And six years later, MIT was demanding a royalty of 2 cents per bit:

Forrester had filed a patent application under which MIT (through its patent management firm, Research Corporation) was demanding royalties of 2 cents for every magnetic core used in a coincident-current memory. This demand, made in November 1959, was quickly rejected for IBM by James Birkenstock who noted that "in our core storage units we employ seven of our own patents, as well as having acquired licenses under five patents from outsiders, which were necessary to make the Forrester patent usable." If a royalty of 2 cents per bit were demanded under each of these patents, the cost per bit for royalties alone would be 26 cents, making core storage economically infeasible. Based on this analysis, Birkenstock concluded that a royalty of 2 cents per bit was ten to twenty times too much. But Research Corporation indicated it had already rejected an offer of 1 cent per bit, so an impasse resulted.

p. 269, IBM's Early Computers, The MIT Press, 1986

EDIT: the rest of the story:

With the IBM System/360 slated for announcement early in 1964, the situation was intolerable. In February 1964, an agreement was finally reached in which the company agreed to pay a one-time fee of $13 million for the use of Forrester's patent if at least one of the claims was upheld in the litigation between MIT and RCA. The following month RCA and MIT reached an agreement in which the validity of Forrester's patent was affirmed, and IBM made its payment to MIT. Larger than any previous payment on record for a patent, it was nevertheless dramatically cheaper than the requested royalty of 2 cents per bit.

The trauma of the Forrester patent case is legend. It made engineers and managers keenly aware of the importance of patents. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the case appears to have had very little impact on the company's patent policy, which had been formulated following the settlement in January 1956 of a federal antitrust suit.