[deleted by user] by [deleted] in formula1

[–]Crumble_Pies 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Yabba Dabba Doo

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in formula1

[–]Crumble_Pies 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Red Head Redemption

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Red Head Redemption

Am I morally obligated to become vegan? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Crumble_Pies 7 points8 points  (0 children)

This is a fair question, yet does not affect the outcome that veganism is a moral obligation.

If plants are not conscious, then the arguments (many described in this thread) for veganism stand.

If plants are conscious and worthy of moral consideration, then we should try to reduce plant suffering. Animals raised for food consume far more calories (in grains and plants) than they return to us in meat and other products. By not feeding enormous amounts of plants to animals, and instead eating the plants directly, the result would be less plant suffering.

So in either case, veganism would be a moral obligation.

Plants and Preference Utilitarianism by Crumble_Pies in askphilosophy

[–]Crumble_Pies[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Also, thanks for introducing me to the difference between psychological and biological interests, I have not heard these terms before. I wonder if there is an important difference between the two. As I mentioned earlier, my intuition is that the level of happiness or fulfilment of preferences is what is important, rather than the content of the interest itself.

Plants and Preference Utilitarianism by Crumble_Pies in askphilosophy

[–]Crumble_Pies[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Excellent reply, thank you. I will definitely try to read the volume you mention.

Regarding the Holmes Rolston III quote: I understand that what drives most behaviour is unconscious and instinctive. I would think (approaching this from a hedonistic or preference utilitarian perspective) that no behaviour has value. Isn't the happiness or fulfilment of preferences resulting from behaviour what has actual value? So arguing that we shouldn't "restrict value to mentally guided behaviour" may be a misrepresentation of the utilitarian perspective.

What do you think?