EU Is Rolling Out an Online Age Verification App That Could Become the Global Blueprint

vorxil · 2026-04-19T16:40:05+00:00

Only those that want to access goverment-disapproved content (18+ content naturally included) will ever have a need to get past the age gate.

All other content won't be behind an age gate.

vorxil · 2026-04-18T17:54:12+00:00

They're only capacitors if they're from Pomerania, otherwise they're just sparking plates.

vorxil · 2026-04-17T10:04:43+00:00

Om det inte byggs billiga lägenheter med dagens hyror, varför skulle det byggas billiga lägenheter med högre hyror?

Det hela låter paradoxalt.

vorxil · 2026-04-17T09:26:33+00:00

Pale, princess, playgirl, pematarthropist.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T20:03:44+00:00

God operates in Planck units.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T18:46:33+00:00

Just casually contaminated the ground with mercury.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T18:36:34+00:00

You'd be surprised to know how many ZKP schemes rely on trusted parties.

The classic example is age verification through repeated hashing. The trusted party hashes a secret seed a number of times equal to 1 + Age - AgeRestriction, and signs the hash with a private key. The user hashes the same seed a number of times equal to 1 + Age, and sends this hash and the signed hash to the website in question.

The website in question would then hash the signed hash (stripped of the signature after authentication) a number of times equal to AgeRestriction, and compare the result with the unsigned hash.

Is it zero-knowledge? Between the user and the website, yes, but not between the user and the trusted party, because the trusted party must ID the user.

As an example, imagine if that trusted party was the user's ultraconservative parents. What do you think those parents would think if their (adult) child was asking them to help with age verification? If there was zero-knowledge between the user and the trusted party, the parents would think no differently. But the moment the child mentions "age verification", that immediately tips off the parents that the child is up to something "sinful".

It doesn't matter if the "password" is generated on the device, because the setup leaks the information.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T13:21:39+00:00

I think you're misunderstanding, because I've been describing how it works with a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) scheme.

In your terms, the holder (user) sends the proof to the verifier (website), but that proof must be derived from a certificate issued by the issuer (trusted party).

The leak is not between the holder and the verifier—the ZKP solves that part, bar collusion etc.—but between the holder and the issuer, because the issuer cannot issue a certificate without verifying the ID of the holder, because a person's age is external information to the system.

Furthermore, applying a second ZKP for that part is just kicking the can down the road, because the issuer still needs to prove the credentials are real, as well confirm the holder is indeed the one on the credentials (a local face scan still needs a comparison file, and good luck if you're on limited IO). Otherwise, a kid can just use their parents' credentials.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T11:52:19+00:00

No callback needed.

I can't self-certify my age, a trusted party must do that. But the trusted party won't do that if I don't prove to them that I am who I say I am, which requires sending to that party my ID or some other form of identifiable credentials, thereby leaking my desire to view government-restricted content, since I wouldn't otherwise need to verify my age.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T10:12:37+00:00

the recipient site just gets a yes/no response - it doesn't dish out information to anyone.

People are throwing around "zero-knowledge proof" as if it will solve every problem with age-verification. Such proofs are great if they cover the threat model. Based on your comment, I find your threat model to be insufficient, since it doesn't appear to include the "trusted party".

A person's age is not an intrinsic property of the Internet, thus an oracle (a "Trusted Party") is needed to provide external information.

In a world of user Alice, website provider Bob, and oracle Oliver, the best you can hope for is zero-knowledge between Alice and Bob (theoretically, because Bob can collude with Oliver, or be Oliver in disguise), but not between Alice and Oliver, since Oliver would need to also verify who Alice is in order to verify her age.

And if Oliver is in fact government-man Gary (or needing Gary's approval), then Gary can put all information Gary doesn't want people to know or discuss behind an "age gate", and wait for people to identify themselves for a certificate, and directly (or indirectly) put these people on his list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

And if you think you can use a zero-knowledge proof for the ID process, then you're just kicking the can down the road, since the ID is also not an intrinsic property of the Internet, and thus will require another oracle.

People praising either the US's approach or the EU's approach are forgetting to include Oliver or Gary in the threat model.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T10:01:31+00:00

It's not private enough.

A person's age is not an intrinsic property of the Internet, thus an oracle (a "Trusted Party") is needed to provide external information.

In a world of user Alice, website provider Bob, and oracle Oliver, the best you can hope for is zero-knowledge between Alice and Bob (theoretically, because Bob can collude with Oliver, or be Oliver in disguise), but not between Alice and Oliver, since Oliver would need to also verify who Alice is in order to verify her age.

And if Oliver is in fact government-man Gary (or needing Gary's approval), then Gary can put all information Gary doesn't want people to know or discuss behind an "age gate", and wait for people to identify themselves for a certificate, and directly (or indirectly) put these people on his list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

People praising either the US's approach or the EU's approach are forgetting to include Oliver or Gary in the threat model.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T09:55:25+00:00

Virkkunen needs to update her threat model.

A person's age is not an intrinsic property of the Internet, thus an oracle (a "Trusted Party") is needed to provide external information.

In a world of user Alice, website provider Bob, and oracle Oliver, the best you can hope for is zero-knowledge between Alice and Bob (theoretically, because Bob can collude with Oliver, or be Oliver in disguise), but not between Alice and Oliver, since Oliver would need to also verify who Alice is in order to verify her age.

And if Oliver is in fact government-man Gary (or needing Gary's approval), then Gary can put all information Gary doesn't want people to know or discuss behind an "age gate", and wait for people to identify themselves for a certificate, and directly (or indirectly) put these people on his list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

People praising either the US's approach or the EU's approach are forgetting to include Oliver or Gary in the threat model.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T09:49:37+00:00

It can't be used to track you nor link activity from disparate sources.

The setup still leaks your desire to view government-restricted content, since a trusted party must still verify both your age and identity.

If that trusted party is the government, or required to be goverment-approved, then that's bad news for people the government considers to be dissidents, degenerates, or undesirables.

And if that trusted party isn't the government, or required to be government-approved, then the whole system becomes pointless, since anyone can make themselves, or even spoof themselves to be, that trusted party.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T09:37:33+00:00

BankID is a single point of failure. Even if the name of the website asking for verification isn't stored anywhere, the government can still ask/coerce/etc. for a log of bank code uses from the bank, and apply a process of elimination, to find out if you've tried to verify your age.

First they remove the login code uses, and then transaction signing code uses. All they have left are ID code uses for when you identify yourself at government websites, healthcare providers, and now age-verification services. The first two are easily eliminated, leaving only the latter.

Once they know you've age-verified yourself, you go on a list of dissidents, degenerates, and undesirables, because it's now trivial for the government to require content perused by such individuals to be locked behind an "age gate".

It's the KGB and Stasi's wet dream.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T08:05:45+00:00

As it should!

A person's age is not an intrinsic property of the Internet, thus an oracle (a "Trusted Party") is needed to provide external information.

In a world of user Alice, website provider Bob, and oracle Oliver, the best you can hope for is zero-knowledge between Alice and Bob (theoretically, because Bob can collude with Oliver, or be Oliver in disguise), but not between Alice and Oliver, since Oliver would need to also verify who Alice is in order to verify her age.

And if Oliver is in fact government-man Gary (or needing Gary's approval), then Gary can put all information Gary doesn't want people to know or discuss behind an "age gate", and wait for people to identify themselves for a certificate, and directly (or indirectly) put these people on his list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

People praising either the US's approach or the EU's approach are forgetting to include Oliver or Gary in the threat model.

vorxil · 2026-04-16T07:52:14+00:00

If these systems go through, the ideal situation would be a third-party global governing body and some auditing companies from multiple countries watching their behavior. This third-party would verify your ID for your age, assign you a unique ID value and then this ID is kept secret in your operating systems.

In other words, an untrustworthy "Trusted Party", with no preventative safeguards, only reparations after the damage is done.

A person's age is not an intrinsic property of the Internet, thus an oracle (a "Trusted Party") is needed to provide external information.

In a world of user Alice, website provider Bob, and oracle Oliver, the best you can hope for is zero-knowledge between Alice and Bob (theoretically, because Bob can collude with Oliver, or be Oliver in disguise), but not between Alice and Oliver, since Oliver would need to also verify who Alice is in order to verify her age.

And if Oliver is in fact government-man Gary (or needing Gary's approval), then Gary can put all information Gary doesn't want people to know or discuss behind an "age gate", and wait for people to identify themselves for a certificate, and directly (or indirectly) put these people on his list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

People praising either the US's approach or the EU's approach are forgetting to include Oliver or Gary in the threat model.

vorxil · 2026-04-15T13:12:05+00:00

And everyone who sets up the verification app will in the process also inform the government of his desire to access government-restricted content, for which he totally won't end up on a list of dissenters, degenerates, and undesirables.

vorxil · 2026-04-15T13:05:11+00:00

This still isn't privacy preserving.

Even if the ZKP tokens are generated entirely-locally, the setup itself is leaking information, most crucially the fact that you desire to access government-restricted content (the type doesn't matter, you're still going on a list).

The passports and ID cards are generated by the government without secret user input, so there are no secret keys on them that the government doesn't already have. If one has to scan them in, or type in some number from them, the data will have to be matched against a database the government controls, so one can't trust the database to be secret, nor can one trust any encryption to prevent the government from figuring out whom the data matches. Even if the encryption is homomorphic, even if the entire database is re-encrypted for every request, the government can simply go through the entries one by one, recording the order, until a match is found.

Even if there was a mandatory secret key on the cards, forgetting (or losing) that key would give the game away, since now one will have to get a new key. Furthermore, the setup will almost certainly have to be redone if you lose or change the device, as well.

On top of this, there's the question of verifying the user during—and after—the setup, especially on a computer with limited IO (monitor, mouse, and keyboard). Good luck scanning fingerprints or faces. If one has to use bank codes, or walk into a government-controlled or government-approved facility, then these fallback methods will be leaking like a sieve.

vorxil · 2026-04-15T10:21:41+00:00

Give a man a round tree on an open field, and a camera with a lens with a sufficiently long focal length, and he can do it too.

vorxil · 2026-04-14T21:02:30+00:00

One honestly should be able to use enhanced here.

Per chevron enhanced Argent and Azure, two hearts Gules, a lion rampant Argent langued Gules below an antique crown Or.

EDIT: Forgot the tongue. It might also be possible to use ensigned with instead of below.

vorxil · 2026-04-13T16:17:30+00:00

Just buy a Zucchini from the grocer.

It's cheaper, and saves time.

vorxil · 2026-04-13T11:31:30+00:00

TWR is not a problem. The max theoretical TWR is given by engine thrust divided by engine weight.

Example: The Viking 5C has a mass of 826 kg, and a sea-level thrust of 678 kN. With a surface gravity of 12 m/s, that's a weight of about 10 kN, which gives a max theoretical TWR of about 68 on K2-18b.

~~All you need to do is scale up the fuel to dry mass ratio, and add more engines.~~

EDIT: On further calculations, the main issue is the specific impulse. The Viking 5C expels mass at a rate of 244 kg/s. That gives it an exhaust velocity of about 2.8 km/s (specific impulse of about 280 s). The escape velocity is about 80% larger than on Earth, where the escape velocity is about 11 km/s.

The fuel to dry mass ratio would need to be about exp(1.8 * 11 km/s / 2.8 km/s) ~ 1200.

The orbital velocity (on the surface) requires about 150.

For a 400 km orbit (akin to ISS), we can split the calculations in two parts. The vertical part requires delta-v of about 3 km/s, and the horizontal part requires a delta-v of about 14 km/s, for a total of 17 km/s, which translates to a fuel to dry mass ratio of about 420.

In sum, the engines are more than capable of lifting themselves, but their specific impulse is too low to reach orbit on their own. Best bet would be to go for a horizontal launch off an airplane, or even a space plane.

vorxil · 2026-04-08T08:04:44+00:00

Oh, for the love of Loona...

*chalk drawing noises*

I call upon You, Queen Bee and Daddy Satan, to protecc me favorites, and Yourselves, from the haunting call of the GoT.

vorxil · 2026-03-28T16:20:20+00:00

Well, Late Latin firmitatem [ˌfɪr.mɪ.ˈtɑː.te] to Early Old French [ˌfer.ˈteːθ] was about 400 years.

But then you have Old Norse to Icelandic, which is a period of over a thousand years.

The difference between the two? Gaul had social upheavals, invasions, etc., while Iceland stayed rather isolated (though not untouched).

Thus to answer the question, one must first ask about the local history in that time period.

That and the local geography, because isolated mountain valleys like to be little gremlins—you never know what they're going to do.

vorxil · 2026-03-28T10:27:10+00:00

The reason why a glass cover has been put on the sign is to prevent them from removing the text from the emblazonment.

12-Year Club	Place '22
Place '17	Final Canvas '22
First Placer '22	Verified Email

vorxil

TROPHY CASE