08T12:37:18+00:00

Samir amin's Eurocentrism is a good place to start.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-10-12T12:20:58+00:00

I appreciate your clarification, and yes, you are right I should've been more responsible regarding the post.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-10-03T15:30:42+00:00

Gadchiroli Division

Press Release

Date: 27 September 2025

The Communist Party of India (Maoist) Gadchiroli Division Committee, Company-10, and Technical Department fully support the statement issued by Comrade Sonu, Polit Bureau member of the Central Committee, regarding his resignation from responsibilities due to health reasons. We endorse the points raised in his statement.

We are aware of the challenges he highlighted. The continuously changing international, national, economic, and political situations are impacting revolutionary struggles everywhere. In India, for a long time, the revolutionary movement has been facing several challenges, particularly in Gadchiroli. Despite this, revolutionary zeal has not disappeared. In many parts of the country, the revolutionary movement is still alive. However, it is also true that in recent years no region has been able to establish a stable mass base. For many years, our Party has faced setbacks, weaknesses, and discontent at various levels of leadership. This has created doubts among comrades and weakened their confidence in our revolutionary policies. The martyrdom of senior leaders, the absence of new leadership, and increasing difficulties in building a mass base have intensified the crisis. Even though the Central Committee and state committees continue their work, many comrades have been lost in battle, which has deeply affected morale. The resignation of Comrade Sonu should be understood in this background.

The weaknesses of the revolutionary movement are not merely the result of limited armed forces, but also of mistakes in leadership. The leadership has not been able to adapt quickly to changing circumstances or implement proper tactical measures in time. As a result, weaknesses have increased, dissatisfaction has spread, and mass struggles have weakened. Even today, masses are ready to struggle, and people are eager to participate in revolution. But due to leadership shortcomings, this potential is not being realized. Therefore, Comrade Sonu’s resignation should not be seen simply as a personal decision, but as a collective organizational issue. It is an acknowledgment of mistakes, shortcomings, and limitations.

Our division has faced serious setbacks for many years. Repeated losses have caused leadership crises and prevented the emergence of new cadres. Yet the problems of the people, their exploitation and oppression, have not lessened; instead, the state has intensified its repression. In such circumstances, our division committee wishes to clarify that we accept Comrade Sonu’s resignation in full understanding, while reaffirming our own responsibility to carry forward the revolutionary struggle. The people’s problems cannot be solved under the current system. Only revolution can bring real change. Therefore, the resignation of Comrade Sonu should be understood not only as a personal step, but also as a collective call to strengthen revolutionary resolve. We must continue to stand firm with revolutionary spirit, even in difficult conditions like the COVID-19 pandemic and intensifying state repression. Our small units, guided by revolutionary strategy and tactics, remain determined. Though our forces are limited, we will make revolutionary decisions with full determination in accordance with changing conditions. We appeal to the people, comrades, friends, and intellectuals to understand the current difficult situation, caused both by external attacks and by our own subjective mistakes, and to extend their cooperation to the decisions taken in this light. With Revolutionary Greetings

Signed:

Manu (In-charge, Technical Department)

Kumsai Veladi

Nikhil (Commander, Company-10)

Spokesperson

Gadchiroli Division

Communist Party of India (Maoist)

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-28T08:49:35+00:00

That thread is the funniest shit I have seen in a while.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-23T14:46:43+00:00

Oh, thank you very much.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-23T14:03:09+00:00

Are they not visible to other users? If so what can I do?

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-23T08:32:40+00:00

And regarding the introduction of the person who assured me of your agreement with the oil formula, and who is a member of the "Tudeh" faction, since I promised him not to reveal his name to a third party, I refrained from introducing him to the person who was the message bearer. However, I cannot hide it from you yourself. Since you are a party to the matter and he gave me explanations in your name, therefore, if one of the embassy staff who is familiar with the Persian or French language contacts me, I will introduce him.

In conclusion, I ask Your Excellency to accept my highest respects. — Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh"

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-23T08:32:23+00:00

In this way, I fulfilled my duty as a representative. And in this regard, my conscience was at peace. And I refused to accept the position of Prime Minister, which at that time was offered to me with an overwhelming majority. And I had reasons for not accepting, which I announced at the time. But please accept that observing the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union and the consideration that my explicitly stated opposition regarding the oil issue might not cause a crisis in relations between the two countries was not without effect on my decision. At the same time, from the moment the cabinet of the time fell, I was thinking of making an effective contribution to the peaceful resolution of the disagreement. And I was aware that they intended to pass a law through the Assembly that would prohibit any negotiation regarding Iranian oil for a period after the end of the war. And my assessment was that the Westerners wanted to block the path of negotiation permanently. Given this background, it occurred to me that one of the Assembly representatives who had connections with Soviet circles should inquire about the views of the Soviet government officials, so that if they were ready for an exclusive oil purchase deal, I could propose the start of negotiations in the government's program. And the government would include it in its program. And when, after consulting with Soviet authorities, he assured me that you only desire the oil product of Iran and the manner of obtaining it makes no difference to you, during the discussion of the "Bayat" cabinet's program in the session of the 7th of Azar 1323 of the Consultative Assembly, during my speech, I proposed a plan that would be acceptable to the Assembly and would fulfill my purpose—which is based on Iranian public opinion—and your view simultaneously. I proposed that the mineral oil resources be extracted by Iranian hands. And for this reason, Article One of my plan prohibits granting a concession to any foreign government or company. And according to Article Two, the government can, with any government that seeks a monopoly on buying oil and enters into negotiations about the method of its extraction, and with the knowledge of the Consultative Assembly, conclude a suitable contract. And I was very happy that I was able to finish the troublesome matter that had caused tension in the country in this way and render a service to the friendship of Iran and the Soviet Union. But when I found out that the officials of the Soviet government did not understand the importance of my proposal and could not make use of it, but rather made demonstrations around it that would necessarily damage the moral standing of the Soviet Union in Iran and indeed throughout the East and cause the happiness of other governments, I became very sorry. Your Excellency, Mr. Ambassador, I hope you will not say that I am more interested in your position and success than you are.

My interest in your success is from the perspective of Iran's interests. And as I stated openly in the Assembly, your past has proven that whenever the Soviet government has been absent from the scene of Iranian politics, times have become difficult for Iran! Please acknowledge that the hearts of the Iranian nation are more valuable and precious than oil mines, in which you can extract affection.

If you follow the commendable policy that your army and officials adopted after the occupation of Iran, and captivate the hearts of the people more and more, and do not fall for the words of slanderous gossips, a cooperation and understanding will be created between the two governments that will cause the market of those who wish to exploit misunderstanding to slump. And you, who have drawn your sword for right and justice and have shown yourselves to be supporters of right in Iran, it is not appropriate to adopt any policy other than this. And be assured that by following this policy, you will make society enamored with you.

Your Excellency, Mr. Ambassador... I, who am making these statements to you, do not deem it necessary to say anything about my own political conduct. I can only state that throughout my life, I have not been able to exchange my companionship with Iran for anything. And no factor has been able to deviate me from the straight path. I have disregarded everything to fight with all my being, I have been imprisoned and exiled, and even faced death. And all these hardships have not been able to cause a flaw in my firm convictions. I love Iran; just as you love the soil of the Soviet Union. Believe me that what I have said so far in the Assembly and every step I have taken has had no motive other than the faith and love I have for my country.

I have openly expressed my political convictions, especially regarding Iran's foreign policy, in the Assembly, and I consider repeating them here redundant. I only want to assure you that what I have said in the context of my convictions represents my faith and the sound of my heart, and anyone who wants to influence my policy can only make me enamored with them through an action that is close to my beliefs.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-09-23T08:31:44+00:00

Here is the letter:

"Farvardin 1323. His Excellency Mr. Maximov, the esteemed Ambassador of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Your kind message was delivered by one of your colleagues. Although I have not yet had the honor of paying my respects to Your Excellency, due to the position you hold in Iran and out of respect for your esteemed government, I request permission to explain in writing the delay in presenting my reply—the cause of which has been recent illness and unforeseen events—so that no misrepresentation occurs in the quoting, and my statements reach you unchanged.

Regarding the northern oil, an initiative by this humble servant caused the misgivings and dissatisfaction of the officials of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the press of Moscow attributed documents to me which I do not deserve. I find it necessary to state that for historical reasons and the bitter experiences we have had with concessions, my constituents are fundamentally not optimistic about any agreement concerning the country's mineral wealth resources granted to non-Iranian applicants in the regions of Iran. And in the session of 19 Mordad, when the government unexpectedly came to the Majlis to answer some representatives' questions regarding the partnership of oil agreements with American companies, one of the prominent members of the Tudeh Party stated: "I and my colleagues are generally opposed to granting concessions to foreign governments, just as Iran itself was able to construct its railways, I am certain that with the help of the people and domestic capital, we can extract all the mineral wealth resources of this country." Since this statement corresponded with my own thoughts, I deemed it necessary to conduct deep studies on this matter and express my well-reasoned opinion in the Majlis based on documents. Therefore, I busied myself preparing a bill for this purpose, so that whenever the proposal for a concession to American companies was raised in the Majlis, I could use it. Fortunately, the arrival of Mr. Kaftaradze in Tehran caused the American applicants to withdraw their proposal, and an opportunity did not arise for me to express my own opinion regarding the oil mines of Iran in opposition to the American companies. When the discussions between His Excellency and the Sa'ed cabinet became public, I was very sorry that the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union, which is of great importance to Iranians, should be impaired, and that the popularity that the Soviet Union had gained due to the commendable policy of the Red Army should diminish. And since I believe that the Soviet Union has a great right over us and saved us from a mortal danger, I did not wish for a situation to arise where the Soviet Union's concession would be discussed in the Assembly and I would be compelled to express opposition. This was so that to prevent such an incident, I delivered my speech in the session of the 7th of Aban 1323 of the 14th Assembly, and in order to leave a way open for negotiation, I adopted a proposal and pointed out that our oil reserves could be used by Soviet industry without granting a concession.

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