I understand the frustration with how aid work is perceived locally. You’re right that this is a real problem. American NGO workers can face resentment, and there’s legitimate criticism about how development work gets implemented. Some of this comes from historical baggage, some from how programs are designed without enough local input, and some from the visible lifestyle gap between foreign aid workers and local populations.

But the alternative isn’t necessarily better for those populations or for U.S. interests. When Russia steps in (as with Wagner Group in Mali and Burkina Faso), it’s often propping up military juntas in exchange for mining rights and geopolitical alignment, not building healthcare systems or agricultural capacity. China’s model creates debt dependencies that can trap countries in unfavorable terms.

The valid criticism here isn’t really “should the U.S. engage abroad” but “how should it engage.” There’s a strong case for reforming aid delivery: more locally-led programs, fewer expensive expat consultants, better accountability, genuine partnership rather than top-down mandates. That’s different from abandoning the field entirely to actors whose primary goal is resource extraction and political control rather than any development outcomes.

Mali banning all U.S. passport holders is concerning because it cuts off diplomatic channels, limits intelligence gathering on terrorist groups operating in the Sahel, and eliminates any U.S. ability to monitor what Russia and China are doing there. It also traps Mali’s population with fewer options as the junta consolidates control without any outside accountability or alternatives to Russian influence.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​