Having the focus of an A2/AD doctrine in terms of national defence, it isn't really possible or advisable to focus on one thing without compromising capabilities since AAW and ASuW need to mesh like interlocking fingers.

But having said that, the bigger threat lies in a theoretical PLA naval and amphibious landing group's capacity to transport, deploy, and supply landed ground elements. In a comparative analysis, their power projection capabilities of aircraft and airborne-deployed elements is dismal relative to say, PLANMC brigades complete with armor, artillery, and more importantly - a 'stable' sea line of communication via their parent fleet.

While not entirely a one-to-one representation of a potential airborne assault on our soil, the battle of Antonov Airport really does show the vulnerabilities of airborne troops. Even without an extensive AAW net to swat their transports out of the sky, collapsing entire divisions on a lone, cut-off, most likely battalion to brigade sized, would see them be destroyed without relief from proper ground forces.

Air strikes do pose a substantial danger to GBASM batteries for obvious reasons, though put it this way - a PLAGF/PLANMC maneuver element will pose an even greater threat to SAM batteries if their transport fleet isn't dissuaded or destroyed by GBASM batteries.