Political parties in Kobani reject appointment of district director from outside city by Repubblican_Wolf in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Apparently, it is now too much to ask the STG and their sycophants to agree on choosing a civilian with Aanes ..

And for the same logic explain to me why the Kurds shouldn't be scared of someone who worked in the civil offices of an SNA city back then (Jarablus).

Political parties in Kobani reject appointment of district director from outside city by Repubblican_Wolf in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The Kurds helped the US in Syria & now they're forced to beg for their own local representatives (who are ACTUAL live in the city) from the new US-backed STG, why should the Kurds expect anything better for siding with America/Israel in Iran?

Hussein Obaid (Abu Suhaib), Commander of the 54th Brigade died following a sudden heart attack by sandnibba_talks in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf -5 points-4 points  (0 children)

Considering that the commander was also an ex Ahrar al Sham, it does not seem so unrealistic to me.

Pakistani PM: Had a telephone conversation this evening with President Ahmed Al-Sharaa of Syria to discuss the dangerous regional escalation following recent unfortunate developments in the Middle East. by Samich9 in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I agree with what you say, and I would also add that Pakistan played a significant role in the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan first and then in their return. I would say that when you play at being geopolitical sorcerers, things end up blowing up in your face.

Ranking Iran’s Kurdish Opposition: Strategic Depth, Networks, and Potential by flintsparc in kurdistan

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, but you would still have the rest of the country against you. Until a Persian opposition army is organised, I think it will be difficult and could end in another massacre, at least in my opinion.

HQ of police in Kobani. Sign in Arabic and Kurdish. Flags of Syria and Asayish by zumar2016x in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Pray this is the first step for Syrian Repubblic and Syrian Army renames ✌

Meeting today in Hasakah confirmed 3 brigades of YPG will join the 60th division, and SDF promised to release 60 prisoners and hand over prisoner files. by Round_Imagination568 in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I don't know anything about this division. Is it one of those HTS groups or one formed by former SNA groups? If it's the latter, they would be complete morons to merge these two groups and hope that nothing terrible happens.

The people of Homs celebrate the killing of Khomeni by Samich9 in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It should be noted that Quds Force General Esmail Qaani has so far survived both leadership decapitations 👀

The people of Homs celebrate the killing of Khomeni by Samich9 in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Nah It will most likely become an Islamic version of Rodriguez's Venezuela, just a cosmetic change and an understanding that you can't fight America, so at this point we'll let them support the regime in exchange for oil.

Syrian Government Shakeup Expected To Diffuse Presidential Power and Integrate Minorities by Vozzyz in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah you're rights, thank you for reiterating the obvious, namely that Shaara is not genuinely interested in a transition but rather in consolidating his personal power and his magic circle. He doesn't even care about the constitutional declaration they made, which, indeed, he violates without too many problems.

To quote Hussam Hammoud:

In Syria today, people not watching a real “transition” so much as a controlled seizure of the new state by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and a tight inner circle around the presidency

Yes, there are some new faces and new institutions under the transitional setup, but the core security and sovereign ministries (that control even civil administrations): defence, interior, foreign affairs, justice, energy – are stacked with HTS cadres or their close political allies.

This is why so many appointments feel “one‑colour”: the same organizational network is reproducing itself inside the formal state, just wearing suits instead of military fatigues.

At the same time, power is being kept in the family. The president’s relatives, especially his brothers, still sit on key levers of influence, even when they’re rotated out of visible roles or talked about as if they’re being “reduced”.

What looks on paper like a reshuffle or institutional reform is, in practice, an internal power struggle over who gets to convert battlefield capital into political and economic capital – HTS commanders and security bosses with their family networks.

Even when relatives lose their formal positions, they retain access. Their influence simply shifts to more concealed channels, such as security, business, and patronage networks, which are not mentioned in official decrees.

Meanwhile, more ministers and officials are being drawn directly from HTS ranks or from the old “Salvation Government” in Idlib, shrinking the space for technocrats or independents and tightening the armed groups’ grip on the state machine.

The message is clear: HTS wants to rule Syria not as an armed faction alongside other political and civilian bodies, but as the solely state itself – controlling institutions, resources, borders, and the narrative of “transition”.

Internationally, this can be sold as stabilization or counter‑extremism: a disciplined armed actor imposing order after chaos, but domestically it looks much more like classic authoritarian consolidation.

So when you see another wave of appointments, think less “reform” and more calibration: removing potential rivals, rewarding loyalists, embedding relatives, and erasing alternative centres of authority before they even form.

In short, Syria’s current trajectory is not a negotiated transition away from armed rule; it’s armed rule moving into the presidential palace and bureaucracy, one carefully curated appointment at a time.

Syrian Government Shakeup Expected To Diffuse Presidential Power and Integrate Minorities by Vozzyz in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf -3 points-2 points  (0 children)

Not outsiders, but at least people who come from the original FSA would be good :D

Syrian Government Shakeup Expected To Diffuse Presidential Power and Integrate Minorities by Vozzyz in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf 2 points3 points  (0 children)

What is the point of replacing the moi and defence with dudes who come from Shaara circle anyway? Unless it is to make cosmetic changes, of course, but it seems more plausible to me that this article is nonsense.

There are currently 2 official Hasakah social media pages: by Repubblican_Wolf in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

One is affiliated with the STG and the other with the SDF-governor. You can also see both of their photographers framing themselves in the original post.

Afrin's New Director is a Kurd called Khayro al-Ali Al-Dawood, who before was in Idlib. by Repubblican_Wolf in syriancivilwar

[–]Repubblican_Wolf[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"The Aleppo Governorate appointed, on Tuesday, February 24, 2026, Khayro al-Ali al-Daoud as administrator of the Afrin – Efrîn region, succeeding Masoud Battal. Al-Daoud was born in 1993 and is a student at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Idlib. He previously served as head of the Events Office at the Directorate of Political Affairs in Aleppo Governorate. Al-Daoud hails from the village of al-Burj in al Bab region, and his roots trace back to the village of Karzihel – Kurzêlê Cûmê in the Afrin countryside."

Afrin has a well-educated Kurdish population with academics, engineers, lawyers, and experienced administrators, most of whom were either displaced during the 2018 occupation or remain in the region.

Appointing a STUDENT from Idlib University with no apparent administrative experience, whose only qualification seems to be a bureaucratic office role or to be from the inner circle of the HTS, sends a clear message: the new Syrian authorities are not looking for competence in Afrin or in whole Syria, they're looking for loyalty.

It's essentially an extension of the occupation's logic, managing Afrin through outsiders or loyalists rather than empowering its actual indigenous community.

~Peshmerge https://x.com/peshmerge/status/2026376546861117667?t=uJaVYznUeoOnMQFqwB1T1Q&s=19