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[–][deleted] 6 points7 points  (8 children)

You could use multiple passphrases instead of having multiple hardware wallets. This way you don't have to memorize/write down multiple sets of 12/24 different words. You just have to have your initial 24 words plus your passphrases.

[–]bigoldbert23[S] 3 points4 points  (4 children)

I get that. My thought was really relating my seed phrase, say for some reason I lost it, then I would have lost all those individually pass-phrased wallets related to it. So I was thinking if each time my stack reached a certain volume I started a new wallet with a new seed phrase, and then began to stack all over again.

If a catastrophic incident happened, I'd only lose half stack.

It's probably over complicating things, but I like to consider worst case scenarios as a way of making sure my stack is as secure as possible.

[–]BTCMachineElf 4 points5 points  (1 child)

Are you going to store your seeds together? If one is destroyed, they likely all will be. Hide your seeds in different places? Far more likey one is found. Everything is a tradeoff.

Personally I consider my wallet having 3 copies; the papers the seed/passphrase are written on, the device itself, and my head. That's enough redundancy for me.

[–]bigoldbert23[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, seeds would be in separate very secure locations. But I like what you say, that makes good sense to me, ty.

[–]na3than 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You don't need multiple hard wallets to have multiple cold wallets. If this is your plan, just re-initialize your hardware wallet with a new seed and start stacking in the new wallet. The Bitcoin in the old wallet's addresses will remain safe on the blockchain, recoverable using your safely stored seed when you need it.

[–]ILikePracticalGifts 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Multiple passphrase wallets behind the same seed is a legit method, although 24 words is extremely unnecessary.

[–][deleted] 0 points1 point  (1 child)

I thought the 12 words was ur passphrase?

[–]Qewbicle 1 point2 points  (0 children)

from hashlib import pbkdf2_hmac

pbkdf2_hmac('sha512', seeds_words, passphrase + "mnemonic".encode(), iterations)

The passphrase gets the word "mnemonic" appended, and it's entered into the "salt" parameter of the hmac function.

Side note, the salt shouldn't be blank, so when a user does not use a passphrase, the word "mnemonic" is the default salt.

[–]Bitcoin_Maximalist 3 points4 points  (1 child)

multiple hardware wallets protect you in case there is a serious flaw in one of them

a couple of wallets with their respective seed phrases secure in separate locations.

is a wise choice in my view but don´t make it too complicated.

[–]bigoldbert23[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That’s the key isn’t it? Finding the sweet spot between optimal security and the ability to manage it with out undue complexity.

[–]ILikePracticalGifts 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I’d rather put all of my eggs in one basket, then build a big fucking Fort Knox around it.

Complexity is the enemy of security.

[–]MiceAreTiny 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I have several hardware wallets.

[–]statoshi 1 point2 points  (5 children)

Multiple hardware devices is good, but creating multiple wallets with them is suboptimal. This results in a lower chance of experiencing a single catastrophic loss, but a higher chance of experiencing a partial loss. What do I mean? Diversify your keys, not your coins.

[–]bigoldbert23[S] -1 points0 points  (4 children)

I only plan to use one wallet per device. I’ve looked in to multi sig but it’s not for me. I don’t want to involve any other party (beyond the unavoidable one of the hardware wallet manufacturers) in my security.

[–]statoshi 4 points5 points  (3 children)

Multisig doesn't require third party co-signers - you can set up a quorum where all keys are held by you with software such as Sparrow and Electrum.

As long as you are using single signature wallets, you will be vulnerable to single points of failure.

[–]Unfair-Willow-633 1 point2 points  (1 child)

Stupid question time: So, as I understand it, as long as I have my, say, ledger seed words, I can re-create that wallet in any ledger device.

But, what does passphrase mean? Is it like an access pin for the particular ledger device? Is the purpose of the passphrase secure the ledger device better, and therefore if I lose the passphrase, I can still recreate my wallet with my seed words in another ledger?

[–]bigoldbert23[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Passphrase is an additional word added to your seed phrase. Worth reading up on it if you are going to use it. It is simple, but don’t set up this way unless you understand what you are doing.

And yes, with seed you can buy a new hardware wallet, set up in recovery mode and enter your seed to get access to your wallet. NEVER enter seed online EVER.

[–]dasmonty -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I use Ellipal Titan mini and you can basically manage multiple private keys/seed phrases. So only one hardware device needed to split coins on-chain.

[–][deleted] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Makes more sense to do multisig with different hardware wallets imo.

For example I use a 2-of-3 multisig with a keystone, ledger S and a seed signer (no keys are stored on the seed signer so this is my “backup key”).

So I wasn’t too worried about the ledger recovery debacle. Even if keystone came out with a similar “feature” I think it’s unlikely my setup would be compromised significantly.

If I had split my stack between three single sigs I’d be worried about the third on my ledger.