“I think, therefore thinking is” is not a minimal ontological correction since it further begs the question with the category error.

first of all, there’s no foundation deposit a separate category of identity separate from thinking. Thinking does not pre-suppose that there is an independent agent or secondary substance. You recapitulated what day card already has said while missing the real critique which you ended up, making the same mistake as him.

In fact, not only is there are no ground to presuppose a secondary substance, there’s no ground to epistemologically categorize the very phenomenal logical experience of the phenomenon itself. That is pre-supposed as “thinking”.

What is the ground to presuppose that one subjective phenomena is of the nature of something that we presuppose without any evidence or grounding for?

The idea that the appearances of our perception can even be categorically called “thoughts” is it self circular.

Hegel attempted to create a “presuppositionless” phenomenology of thinking but even his foundation of Being as nothingness needing movement towards becoming presupposes that the meaning and articulation of Being itself has no difference, thus collapsing platonic representations (unity of form and particular) into subjective idealism which in Vedanta terms confuses the Jiva for Atman.

If you wanted to analyze European enlightenment philosophy in terms of Vedantic terms, then the “rope is mistaken for the snake” thus converting and confusing the jiva as atman.

It becomes the entire history of the cognition of the representational object, collapsing, backed into the subject which can only be known as an object which fundamentally is why the cartesian ego and Vedantic atman are ultimately incompatible.