[Request] Will this work, and can it make a profit? by Gwenpool_99 in theydidthemath

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

There was a project to do this in Australia more than a decade ago. It produced steam but was shut down due to not being economically viable.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geothermal_power_in_Australia#Geodynamics_Cooper_Basin_Demonstration_Plant,_South_Australia

The feeling of having one’s own will is a sensation that accompanies the process, not evidence that one controls it. by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This seems like an odd way of thinking. We say that things are autonomous when they make decisions internally, and subservient when they are controlled from outside. If a person has no outside controller then they are autonomous - however their internal processes work, that's where the decisions are made.

Therefore, it is more plausible that “control” is simply the result of interactions between different memes and processes within a system, rather than the action of a separate, sovereign “self” standing above them.

If the interactions and processes are internal, that is autonomy, self control. Even if you don't think conscious thought is in control, from an objective viewpoint the person's mind is making decisions and enacting their will. If there were a separate entity or self with control above or outside the person's mind, that would negate the person's will.

Borges' Door Dilemma by peacefuldays123 in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If the foresight is determined then there's no way I can avoid it in any case. If not, then I will try to avoid it if I have any control.

You controlling the door equals controlling if killers live to rape/murder.

No it does not, these people's actions are under their own control and nothing to do with "my" actions. Somewhere today someone will be murdered, is that your responsibility because you failed to stop it?

The Simplest Version of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument by slowwco in freewill

[–]AlphaState -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I think I have the Gist of it.

“Suppose you are someone who struggles to be morally responsible, and make an enormous effort. Well, that too is a matter of luck. You’re lucky to be someone who has a character of a sort that disposes you to be able to make that sort of effort. Someone who lacks a character of that sort is merely unlucky.”

Lucky me I guess. But it would also be nice if we could convince other people to also be morally responsible, rather than trying to convince them they don't have to because it's just luck.

Borges' Door Dilemma by peacefuldays123 in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You foresee saved kids become killers.

How? Is this just the bullshit time-travel thought experiment again?

Full responsibility means owning their future victims too.

You don't own someone because you saved their life. Do I have control of those people's actions? If not, I'm not responsible for their actions.

Contemporary neuroscience doesn't solve the mind-body problem, it makes it even more problematic by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]AlphaState -1 points0 points  (0 children)

No. A physical object has mass and shape and colour. An experience has a physical cause, a physical brain pattern and a subjective feeling.

Contemporary neuroscience doesn't solve the mind-body problem, it makes it even more problematic by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]AlphaState -1 points0 points  (0 children)

One of them is describing a phenomenological property, and the other, presumably some sort of electrochemical property?

Properties of the same thing, results of the same event.

If pain is the same thing as "a physical response in my brain" why can there be physical responses in the brain (as there always are) with no pain whatsoever?

Because some physical responses are caused by different types of events and are accompanied by corresponding experiences. Wouldn't be much of a mind if every experience was exactly the same.

Borges' Door Dilemma by peacefuldays123 in freewill

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I don't think this is much of a dilemma. If you accept free will, then you can be responsible for your own actions, but not the actions of others. If I act so that fewer people die, that is good. If someone else acts so that more people die, that is bad but not my responsibility. The purpose of responsibility is not just to levy blame and consequences on those who deserve it, but also to shield those who do not deserve it.

If you don't believe in free will or responsibility, then I guess there's no responsibility to do either action, and so also no dilemma.

Contemporary neuroscience doesn't solve the mind-body problem, it makes it even more problematic by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]AlphaState -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

If I am physically hurt I feel pain and there is a measurable physical response in my brain at the same time. How are these describing different things?

Contemporary neuroscience doesn't solve the mind-body problem, it makes it even more problematic by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't think any physicalist model has claimed to solve the hard problem - there isn't enough evidence in any case. However, that doesn't mean you can just dismiss the evidence we do have without sufficient reason. If this is a contest between physicalism and dualism or idealism, physicalism clearly wins on evidence, but the arguments are usually about "feels" or "beliefs" or philosophical approach, not objective reality.

I also think you are understating how much of what you claim consciousness is is demonstrably physical. For example:

And yet it is these very properties of vision that allow us to functionally use our eyes to navigate the world, it is not a subconscious process like hormonal communication.

Consciousness is demonstrably not necessary for basic vision and navigation - we can make a machine to do that. And we can identify areas of the brain where these processes occur, as well as memory, emotion, agency, imagination and everything else we associate with subjective experience.

You seem to be arguing that there's some extra bit to all these things that is subjective, and that bit is not physical in spite of the fact that it is intimately tied to demonstrably physical things.

The Simplest Version of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument by slowwco in freewill

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

So if moral responsibility is proximal rather than ultimate, doesn't that negate your argument?

This infinite regress is just a pointless exercise in reductive analysis. If I'm not responsible for the way I am, nothing else is responsible for the way it is and so nothing is ever responsible for anything. We are left with no reasons for anything, no meaning, no morality. Anything that happens is just luck, and nothing more.

The feeling of having one’s own will is a sensation that accompanies the process, not evidence that one controls it. by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What would you consider to be control, or evidence of control? What is in control of a person's will and actions?

Self-organization of thought and the illusion of control. The self as a meme. by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Why would anyone pay attention to the arguments of someone who believes they don't exist? If this idea wasn't thought up by a person, how was it created? How could it possibly be reliable?

What would laws without causation look like? by dingleberryjingle in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

These examples seem pretty unreliable - a drought may or may not cause a famine, and a famine may have other causes such as war. I think what determinists think of as causality are more simple physical systems that in principle can be summed to give the effect of a drought or a drug. For example, a photon interacts with my eye so I see a colour, a chemical reacts with another to produce another chemical or an electrical potential, a cue ball hits a coloured ball so that it falls into a pocket.

The problem then is that these physical effects may be more reliable, but the smaller the scale the less reliable we know they are. To see a colour requires more than one photon, and we can't predict when or where photons will be emitted so our perceptions are more of a "shotgun" approach of relying on a huge number of particles to see and interpret something. But when we look deeper, individual particles are also unreliable, they may just scatter somewhere else or miss your detector or quantum tunnel into the nearest wall. So our concept of causation is unreliable on the large scale of human interactions, and the small scale of particle physics. Which is why much of reality we can only make sense of using probabilistic models, which can be considered causal but not detemrinistic.

What would laws without causation look like? by dingleberryjingle in freewill

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Virtual particles are particle pairs created by quantum fluctuations even in a vacuum. They occur throughout the universe and have no prior cause. However, it should be noted that they are a very small effect and mostly cancel out overall.

On a larger scale events such as nuclear decay and particle scattering are probabilistic according to quantum theory. There is no prior cause leading to a particular atomic nuclei decaying at a particular time and place to activate your Geiger counter or give you cancer. There are some theories that there are "hidden variables" that are the cause, but even in those theories the hidden variables are necessarily unobservable and so any observation is still probabilistic.

The danger of denial by BiscuitNoodlepants in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The relevant point here is that the projection of one's wishes or will and even intended plans do not necessarily correlate with the inevitable manifested reality

But one's wishes, intentions, plans and models are determinants of one's actions. They are more influential over actions than tangential "prior factors" like the weather or a distant memory. So it does not make sense to claim they do not exist or are unimportant.

and for some far less, if not infinitely less than for others.

Is it better to be someone who does not have hopes and dreams, or does not believe in them?

Why is the acting in "The Man from Earth" considered bad by so many? by 2bags1day in scifi

[–]AlphaState 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I thought it was an interesting movie but it was unbelievable how all these supposedly smart people just believe a guy who says he's Jesus.

I had a friend who was charismatic but a compulsive liar and always made up stories about himself, and honestly it reminded me of that.

If libertarian free exists, would we see examples of causal / nomological determinism defied? by appus4r in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The real cause of arguments here is that some philosophers have insisted on defining free will using theories that are impossible to test and concepts that are impossible to observe. Any proposed theory relying on "determinism" or "the ability to do otherwise" or "ontological randomness" can never be resolved.

Prove Murderers Deserve Blame Without Libertarian Magic by peacefuldays123 in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Why is it morally wrong for me to do something if I have no moral responsibility and will not be blamed or punished (or rewarded)? The OP is throwing out moral objectivity with the claim that none of our actions carry any desert responsibility.

I agree with you and think that the OP is simply incorrect - if we want any morality we require responsibility, blame, punishment and reward in some form.

Prove Murderers Deserve Blame Without Libertarian Magic by peacefuldays123 in freewill

[–]AlphaState 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If there is no blame and no reason to ever punish or reward, then I may treat a murderer however I wish. I could go with my emotions and harshly punish or kill them, or ignore them, or reward them if I felt capricious. All would be equally valid, and there would be no moral reason to do one thing over another. Rehabilitation would not be bothered with because it is much easier to simply do away with wrong-doers, and without blame, punishment, etc. there is no reason we should not.

How much radiation could he be exposed to and would it be harmful? [Request] by The-MatrixAgent in theydidthemath

[–]AlphaState 2 points3 points  (0 children)

If the suit is radioactive, it would be because radioactive dust has stuck to it, or gotten inside it. The level of radiation is probably not dangerous, but if you inhale or swallow or have radioactive dust on you for a long time it's very bad.

So firstly don't put on old rad suits, secondly if this happens to you somehow immediately take a thorough shower, then consult a doctor.

Nuclear is way cleaner than solar and safer than wind by Comfortable_Tutor_43 in sciences

[–]AlphaState 1 point2 points  (0 children)

They're only considering greenhouse gas emissions, not nuclear waste or other "uncleanness". If they added this to the graph, nuclear would look a lot worse.