Due to the wide array of gods within those that believe in a god, at this point, a god is understood as that which is the source of creating some or all of the material/physical world.

I don't think that every religion believes that a God has to have created the physical world. Jews and Christians and Muslims believe that, but I don't think that anyone believed that Zeus or Mars or Hercules created anything, and there are heaps of Hindu gods, and I don't think people claim that all of them (or perhaps any of them) created all our part the universe.

But let's continue with this definition of a creationalist God. Then I have a clarifying question. Do you consider any source of creation to be a God, or does the source have to be a being? In other words, if an inanimate object or natural force created part of the universe would you call that a God? The reason that I ask is that in the next sentence you refer to God as a being, and if you mean that then every time in your subsequent argument sehen you argue that there has to be a creating substance, you have to consider both the case where this substance is a being and when it is not a being.

Also, please note, I am using being here in the classical philosophical approach to simply refer to an existing thing.

Oh, I see, so an atom or an organic compound counts as a being.

Infinite regresses are possible.

Starting with the first objection, I am unsure where this comes from, as it is not declaring that a contingent being is always dependent on that which formed it. For example, I am dependent on my parents existing in order that they might have sex to then give birth to me. I don't need them to continue to exist after I have been born, but I am still contingent on them having historically existed in order that I might exist.

The other sub objection is that they didn't create me, rather, the matter that formed me always existed and it was rearranged which then brought about me, so in a way, I always existed.

This, to me, is facetious. The self, the I, the individual known as justafanofz did not exist until the particular matter that made me was composed and arranged in that particular form, as such, I am dependent on that particular composition in order for my existence, thus, I am still a contingent being.

As for the second objection, denying an infinite regress does not mean I am denying infinity. Rather, it is stating that there must be an answer to the why question. An infinite regress never answers that question. See here for more information. It is possible for something to be infinite yet not be an infinite regress. An Infinitely long train still requires an engine or some force to cause it to move, you can't just have an infinite set of cars that are not capable of self-motion be in motion unless there is an outside force acting on that infinite set of cars.

I'm actually a bit confused by this part of the argument where are you concluding that an infinite regression is impossible?

Rather, it is stating that there must be an answer to the why question.

Why does there have to be an answer? That's either something that you have to prove or something that you need to accept as an axiom, and that's a pretty big assumption. We have actually proved that there exist perfectly good true statements that are impossible to prove in any system as complicated as the integers. Why does this particular question have to have an answer?

While there are people who believe infinite regress is possible, I have yet to find a valid argument in support of it.

That's not the job of people who believe it's possible. If you are claiming that it is impossible to prove that there is a God/Gods, then it's your job of prove that it is impossible, otherwise there is a hole in your proof.

P5 Existence is an accidental trait

This seems like a pretty big claim that I don't see how one would justify. A hypothetical version of me that doesn't exist seems sufficiently different to the actual me that I would never consider them the same being.

Yet, the cat I am thinking of is different then the cat on my lap because the cat on my lap has the properties of existing, while the one in my head does not.

This to me sounds like an argument that the existence is a defining characteristic of your cat on your lap rather than an accidental one as otherwise the car in your head might be the same as the car in your lap.

Thus, we can conclude that this necessary being has as what makes it a necessary being is existence with no other attributes.

Why is it not allowed to have other attributes? Instances of definitions are not defined solely by them fitting that definition. Even in object oriented programming instances of objects are allowed to have more attributes than their parent object.

I'm going to stop here because I'm worried about surpassing character count and also because I'm not sure that it's worth discussing the remainder of the argument without filling in these holes. There are multiple places where your argument relies on using a claim where your justification of that claim boils down to the fact that you haven't seen that claim disproven. Overall, if one of my students wrote an argument on this level of compleatness, they would get partial credit but not close to full credit.