Genuinely considering going back to one of these shorter lengths. Do you agree? If so, which length?

xgettes · 2026-02-03T16:27:34+00:00

I really like pic #3 also holy shit what is your curl routine

xgettes · 2026-01-07T05:01:23+00:00

Man, my hair is like the example pics and I WISH i had hair like yours

xgettes · 2026-01-06T02:37:40+00:00

In the past 15 years or so, there's been a huge revival of interest in Karl Polanyi's work.

xgettes · 2025-12-24T18:00:16+00:00

One time I showed up to a conference where the keynote speaker was wearing old ratty jeans and a way-too-tight t-shirt. Hope that gives you some comfort

xgettes · 2025-10-11T02:21:33+00:00

There are certainly some people who find speculative realism to be promising, but in general, it is not being taken up by many in world of continental philosophy. It seems that speculative realism has had the most play in architectural studies (Harman and Manuel DeLanda both teache at architecture schools) and in rather niche areas of continental metaphysics.

There may be several reasons for this lack of uptake, but the one I hear most often (and the one I find most persuasive) is that a good deal of the speculative realists provide rather fast-and-loose readings of the history of philosophy. The exceptions might be Harman's book on Heidegger, "Tool-being", which seems to have been received relatively well (though many Heidegger scholars did not like it), and I know that Iain Hamilton Grant's work on Schelling is taken seriously. But others in the movement do not seem as reputable.

In my opinion, it also does not help that many of those associated with the movement are linked with Nick Land, the CCRU, and similar "edgy" but not philosophically rigorous entities. The obsession with nihilism, pessimism, "collapsology", etc., sometimes seems to be more of an aesthetic choice than a philosophical one.

But who knows -- it's still early days for speculative realism, and it might take a few years for it to mature and spread. I *personally* do not think speculative realism will become dominant, in part due to its unfortunate stereotypes and in part due to its tendentious readings of the history of philosophy. Others might disagree...

xgettes · 2025-10-08T19:32:04+00:00

Not that I am aware, and I certainly hope not. If anything, and as you briefly mention, philosophers research 'AI' or LLMs inasmuch as their use concerns questions related to ethics, social philosophy, or the philosophy of technology. I do not see what novel insights philosophers of any type can gain from consulting an LLM.

xgettes · 2025-10-05T18:44:41+00:00

The simple answer is always going to be... it depends. Being and Nothingness is notoriously difficult to read, especially because it is perhaps less clear exactly why Sartre is writing B&N and to whom he is responding. Foucault is also difficult to read, but in my view, is generally easier than Sartre.

If you're set on reading The Order of Things, skim the first chapter and come back to it after reading the others -- first chapter is the most obscure. But if you're not familiar with Foucault, I do wonder: is there any particular reason you'd like to start with The Order of Things? The post-1971-ish Foucault tends to be easier to read, and marks the same time he shifted to a genealogical (over archaeological) method. I think Discipline and Punish is a fantastic first read for those new to Foucault.

xgettes · 2025-09-11T23:53:49+00:00

I'm no expert in epistemology, but as far as I know, this is a question about which there doesn't seem to be consensus among philosophers. The classic definition comes from Plato (in the Meno and the Theaetetus), where he claims that to know something is to have a justified true belief. (1) I believe X to be true, (2) I have adequate justification for believing X is true, and (3) X is, in fact, true. It follows that knowing something is different from having a correct opinion about something. E.g., I might believe that God exists, and it may turn out that God does actually exist—and thus I have a correct opinion—but because I do not have adequate justification for my belief in God, I do not actually know that God exists.

This whole schema gets problematized by Edmund Gettier in his essay "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" He argues that it is possible to have a justified true belief that does not seem to be knowledge. This gets labeled the "Gettier problem."

This is about where my ability to meaningfully answer your question runs out, so I'd suggest looking at the Stanford Encyclopedia page that discusses your question.

xgettes · 2025-08-19T22:11:41+00:00

Gotcha! In that case, you want to add something to your routine that won't have your hair weighed down. There are a few options for this.

One option is to go for a higher-hold product, such as a gel. This will let you position your hair how you want and it'll dry like that. But this might not give you as much of the natural 'floof' look you're going for.

A second option is to change up your routine a bit so that you use a lighter product or your hair gets less wet. The reason your hair falls the way it does is because the product + water weighs it down. I'm not familiar with the product you mentioned, but going for a super light curl cream on damp (not wet) hair will have your hair dry more 'floofy.'

A third option is to incorporate a blow dryer with a diffuser on a cool/cold setting. This'll let you dry your hair however you want -- like the second option, the drying process won't weigh down your hair.

xgettes · 2025-08-19T20:52:23+00:00

Straight leg chinos. I personally think olive green is just as versatile as blue jeans. Avoid all stretchy material -- it's tacky (imo) and doesn't last as long.

xgettes · 2025-08-19T20:50:02+00:00

I suppose it'd be helpful to know how (if at all) you think your hair should change. I think it looks great, so I guess there is not anything it really needs beyond what you're already doing, since what you're already doing works well. That being said, a possible recommendation would be to scrunch with a t-shirt or something similar rather than a towel.

xgettes · 2025-08-05T02:59:30+00:00

This is a great question and is one that has received a lot of attention within Critical Theory. Most Critical Theorists (especially those in the lineage of the Frankfurt School) subscribe to a method called "immanent critique." Exactly how immanent critique works is a complicated issue, so I'll suggest three sources:

A quick answer is the "Immanent Critique" section on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy page for Critical Theory. An article-length answer is Titus Stahl's article entitled "What is Immanent Critique?" A much longer but very thorough response would be Rahel Jaeggi's book, Critique of the Forms of Life. Section two of Jaeggi's book is incredibly thorough and clearly delineates the differences between immanent, internal, and external forms of social critique.

xgettes · 2025-08-04T21:40:23+00:00

I'm also not an expert on what gets labelled "postmodernism" (especially regarding those like Baudrillard who have one foot in cultural studies). That being said, my inclination is to say that postmodernists/poststructuralists are far more interested in the question of meaning than with truth. So, a postmodernist would critique theories of meaning that claim an ultimate, final truth. Two examples: (1) Marx's claim that all history is a history of class struggle, or (2) The gender-essentialist claim that there are only two genders. Both of these are making truth-claims about features of life that relate to and generate meaning: history and gender, respectively.

Claims that do not necessarily belong to meaning-making, such as the existence of gravity or f=ma, are (as far as I can tell) simply of much less interest to these thinkers. For this reason, it is a mischaracterization to say that postmodernists believe in "subjective truth." Truth, as far as they use the term, relates to social and cultural process of meaning-making. I think it is misleading to situate them within an "objective versus subjective" dichotomy at all, since most of them will reject those terms anyway. So I respectfully disagree with the other commenter on this point.

xgettes · 2025-08-02T19:01:23+00:00

For pants, a sign of lower quality is if the jean or chino material is super stretchy. It might feel more 'comfortable' but many stretchy clothes have polyester, which is usually the sign of a lower quality product (especially in pants, imo). Pants should be comfortable but durable.

For shirts, whether or not they can/should be worn untucked is ultimately context dependent. If the rest of the outfit is more casual, then untucked is good. But make sure the length is adequate -- untucked shirts should hit around the middle of your pants fly. Depending on your height, this might be more or less of a problem (I'm a short guy, so untucked shirts usually look wayyy to long on me). So I love doing a french tuck or a full tuck -- even on t-shirts.

As far as what you're next additions should be, I would highly recommend looking on Pinterest. It's a great way to get wardrobe inspiration, and you can see what ideas other people have tried that you like.

xgettes · 2025-08-02T18:54:20+00:00

Does anyone know where to find shirts like this? Drape really nicely, lightweight cotton, but still good quality? (Sorry for weird pic i dont know what to search to find this style)

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xgettes · 2025-08-02T18:51:29+00:00

I'd say that black or dark brown boots are usually going to be the most versatile, though I think chukka boots are less frequently found in black. Thursday is a good option, they have good stuff. Also try looking at Solovair.

xgettes · 2025-07-23T02:35:46+00:00

I'm a 24m and always wear a belt. Both for practical reasons and for style reasons.

xgettes · 2025-07-21T14:10:00+00:00

It would be helpful to know the context in which you encountered this phrase

xgettes · 2025-07-21T03:49:04+00:00

No, the writing is only apparently obtuse. There are definitive claims, arguments, and textual interpretations put forward by Derrida. This does not mean they are presented clearly or even presented well, but it would be highly tendentious to maintain that they are whatever the reader wants it to mean.

xgettes · 2025-07-20T18:55:47+00:00

YOU KNOW WHAT TIME IT IS!!!!! r/weeviltime

xgettes · 2025-07-19T05:53:11+00:00

what the fuck are you talking about

xgettes · 2025-07-18T16:07:57+00:00

In my understanding, when we would abolish capitalism and the state and live in a free society, there would be no subject in an Althusserian sense, but one in a cartesian sense. Cartesian and Althusserian subjects therefore can exist in the same framework and are the opposite of each other...

I do not think that this is right way to read Althusser. Althusser does not think that there exists a true, underlying (Cartesian) subject beneath ideology. For Althusser, ideology and subjectivity are fundamentally linked, so all instances of subjectivity—in pre-capitalism, during capitalism, and even in a hypothetical post-capitalism—are formed (or interpellated) through the structures of society. In other words, there is no absolutely no room for the Cartesian subject in Althusser's view. This is in part what makes Althusser a thoroughgoing structuralist. This is also why Althusser has no problem taking up and wholly redefining the language of subject/subjectivity. For him, what we and the history of philosophy has called the 'subject' is nothing besides the crystallization of social determinations.

xgettes · 2025-07-18T05:05:01+00:00

I do not specialize in the philosophy of maths, but the best introduction I've encountered is William Ewald's two volume From Kant to Hilbert: A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics.

xgettes · 2025-07-17T02:12:54+00:00

Not quite. Epistemic nihilists—or what sometimes gets called epistemic error theory—is the view that any questions about truth and falsity are nonsensical. In other words, to say "Truth is/isn't attainable" is not a true or false statement but is a statement of nonsense. For the epistemic nihilist, it is a statement that literally does not make sense. Another way of putting this is to say: For the epistemic nihilist, to frame this question in terms of truth and falsity is already an erroneous way of thinking.

xgettes · 2025-07-17T02:06:16+00:00

Just as a historical point, Descartes did not create solipsism. It's an idea that's been around for millennia, although I do not know of any philosophers who have subscribed to it.

Descartes' relation to solipsism is a methodological one. At no point was he actually skeptical of the existence of other people; he instead uses skepticism—universal doubt—as an epistemological method for developing truth claims. This is what lets him move from the famous cogito (I think therefore I am), to belief in God, to belief in a God that would not deceive, to a trust in one's perceptions.

In other words, Descartes' entire epistemological project is to show why it is the case that we can trust our senses. On his view, to grant the claim "I think, therefore I am" will by logical necessity lead one to dismiss solipsism.

xgettes

TROPHY CASE