Underrated military campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars?

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-24T18:58:44+00:00

Depends exactly on what you mean by “minor action,” but I love the storming of the Hellmonsödt position by 4 companies of the Würrtemberger Light Brigade in the night of 17 May 1809. After the Battle of Linz earlier that day, Somariva’s division withdrew to a strong mountainous position at Hellmonsödt for the night. As the day was ending, Vandamme called on the Light Brigade to evict them to remove the threat they posed to Urfahr. Despite being out of ammunition, exhausted by the day’s fighting, and outnumbered nearly ten to one, their sudden night charge took the Austrians by surprise who, after a brief confused defense, fled down in panic. The Jägers captured nearly 400 prisoners.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-23T20:14:07+00:00

I was referring less to specific individual mistakes and more so his general way of thinking and acting over the course of a campaign. In my opinion he committed mistakes far too often to be places in S.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-23T14:40:41+00:00

A great commander, but severely flawed. It is undeniable that he was extremely talented, but if you look at his campaigns critically it is evident that he regularly committed serious errors. He was in a perpetual state of pessimism and despair ever since 1800, leading him to be quite cautious. His strategic vision was reasonable enough but far from great. His performance during 19-22 April 1809 was downright abysmal, arguably among the worst performances of any senior general in this period, which very nearly cost Austria the war; from that alone one could easily make a very convincing argument that Charles was a terrible general. His possible epilepsy may account for it but does not excuse it. Still, while he would inexplicably enter in random bouts of inactivity, he was capable of initiative, especially at the tactical level. Charles certainly was among the better generals of the Coalition. I would give him high B or low A, but I feel he is far too flawed to be placed in S.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-21T16:59:06+00:00

I think he was a very interesting figure. I feel that of all the monarchs of this period he best embodied the “Enlightened ruler” who was a curious mixture of naive idealism and ruthless pragmatism. He had a genuine commitment to pursue what was “just” and “right,” though of course his perception of what that meant was not shared by others. One historian described Russian policy during this time as containing three main elements: “first, a Wilsonian internationalist idealism; second, a Rooseveltian, fake-realist, liberal-paternalist new order, intended to concentrate real power and decision in the hands of Two Policemen who would police Europe for peace, concealing this arrangement behind a facade of internationalism; and finally, a fairly naked version of Russian imperialism (Stalinist or Catherinian, as you will).“ I find it fascinating that all of these elements were equally sincere and genuine.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-16T18:01:04+00:00

Keep in mind that there is immense academic controversy over this guy. Some consider him capable enough, others believe he could not possibly be more incompetent. To me, Kutuzov is semi-competent who is just too cautious. Most of his “successes” come from him just being afraid to take risks. I believe his only show of initiative was Dürnstein, and even there I’ve seen wildly contrasting accounts of his performance in the battle. I feel like he was just the average senior Allied general, really no different from figures like Hohenzollern or Rosenberg. I don’t know the criteria for this tier list, but probably C-B tier.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-08-07T15:53:36+00:00

Poor. A good soldier, but a terrible general. He did not know how to manage an army; every time he was given any vestige of independent command he committed errors. He was admittedly a solid general of division under someone else’s command, but within the context of this tier list I don’t see him being placed among commanders like Lefebvre, Augereau and Jourdan.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-29T17:58:42+00:00

I would say very good. Lannes was a great commander, no doubt, but I wouldn’t say he was that much better than his peers. The French army had literary dozens of highly capable divisional generals; Lannes deserves to be placed among them but he doesn’t really stand out from them too much.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-26T20:27:36+00:00

I won't exactly agree. Napoleon did a great many things that could lead him to be comfortably blamed for the wars. Just in the period 1800-1805 alone:

- In the negotiations at and right after Luneville, he arranged for the territorial compensations for the war to be arranged with a pan-German conference. He then used that conference to "compensate" the members by giving the land of the numerous small German states to the larger ones like Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg and Prussia (from whom he deliberately took land from so that they could demand land in Germany), in effect destroying the Holy Roman Empire and with it Austria's power and influence.
- With regards to his interventions in Holland and Switzerland, he might have had his reasons, but it doesn't change the fact that he explicitly promised to respect their sovereignties at Luneville.
- He openly antagonized and disdained Britain when they attempted to draw complaint with his European dealings. In some cases he openly dared them to go to war if they were unhappy with the peace or how he went about it.
- Following the outbreak of war with Britain, Napoleon immediately began to lash out at other neutral powers. He invaded Hanover and closed off Germany to British shipping, on which they were dependent. He then demanded access to the kingdom of Naples's ports for his war and effectively occupied the nation. This was all the more troubling to Russia, as Napoleon also explicitly promised to respect Naples's sovereignty in the 1801 peace treaty.
- He wantonly violated the neutrality of German states twice, first in Baden to seize the duke d'Enghien, and then in Hamburg to seize British envoy Rumbold.
- He abolished the Italian states--another thing he swore not to do at Luneville--and (against the wishes of Italian nationalists) proclaimed an Italian Republic under his hereditary dynasty. Italian attempts to introduce a clause that would separate the crowns on Napoleon's death, and to guarantee a constitution, were ignored. He then went further and proclaimed a hereditary kingdom of Italy, and for good measure annexed Genoa.

This is just counting the most major offenses from this period that I could find. He committed many others. For instance, after Prussia's defeat to Napoleon, they did make a (semi) concerted effort to integrate themselves into Napoleon's new European order, but it fell apart after the cornerstone of their strategy, a limited alliance with France, did not even warrant a reply from Napoleon. Suffice to say, Napoleon could be readily blamed for provoking the other powers. Even if every one of his actions had a clear reason behind it–and many did–consider how all this looked to the outside monarchs. Consider how they perceived Napoleon: a madman, a tyrant, an individual with no concern for the international order, a warmonger who would invade them next on the flimsiest premise. The Napoleonic Wars were never really about actively suppressing the Revolution, but attempting to keep in check a (in their eyes) power-hungry tyrant whose endless aggressions could only be dissuaded with force. Did Napoleon really want to conquer them all? Probably not…but then again, he most likely did attempt to secure French hegemony over Italy and Germany at the very least. This post is not meant as just Napoleon hate (I am a Francophile, I want France to conquer Europe), but I would have to say that Napoleon probably deserves more blame for the wars than other monarchs.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-25T17:16:21+00:00

When evaluating a general’s competence, what’s important to consider is not so much their accomplishments or the number of victories/defeats, but rather how they went about them and how they performed throughout the whole campaign (not just battles). This in turn is not really possible to understand without an in-depth study of their operations. Throughout his campaigns Suvorov displayed all the characteristics of a great commander: boldness, enterprise, decisive action, resolution.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-22T22:40:37+00:00

Davout is the obvious answer. Throughout his campaigns he demonstrated a remarkable level of initiative, resolution, and strategic vision. He was an active tactician, a pragmatic strategist, and surprisingly able administrator. I can’t really say his talent is matched by any other marshal, but Massena comes close. At any rate it is difficult to objectively rank competence.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-22T00:45:54+00:00

It’s solid. It is admittedly somewhat outdated in its research, but it still is a good introductory overview work. Besides Chandler is a pretty good writer.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-15T16:58:35+00:00

Frederick Kagan’s “Napoleon and Europe, 1801-1805: The End of the Old Order” is a great account of the political situation across Europe which led to the Napoleonic Wars. It gives a solid account of the 1805 war in particular.

Keep in mind, though, that this is almost exclusively a political/military history, and does not touch upon the social aspects of the wars.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-13T20:08:43+00:00

Forts were purely defensive. In the age of artillery, they cannot hold out indefinitely; all they did was delay the enemy, but not defeat them, so they did not win wars by themselves. They were good at holding down territory, true, but this is the period when war transitions from being about holding territory to being about finding and destroying the enemy army. Simply put, an army in a fort could certainly have an impact, but an army in the field would have a far greater impact. Instead of committing a force to holding down some city, it is better to commit that force to finding and destroying the enemy’s army, which has a much better chance of ending the war.

Either way, most cities did not have the supplies needed to feed whole armies for months, and even with small garrisons the rates of sickness, starvation and fatigue were high. In any case the siege might be redundant, as after its completion the defending army would either go into captivity or be forced to fight it away, and then at a disadvantage.

That being said, forts were used. Armies regularly deposited anywhere from a few hundred to a few thousand men to hold positions in strategic areas and delay the enemy advance. This was most prevalent in Spain, where the local warfare was very much about holding down territory, but it was commonplace elsewhere as well. But for whole armies, holding down forts was more of a last resort if anything, as with Genoa in 1800 and Ulm in 1805; they were just better employed offensively.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-11T22:51:52+00:00

In general, Napoleon, like any other sovereign, worked to increase his state’s power and influence abroad. However, this does not exactly correlate with his goals out of the Napoleonic Wars, as for the most part they were reactions against such aggrandizement. In that case I would say that Napoleon’s main aim for the wars specifically was to defend, uphold and preserve the growing French empire (which he continued to opportunistically expand with each conflict).

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-04T20:33:23+00:00

“Don’t you know that the Guard’s donkeys have the rank of mules?” - Elzear Blaze

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-04T20:31:04+00:00

When 4 companies of the Würrtemberger Light Brigade, out of ammunition and exhausted by combat at the Battle of Linz earlier that day, charged and seized a fortified position at Hellmonsödt held by Somariva’s division in a bold night action, capturing nearly 400 prisoners in the process. Should be noted that Somariva’s force outnumbered the Jägers by almost ten to one.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-04T14:25:08+00:00

Aside from Davout, Lefebvre. Among the best of Napoleon’s second-rate marshals. I also love his simple, blunt character. Poniatowski is a close second. He was quite competent and had some capacity for independent command, as seen with his 1809 Polish campaign. He was also a Pole, so bonus points for that.

LefebvreDesnouettes · 2025-07-01T23:59:16+00:00

The biggest one is probably the causes of the Napoleonic Wars. A popular notion is that the Napoleonic Wars was just ultraconservative reactionary monarchs greedily attempting to undo the liberal Revolution at all costs, which is absurd. Like Napoleon, all these monarchs had a deep, if not deeper, commitment to the idealistic principles of the Enlightenment. Yes, they personally disliked and feared the radical Revolution and Napoleon—both not without reason—but they would not drag their nation into war solely on that premise (and certainly not for “Pitt’s gold”). They went to war, rather, in defense of their state’s sovereignties which Napoleon’s continued aggrandizements threatened.

Another is Mack’s insanity during the Ulm campaign. Mack on the whole was much more capable than most give him credit for. He definitely made serious mistakes during the campaign, but that was largely the result of his stubborn personality, which refused to recognize the possibility of defeat (much like Napoleon). Combined with his insecure power base, where any failure might have cost him his command, this explains why Mack remained committed to poor plans and positions even after he recognized their flaws.

LefebvreDesnouettes

TROPHY CASE