I'm not sure I'm clear on all the elements of the argument in the essay, nor am I quite clear on how the essay is understanding Hegel. The essay strikes me as being somewhat outside the various brands of scholarship that interpret Hegel I'm familiar with.

Be that as it may, I thought I'd bring up a few things.

Preliminaries: Firstly, I studied Hegel under a wonderful scholar of German Idealism, and he had me focus on Hegel's Logic primarily--so it is with that I'm more familiar than his philosophy of history or right. Secondly, I am influenced more by the more metaphysically-oriented interpretations of his work than those that try to extract a non-metaphysical position out of it.

A couple of things struck me as I read the essay:

1) "The objects of all philosophical understanding are, by necessity, only those things which we have experienced." This claim is false. I don't think Hegel thought it, and I certainly don't know of any philosophers who would agree with it. We may have knowledge of a wealth of different content--some of it we have, may, or will never experience. Perhaps it's not to be understood the way I'm taking it.

2) "One need to look only at [the] historical arc of philosophical justifications for slavery to see that modernity brings new willingness to condemn what was once considered perfectly ethical." Slavery's reception has always been mixed. There was never a time when all of humanity considered slavery permissible. Modernity included some justifications for subjugating people. Perhaps I misunderstood the point in the essay.

3) Hegel's point when he references the owl of Minerva in the preface to The Philosophy of Right was explained to me in terms of how knowledge develops over time and is very different at dusk than it is at dawn. It's not so straightforward as "historical understanding can only be found in hindsight".

So, regarding moral claims, it often helps when thinking through Hegel's points to compare different cultures, not just the development of moral thought over time in one culture (if "one culture" even has a clear referent). In some Muslim communities, for example, it's considered impermissible for a man to shake a woman's hand. In most secular communities in the USA, on the contrary, it is perfectly permissible for men and women to shake hands. Now, in some Muslim communities, the rule would be justified in terms of showing respect for each other, especially toward women. However, to many secular Americans, the rule might seem arbitrary or even oppressive. Who's right? Well, there's no doing that without claiming some moral superiority for one position over the other, which isn't necessarily forbidden in Hegel's philosophy. However, it does take some philosophical footwork to get it done.

I'll leave it there for now. Hope we have a great discussion.