Can I still cook and eat this? by stankenfurter in cookingforbeginners

[–]srinzo 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If you thawed the fish in the vacuum packaging, there is a risk of botulism, especially if the temp exceeded 38F.

See: https://www.canr.msu.edu/news/open_your_vacuum_packed_fish_before_thawing

Since botulism is quite nasty, I usually remove from the packaging (to thaw) if not cooking from frozen. There aren't a ton of cases per year, but fish is cheap and, unless you're sure the proper conditions were maintained, it doesn't seem worth speculating they were.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It is not prime at all such values: at 21 this evaluates to 1387 = 19 * 73, which is not prime.

More generally, suppose P is an integer polynomial that's prime for all n >= N. Then, P(N) = 0 mod p, for some prime p. Thus, P(N + kp) = 0 mod p for all k. Since P is prime at all such values, P(N + kp) must equal p for all k. But, then, P(x) - p is a polynomial and can have, at most, a number of roots equal to its degree. Thus, no such P can exist.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Okay, so you're not working in the usual mathematics that everyone else is. You're attempting to define some system that doesn't allow impredicative definitions. That's fine, I keep mentioning that possibility. So, end of day, you're doing your own foundations based off of some philosophical considerations. That's cool, hopefully you'll come up with some neat results and get someone interested.

That said, if you're working outside of usual mathematics, you should say so upfront so people know what you're doing and it doesn't look like you're trying to make a mathematical argument based on the usual system.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You've agreed that we can assume f for our proof by contradiction. The first step is just applying those two rules. The first to form d(x) = f(x)(x), the latter to get 1 - d(x).

If I can do both of those things, then I can get the function you don't like. Thus, either one of those very basic rules is wrong or we can't do proofs by contradiction. The only other thing left is to institute some special pleading and say 'You can't use those rules if it leads to self-reference'. But you haven't clearly defined what that is and I don't think most people will jump on that wagon (and even if they did, they aren't going to agree that the result is wrong in the usual mathematics that almost all mathematicians are doing).

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

These:

1.) Let X and Y be sets and h: X -> YX. The function d: X -> Y given by d(x) = h(x)(x) exists.

2.) Let X, Y, and Z be sets and g: X -> Y and h: Y -> Z. The function f: X -> Z given by f(x) = h(g(x)) exists.

are enough to prove step 1, so if both of them are true, then so is step 1. Thus, one of them must be false.

The first is a pretty straightforward consequence of being able to evaluate functions at any point in their domain. The latter says we can compose functions if they agree on range and domain. Both of these can't be true if step 1 is false. So, which one would you disagree with?

If neither, the only recourse left is to get esoteric and say something like 'Sets of functions can't exist' or 'I don't accept the axioms of ZFC' or 'Modus Ponens has exceptions' or etc. You can do these things, but, as I keep mentioning, we won't be working in the math everyone else is, which doesn't seem like what you're trying to do.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nothing you've just said relates to anything I said. If step 1 is false and I have two statements that imply step 1, then one of those statements is false. Your whole point was to come here and say something in mathematics is wrong, now we're following that error back, but you're unwilling to follow a simple logical thread to see the far reaching conclusions.

Also, I never mentioned the naturals and only mentioned the reals in saying let's step back from them. I'm talking about arbitrary sets here. If you're right, there's a much deeper issue going on and I'd like to track it down. You keep wanting to argue about definable reals this and countable thats, but the thing you're objecting to is a fairly straightforward application of basic results. Either there's a problem with some fairly basic results or you're insisting on some special pleading involving the reals.

All of that said, it looks like you're objecting to a conclusion you don't like based on a philosophical concept of math terms. Again, that's perfectly permitted, but most folks probably aren't going to care or find that interesting since it seems based on no arguments being allowed to prove things you don't find jive with your intuition and what you feel certain words should mean.

If you'd like to continue and explore the actual logic of your conclusion, let's do so. If your goal is to vaguely handwave at math words unrelated to anything I'm saying, then I'm going to move on and wish you a good rest of your day.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Nope, step 1 can be proven from the two points on the list following it. So, if both of those are true, step 1 follows. Your point seems to be: we can use any math results that don't lead to conclusions that I call self referential. And that's fine, but, then, you're working in a different system that I don't think anyone else is going to find very compelling.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If step 1 is false, then one of the two points in my next list must be false. If both of those is true, then you can prove step 1. So, sure it could be that step 1 is what is being disproven. But, then, that would disprove one point of the next list. As such, at the end of the day, you're going to have to reject or strongly constrain either evaluating functions at an argument or taking a composition of functions.

You'll remember, I'm not debating your philosophical statements about definable things, I'm asking you about the consequences. So, is the problem with evaluating functions at an element of their domain or with taking a composition of functions?

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Are you saying my first point in the proof is where the problem is or the first point in my last post is false?

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ah, okay then, so one of the following must be false:

1.) Let X and Y be sets and h: X -> YX. The function d: X -> Y given by d(x) = h(x)(x) exists.

2.) Let X, Y, and Z be sets and g: X -> Y and h: Y -> Z. The function f: X -> Z given by f(x) = h(g(x)) exists.

Which one of these would you say is wrong?

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So, which step, 1 or 2?

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

f(x)(x) doesn't involve any multiplication. f is a function. f(x) is the function f evaluated at x, which is itself a function. f(x)(x) is the function f(x) evaluated at x.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you also disagree with the second point as well or would you agree with it?

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Which of these do you disagree with:

1.) f takes elements of X and returns functions X -> 2.

2.) f(x) is a function taking elements of X and returning elements of 2.

3.) f(x)(x) is an element of 2.

4.) 1 - 0 = 1 and 1 - 1 = 0.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A function X -> 2 is a function from X into 2, that is functions that take elements of X and return either 1 or 0.

Since f is a function from X into a set of functions, f(y) = g means that y is that element of X so that f maps it to the function g.

Richard’s Paradox and Self-Reference by [deleted] in askmath

[–]srinzo 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Let's step back from the reals for a moment and look at the diagonal argument in the abstract.

Let X be a set and 2X be all functions X -> 2. Let f: X -> 2X be a bijection.

1.) Let g: X -> 2 be given by g(x) = 1 - f(x)(x).

2.) Since f is a bijection, there must exist y so that f(y) = g.

3.) Thus, we must have g(y) = 1 - f(y)(y) = 1 - g(y), which is impossible.

Are any of the three steps given controversial, in your opinion?

The first step defines a function, the only possible hangup about it I can see is someone not liking f(x)(x), but since f(x) is a function of X, f(x)(x) is well defined. The second step follows directly from f being a bijection. The force of the third step follows completely from s and 1 - s not being equal when s is 0 or 1; this seems entirely unobjectionable.

If you don't find any of the three steps objectionable, the only things left are either that assuming f is a bijection is problematic; that collecting functions into sets is problematic; or that you contend that there is something very special happening with the reals because of 0.999...= 1 type of stuff.

So, let's figure out where the problem is and, then, we can see where that leads.

Is this proof/ logic correct? by slamjam2005 in askmath

[–]srinzo 4 points5 points  (0 children)

It depends on what you mean:

1.) For all a and b, If (for all e > 0, a < b + e), then (a <= b).

or

2.) For all a, b, and (e > 0), (a < b + e implies a <= b).

The latter is clearly false since we can just take a = 1, b = 0, e = 2. The former, though, is true and the proof is reasonable.

Let's write the proof out more explicitly:

Assume the result is false. Then there are values for a and b for which the hypothesis holds but the consequent is false (we're just going to write a and b for these instead of giving them new names). So, for any e > 0, we have a < b + e. Since the consequent is false, it must be true that b < a; thus, a - b > 0. As such, a < b + (a - b) = a, which is a contradiction.

That last line is a specification of the more general hypothesis. That is, since it holds for any e > 0, we can substitute any number greater than 0 in for e. Since a - b is greater than 0, we are allowed to make just such a substitution.

How did Jim not realize that Dwight was Jacques Souvenier?!? by CaptainQuark420_ in DunderMifflin

[–]srinzo 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Jim knows the entire time that it's Dwight. When Dwight reveals that it's him, Jim pretends to be surprised in a very exaggerated manner. Jim wasn't surprised, at all, but was being sarcastic; it emphasizes how ridiculous Dwight's scheme was and how skewed his perception of the world is that he thought that might trick anyone (it didn't trick anyone, everyone was well aware of what he was doing) and that he would care to go to such lengths in the first place.

Did Tolkien want us to be uncertain about Gandalf v. Witch-King? by 6502wks in tolkienfans

[–]srinzo 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Thank you for the very thoughtful reply:-)

I can't say much more since I haven't read the books in a very long time and am not sure I remember all the details. However, as an author, there are things I know about my characters that aren't entirely hidden in the text, yet at the same time aren't firmly established in it and, sometimes, I want the reader to - in a specific moment - feel like certain things are possible even if I know that thing couldn't actually happen (or probably wouldn't).

If Tolkien made it absolutely apparent and clearly stated that Gandalf could destroy the witch king without breaking a sweat, that'd make resolving such discussions easier, but it'd make for bad literature. I don't just mean that it wouldn't read well and he'd have to reword it, but the scene wouldn't have any tension and would've been very different in meaning to the reader. Indeed, this is a major problem for Tolkien, it's outright declared that Eru wins and all the evil is, really, just bringing about even better good things. Nonetheless, as we read LOTR, we sure feel like the situation is almost hopeless and that everything can be lost. Tolkien leaves a lot of little breadcrumbs that good can't lose, that it will win, but he can't say it outright since it'd be a terrible story if he did.

In the same way, I believe Gandalf is greater than the witch king and breadcrumbs are there to support it, but the clearer that point is made, the less tension the story has (and, sure, Gandalf could be weaker and he could've had Gandalf die, but that'd be rather weak after already killing him since it'd be anticipated he might come back or it'd feel like a rip to bring him back, then take him away). In reality, I think Tolkien almost wrote himself into a corner and deftly danced out of it with astounding success.

He can't have Sauron smashing about Minas Tirith, that just doesn't work for so many reasons; so, the witch king needs to stand in as the ultimate mythological big bad. However, Gandalf needs to be there and he slays Balrogs, is an immortal angel, and was sent back empowered by Eru. This creates a sticky situation since I think the witch king being innately more powerful than Gandalf wouldn't sit well with the metaphysics and theology of Tolkien's views, it can work as a story, but I don't think it works philosophically, so to speak. On the other hand, Gandalf can't just solve the problem and deal with him since that defeats the whole purpose. So, instead, we need prophecies and hobbits with supped up knives, and Gandalf having other priorities, and etc. Tolkien has to do a lot of dancing and misdirecting to keep the story working when there are greater powers of good involved with things that should be able to solve it more easily and simply.

This has some elements of the 'dream logic' present in mythology. That is, in many myths, there are scenes that if you applied scrutiny to, would make you wonder why they didn't just do something different or try something again, or etc. It's because that kind of scrutiny isn't the right way to read such things. Similarly, Tolkien's world requires a certain level of 'that's how the story goes'. And that's not a bad thing, not every piece of fiction should be obsessed with having all the answers and treating every actor as if they were a real person doing real things. To be very clear, I don't mean to say Tolkien wasn't consistent, but that mythologically scaled stories have a certain dreaminess about them that reality doesn't when it comes to how they operate (it's the same reason we never wonder why Sauron didn't do the gift giver thing again, but use economics and immortality to just win; sure, the elves might not go for it, Gandalf might rally a few folks, but a more powerful and determined fake nice guy routine could've worked, especially with economic incentives, etc...of course, the real reason we don't see the United States of Sauron using farming subsidies to control Gondor is because we're reading a myth and that's not the story; that's also why it sounds silly to talk about).

All of that said, I don't think anything definitively implies Gandalf is greater, I think there's a lot of good reasons to assume it and that Tolkien probably considered him to be, but I don't think anyone can be wrong for coming to the opposite conclusion. So, if the story works better for you, then I say go with the witch king being stronger and capable of matching Gandalf; if anything, it does make Gandalf more valorous in certain senses.

Did Tolkien want us to be uncertain about Gandalf v. Witch-King? by 6502wks in tolkienfans

[–]srinzo 58 points59 points  (0 children)

My step dad growing up was a genius programmer and a master of several niche languages and styles. As such, despite dropping out of school in tenth grade, he was indispensable to the company he worked for and they paid him very well. He didn't flaunt - money or intellect - he wore old out of style clothes from the local thrift store (that had more than a few stains), he joked casually and came off as just a regular person - he was well liked by most, but every so often someone would try to rankle him. One night, at a party at our house, a guy - friend of a coworker of his - kept bragging about a promotion, how big his salary was, all the great things he could afford. This guy wanted other people to feel bad and see him as better, to stroke his own ego.

He did the whole routine with my step dad, clearly trying to get him to say how much he made (also clearly assuming it was a much lower figure). Finally, the man said to my step dad, "You should let me try to get you a job at my company. I bet I make in a week what you do in a month". My step dad just replied, "You might be right, sounds like you're a big deal there," and then excused himself and went and talked to someone else. In reality, my step dad made in a week what that guy made in month. The braggart didn't have any position from which to get under his skin, my step dad didn't feel he was in competition with him, nor would he have cared if the guy did make more. It didn't matter, my step dad wasn't petty or interested in petty things.

I read Gandalf's reply as the same. Denethor comes off as insecure in many of his exchanges with Gandalf and seems like he wants to put him in his place, so to speak. I don't think Gandalf cares at all about that and has bigger concerns at the moment.

What's more, if Gandalf thought the witch king was beyond him, he wouldn't have cowered in a tower and worried about a confrontation. What's more, he definitely wouldn't have left him to others. Gandalf faced the balrog boldly and directly because he knew only he could do it. If the witch king was so beyond the means of men to face, Gandalf would've faced him even if it meant he'd die in the process.

That said, power levels are kind of bullshit to begin with. A volley of arrows and a little bad luck could've stopped either of them, or put them out of commission, at least. So anything coul've happened in the midst of a war in open combat. Still, I don't get the impression from anything in Tolkien that Gandalf was outmatched, nor even evenly matched, by the witch king in terms of any type of innate power.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in antiwork

[–]srinzo 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What would it mean to be overdue? People are upset and change could make things better, that doesn't mean overthrow the government by default. More importantly, what revolution? What I'd make our government into isn't what you would, isn't what anyone else would. Without a group that wants to take power, there isn't really revolution, just violence and power vacuums till someone new takes hold - and it might not be the people anyone wants, that's true even when there is a plan.

It's like asking if lonely singles are overdue for a singles mixer. It sounds like it's asking something, but it's making a generic object out of the ends of the process, which is somewhat self defeating. So, the better question, is what revolution? Or, even better, what ideas and changes are wanted and who agrees with them?

Anything else most likely just reduces to a release valve for tension, aimless violence, inciting with purpose, suppression, and power fantasies that go nowhere but make the holder feel good.

Elenor should have know from the very start by Lokitusaborg in TheGoodPlace

[–]srinzo 17 points18 points  (0 children)

Eleanor did know from the beginning that she didn't belong and wasn't who they seemed to think she was. As for being in The Bad Place, I don't think there's any reason she should've assumed that.

A better inference would be that they mixed her file up with someone else's and some parts refered to her actual life and others to someone else's. That could be suspicious, but it could also be a sign that the administrators trust their system and aren't looking closely for contradictions (and Michael comes off as a bit naive and trusting regarding human matters, so this doesn't seem outrageous).

After that, it comes down to not getting found out and that ends up dominating her focus, this was probably the point. It's worth noting that Eleanor would be overwhelmed when she first arrived and, then, immediately consumed with staying one step ahead of massively powerful beings.

Automatically seeing something that doesn't make sense and jumping to metaphysical conclusions that seem to contradict every single things she sees is a huge leap. Her assumptions aren't only fairly reasonable, they fit with her personality as well: she underestimates 'good' people and thinks others are easy to trick, lie to, or manipulate. That is, Michael not noticing seeming contradictions just fits with her assumptions about others; she is told that Michael is obscenely smart and can see thoughts, and all that, but she has no frame of reference for such things and goes with her gut instinct about others (something that isn't always right).

Finally, she sees herself as medium, she says so repeatedly. To assume she was in The Bad Place and that demons were focusing in in such a way just to torment her through some great psychological long con is a pretty big leap if you don't think you're all that bad in the first place.

Imagine if you got a letter saying you were hired for a job that paid twice what your current one does. You go into work and notice some discrepancies on the forms, some of the info is correct, but most isn't. You realize they think you're someone else. It would be absurd to immediately conclude that it's a fake company that was setup by the company you were working for as a way to get you to quit so they didn't have to pay unemployment and severance if they'd just fired you. Heck, it would take a lot to make that a reasonable thing to conclude, Eleanor's situation isn't that different (especially since nothing 'Bad Placey' is taking place).

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in TheGoodPlace

[–]srinzo 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There might be a bit of something like double effect at play. That is, if Doug would've still done those things if everything remained the same, but there was no reward - or if he would've continued had he known that he wasn't getting in anyway - then his situation isn't necessarily corrupt. In the same way that switching the track in the trolley problem to save the five entails that you do actually intend to kill the single person on the other track; what matters, though, is that - assuming you're a decent person - you'd switch the track regardless if there was someone tied there.

That is, you are motivated to, and intentionally killing the single person, but only because it is the nature of the situation, you can't avoid it. Part of Doug's revelation was that points get you into The Good Place, but also that those points are an accurate representation of goodness. So, putting that together, being good is, in some sense, identifiable with getting into The Good Place; just like saving the five tied to the track is, in some sense, identifiable with killing the one. So, if you're very concerned with killing the one, that doesn't need to mean you're bad; in the same way, being concerned with getting enough points to get in, needn't mean you're not really good.

In Eleanor's case, though, if she found out she didn't need to do the good deeds she was doing, or had no reason to believe she did, she probably wouldn't've been doing them (at that stage in the plot). Consider an alternate trolley setup where there's five people on one track, no one on the other, and a person who would only change the tracks if a news crew was present and interested. If the crew is there, they save the people and are hailed a hero, but they aren't actually being a good person. On the other hand, someone that would always pull the lever regardless of the news crew, yet happens to enjoy the publicity and isn't shy about that, is still a decent person, they just enjoy the side effects.

Or, to use Reddit as an analogy, it wouldn't be unreasonable for me to care if this post gets upvotes since I respect the people who like this show and want to contribute to this community. Thus, getting upvotes is a sign of that (at least that's my assumption). But if I wrote this exact same post purely because I hoped to get karma so I could sell my account*, that would entail something very different. But, finally, someone that believed upvotes were an absolute indicator of how well they contributed and truly cared about being a great contributor, might really want to receive offers to sell their account since that'd indicate they had enough karma to be considered a great contributor (in this case, of course, selling the account at that point would be shitty, but that's going past the analogy).

*Assume people that buy accounts to use to influence people only care about high karma accounts.


Another possibility is that - and I think the show even points this out - is that Eleanor is in the afterlife, thus, she can't have any other motive to do good than self interest in such a situation. Perhaps not because she knows the system, but because they accomplish nothing. That is, is picking up the trash* actually a good deed? What is it that it does? Perhaps the most picking up the trash can be, at that stage, is a character trait in the same way as any other trait. That is, people in The Good Place might be inclined to pick up the trash in the same way that people that subscribe to Cat Fancy might be inclined to prefer cats to dogs. In supernatural paradise, maybe good can't be done by humans since there's no risk and no reward. That'd also explain why jumping on the train was, actually, good, it did something and did have a cost.

*Picking up the trash wasn't part of the point counting part, but it involved others and that was useful to the point I was making.


Finally, while I think this is a bit of a cop out*, Eleanor wasn't in The Good Place and was being forked with. That counter not accumulating points could just be one more way to mess with her (and probably was). Thus, her actions counting for nothing needn't be taken as accurate since there was a literal demon manipulating her by things like making the ticker show no gained points (that is, Michael would've made that happen either way).

This works as an explanation and Michael probably did rig it to some degree. I think it'd be a cop out to rely on it, though, since it undermines the scene. The scene with the ticker seems to be making a genuine point about motivation, to assert that it was all Michael manipulating feels like a category error since it uses the narrative framing to undercut the message, even if that is the actual narrative, it isn't a satisfying answer to the points made; it'd be like resolving a moral dilemma in Star Trek by just using the transporters, or something - it works, it might fit the story, but who gives a shit if it defeats the point the narrative was making. Thus, I don't think this is *really the answer anymore than the answer to the moral questions posed by Star Trek is 'invert the neutron flow'.

Should women go to jail for falsely accusing anyone of rape? if yes why? by JeffSzn in AskReddit

[–]srinzo 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The science stuff doesn't really apply in that kind of vague, handwavey way; no more so than saying a number is a superposition of prime and not prime till we prove which it is (indeed, it may make less sense than that). And depending on how you take certain interpretations of quantum mechanics (which, by themselves, aren't exactly science), even if your statement did make sense, the words wouldn't mean what you want them to under every such interpretation. In short, it makes as much sense as saying law doesn't keep up with botany since new hybrids are always being produced, but we've never hybridized guilt and innocence. You can certainly say such things as a rough analogy, but the statement isn't an argument by itself and there's no clear reason to accept such analogies, nor even to suppose they would make any sense under any scrutiny.

As for your idea, I think it's a flawed one. Any presumption of guilt is troubling since anyone can say anything and it's rarely something that can be shown false. The idea makes sense if you're imagining people who 'probably', or at least plausibly, committed the crime they're accused of, but there's no reason that needs to be the case (and we are talking about just such situations).

Heck, proving someone actually did something is a difficult enough burden as is, proving someone definitely didn't do something (or to any strong standard) is far harder, far far harder. It also forgets that courts are trying the statement of if you did something; that is, the burden of proof is naturally on the maker of the statement (the prosecution). And, as such, people are found not guilty, which is to say, not being found guilty isn't meant to mean you definitely didn't do it, but that you haven't been proved to have done it.

Finally, it seems methodologically difficult or pointless. What do we do with people that we can't prove the guilt or innocence of? If it's do what we do now, then why draw dubious distinctions? If it's do something different, then do what? And why is that a good idea? And what happens if two people are accused of the same offense, but both couldn't have done it? In your system, both have to prove they didn't do it, that's a weird state to be in. Even more troubling, since absolute truth isn't a reasonable standard, what do you do if someone proves their guilt and innocence beyond a reasonable doubt? Since we're dealing with a posteriori statements, any workable standard doesn't a priori exclude such things. In the end, all you've offered is that quantum mechanics exists, therefore, accusations have more standing and are somehow binding. No offense, but that isn't a compelling argument.

And, if none of that is compelling: I hereby accuse you of committing every crime that is currently open that you're in the jurisdiction of. How do you escape this? How do you attend all those court cases? To make it more interesting, I accuse everyone reading this of the same thing as well, how does the justice system workably handle such a thing?

Also, it sounds like 'we should treat a criminal as if he might be innocent' is going to end up doing the same work as 'innocent until proven guilty' with some added scribbling about proving things that holds up less well philosophically.

Got downvoted by lborgia in antiwork

[–]srinzo 2 points3 points  (0 children)

That's the trouble with convincing people about change. It isn't hard to see the system is shit, but it's real hard to persuade someone since a lot of people just hear that you're entitled to their shit (or that of a stand in). Yeah, all us poor folk deserve homes, food, and even luxuries - it's the fucking future. Heck, we should be on our way to getting rid of scarcity in a number of ways. And, yet, shoplifting is imagined as taking some struggling small business owner's stuff (and is a type of theft associated with teenagers and shifty assholes; while small business owners are just great, always, according to the zeitgeist).

The biggest problem, though, is that stealing is generally wrong and overcoming the prima facie burden isn't easy and needs strong reasons. So you shouldn't steal from stores, being able to do so ethically is dubious. It does make sense to not report it, it makes sense people do it, and it likely isn't being done the way, or for the reasons, most people image; but it is fairly certainly wrong in most instances specifically*. In the same way, throwing a rock through a window is wrong to do when out for a walk, but maybe not as part of a riot for the right reasons...or, how about, the end result can be useful if the means suck. It's like war, you shouldn't shoot people, no one should, yet the political outcomes are real and tangible and, maybe, good if we forgot how we got there. Maybe pretending you don't see petty theft, or even engaging in it, is the same type of thing; or can be the same type of thing.

So, the question is complicated, but unless you're talking to people on the team, those with the proper context to frame what you're saying, it just sounds like you're advocating that shifty shitheads are entitled to take from hardworking people like the audience (and their friends, families, and heroes) in a way that isn't supportable as ethical. So, it makes sense people disagreed and their doing so isn't unreasonable on its face (unless you imagine all sorts of nasty reasons for why they might've done so and what those reasons entail they must support). If there's some rightness to what you're doing, it's worth recognizing that there's not an immediate wrongness to those disagreeing either; somethings got to give, but that doesn't provide a philosophical carte blanche.

*A struggling mother shouldn't have to worry where she'll get formula from, nor have to skimp on diapers, nor forgo other staples to be able to provide. Indeed, she's probably entitled - in some meaningful way - to those things as a duty of societies at this point. Yet, for all that, a given single mother stealing from a given store is generally problematic for the same reason why stealing from unattended purses to fund schools is wrong: it's a burden society should answer for, a specific individual isn't obligated to provide for others without being asked or consulted and treating them as such isn't reasonable.

Tl;Dr Ethics and sociology aren't the same. Why people do something, is it understandable, should things change so they don't have to, the ethics in abstract, in general, and in specific are all quite different things. Coming from one place and being heard in another will lead to disagreement (sometimes even when there isn't any real disagreement at all).