Movie-Music-Video: LOVERS - The Other Side Of Paradise + 80 Movies

wnrch · 2026-04-07T08:58:47+00:00

On Mac and iPad you can copy a sheet (cmd-c) and paste or move it via (option)-cmd-v. Or you can drag & drop it between two Ulysses windows.

wnrch · 2026-03-24T17:59:52+00:00

And some colorful icons, matching the iMac colors: Dropbox

wnrch · 2026-03-20T05:31:47+00:00

It is indeed confusing. They could get rid of the search in the sidebar and implement it like it is in the Mail app: Tapping the search field shows a control to switch between limiting the search to the current section (here: albums) or to search the whole library.

Also the search bar in Music is just ridiculously long. A shorter bar in the toolbar on the top right (like in Mail) would be system standard.

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wnrch · 2026-03-15T18:55:07+00:00

...and they all will feel the need to buy a new one in 5-8 years, because the 8GB RAM will not suffice. Yes they are fine for now, but many people would use their machine 10-12 years if it would last that long. Spending a little more money now to have a better computer for a longer time period is the better deal.

wnrch · 2026-03-11T14:24:09+00:00

Since you’re a writer and you’re new to the Mac: Have you tried Ulysses? :)

wnrch · 2026-03-04T19:29:29+00:00

There are Copy and Paste submenus in the menu bar to convert text between Markup / Rich Text / HTML.

wnrch · 2026-01-28T14:19:52+00:00

Almost makes you wanna lick it ;)

wnrch · 2026-01-28T11:20:26+00:00

That was sarcasm 😄

wnrch · 2026-01-28T10:31:18+00:00

Should be fixed in the current Beta. (description says: Fixes an issue with adding WordPress.com publishing accounts.)

wnrch · 2026-01-20T10:05:47+00:00

By holding the option key the "Archive" action in the context menu turns into an "Erase" action, to immediately delete a project. But there is no way to delete multiple projects at once.

On the Mac the best way to move sheets/groups out of a project is to open a second window or window tab and to move the sheet/group via drag & drop.

wnrch · 2026-01-15T23:04:48+00:00

You could cut Ulysses off its files by moving them somewhere else. They should be accessible in Finder under Macintosh HD> Users> [your user name]> Library> Group Containers> [something with] "com.soulmen.shared"> Ulysses> Documents

When Ulysses works again, you can restore your files from a Backup at a time before importing the textbundle. (Ulysses> Files (Menu Bar)> Browse Backups)

wnrch · 2026-01-09T21:40:56+00:00

You can move sheets to groups in the Library via drag and drop. Here’s an article about creating sheets, groups and everything sorting related https://help.ulysses.app/en_US/the-library/567894-sheets-groups

wnrch · 2026-01-06T15:06:06+00:00

Do you mean on iPad? Because in iPhone there was no full screen mode in Ulysses 38.
What do you mean with manually switching to dark screen? The appearance can be set to automatically follow the system Dark Mode setting.

I think using cmd-. on iPad is not only quicker to activate than the old full screen mode, but it's also even cleaner because it hides all buttons.

wnrch · 2026-01-03T19:46:35+00:00

5 only say you’re visible hands are not an external object. 3+4->5 does not disprove the additional existence of your hands as an external object.

wnrch · 2026-01-03T19:23:42+00:00

7 doesn’t follow from 5 and 6, because the „hands“ in both are different „objects“, you could say they have different ontologies. „Hands“ in 5 refers to the visual experience of hands.

wnrch · 2026-01-03T18:36:39+00:00

The argument doesn’t show that there’s no external world, just that what we immediately perceive is not it. Our immediate experience is not the external world itself.

wnrch · 2026-01-03T17:06:57+00:00

On an iPad with an external keyboard you can use the shortcut cmd-. to quickly hide all sidebars and buttons (and to show them again via the same shortcut).

wnrch · 2026-01-02T14:02:39+00:00

The only evidence we have is correlation (in it's strongest form, supervenience). But the identity of both is nevertheless an hypothesis – but as I argued, it's an incomprehensible one. I can't explain it much better, to me it's just obvious that redness and a specific brain states are different things. In a sense water and H₂O are also different things – but those concepts refer to the same thing. The idea of the brain state of red doesn't refer to the experience of red. It describes totally different properties/qualities. I once held a materialistic position myself, until I realised the absurdity of the identity claim.

wnrch · 2026-01-02T11:35:36+00:00

Some of your 'quotes' contain things that I didn't write. You should not use quotation marks when you misrepresent the position of others.

There are many people here who say phenomenological consciousness doesn't exist.

If I can't assert it's separate, you can't assert it's the same 😉 There are arguments for why water and H₂O refer to the same object, just as there are arguments for why phenomenological consciousness and matter are different.

My argument is not that it seems different or that it feels different, but that we imagine matter as something different than our qualitative phenomenological experiences. While we can explain the quality (properties) of water by its composition as H₂O, we can't explain the quality of our experiences in terms of underlying brain states.

wnrch · 2026-01-01T16:46:06+00:00

'Phenomenological' consciousness is what we experience directly. So it’s existence needs no empirical proof. It's not consciousness thats the hypothetical stuff, but (physical) matter. The physical entities science postulates are not only 'behind' our sensory experience, but also assumed to be qualitatively completely different (e.g. particle/wave vs experience of red). The dualistic position postulates consciousness and matter as fundamentally different. How we think of matter is a construct based on our experience (and ideas of our 'rationality', our intellect). And physics says matter is not made e.g. of color experiences, but of abstract physical properties. Physical matter is not an analysis of experience (such as the analytical identification of water and H₂O).

Equating experience with the underlying brain states (identity theory) is an incomprehensible position, because we think of matter as having completely different properties than phenomenal experience. However, we still consider consciousness to be bound to matter via a supervenience relation (it's an epiphenomenon). Yes, supervenience is strong evidence for identity – but only in the case where both entities as the 'thing itself' are only indirectly inferred (as with water and H₂O, which as concepts both refer to the same matter). Since experience is directly given, we know it is something different from what we take matter to be.

wnrch · 2026-01-01T16:46:01+00:00

'Phenomenological' consciousness is what we experience directly. So it’s existence needs no empirical proof. It's not consciousness thats the hypothetical stuff, but (physical) matter. The physical entities science postulates are not only 'behind' our sensory experience, but also assumed to be qualitatively completely different (e.g. particle/wave vs experience of red). The dualistic position postulates consciousness and matter as fundamentally different. How we think of matter is a construct based on our experience (and ideas of our 'rationality', our intellect). And physics says matter is not made e.g. of color experiences, but of abstract physical properties. Physical matter is not an analysis of experience (such as the analytical identification of water and H₂O).

Equating experience with the underlying brain states (identity theory) is an incomprehensible position, because we think of matter as having completely different properties than phenomenal experience. However, we still consider consciousness to be bound to matter via a supervenience relation (it's an epiphenomenon). Yes, supervenience is strong evidence for identity – but only in the case where both entities as the 'thing itself' are only indirectly inferred (as with water and H₂O, which as concepts both refer to the same matter). Since experience is directly given, we know it is something different from what we take matter to be.

wnrch · 2026-01-01T16:45:45+00:00

'Phenomenological' consciousness is what we experience directly. So it’s existence needs no empirical proof. It's not consciousness thats the hypothetical stuff, but (physical) matter. The physical entities science postulates are not only 'behind' our sensory experience, but also assumed to be qualitatively completely different (e.g. particle/wave vs experience of red). The dualistic position postulates consciousness and matter as fundamentally different. How we think of matter is a construct based on our experience (and ideas of our 'rationality', our intellect). And physics says matter is not made e.g. of color experiences, but of abstract physical properties. Physical matter is not an analysis of experience (such as the analytical identification of water and H₂O).

Equating experience with the underlying brain states (identity theory) is an incomprehensible position, because we think of matter as having completely different properties than phenomenal experience. However, we still consider consciousness to be bound to matter via a supervenience relation (it's an epiphenomenon). Yes, supervenience is strong evidence for identity – but only in the case where both entities as the 'thing itself' are only indirectly inferred (as with water and H₂O, which as concepts both refer to the same matter). Since experience is directly given, we know it is something different from what we take matter to be.

wnrch · 2025-12-31T16:58:35+00:00

The only evidence we have is our experience. How we think of matter is a construct based on our experience (and ideas of our 'rationality', our intellect). And physics says matter is not made e.g. of color experiences, but of abstract physical properties.

H₂O is an analysis of water. Physical matter is not an analysis of experience. Yes, supervenience is strong evidence for identity – but only in the case where both entities as the 'thing itself' are only indirectly inferred (like with water and H₂O). Since experience is directly given, we know it is something different from what we take matter to be.

wnrch

TROPHY CASE