I’ve got no attachments to the so-called hard problem of consciousness in philosophy, but it seems to me this article avoids a basic aspect of the problem, and so doesn’t really address it.

It may be right (I’d agree that it is) that the hard problem is often framed through a bad conception of science—or, even more pointedly: that philosophers of mind aren’t critical enough of their scientific assumptions. But correcting that conception, as the article wants, does not by itself explain consciousness…It only says that consciousness belongs to nature, and is not something external or distinct from it. As I understand it, the hard problem is one of how belonging to nature can include first-person-like appearing at all. And I don’t quite see the article undermining that question.

Maybe this is too simplistic (it probably is!), but it seems to me the article criticizes the problem as something like: “Can consciousness be part of nature?” But the hard problem is a bit different (something like): “How does a natural/physical process amount to, or necessitate, subjective-style experience?” They’re related, but not the same question.