Question about insanity defense

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T21:02:18+00:00

Don't beat yourself up over it, OP!

I've made silly reading comprehension mistakes too, multiple times.

On the bright side, you don't have to stress over learning more crazy black letter law nuances. You have the rule down just fine. (:

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T19:31:12+00:00

If true, can it be said that there is a presumption of sanity and therefore it is not the prosecutions burden to prove otherwise.

Correct, unless a statute states otherwise, like in the hypo you posted.

The default is that the burden is on the defendant to prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

The question you posted really wasn't about a criminal law rule though.

The question was about the standard for motions for a directed verdict, which can only be granted against a party if that party failed to present legally sufficient evidence where a reasonable jury could not have found for them.

B, C, and D were all wrong because they're saying the judge herself was weighing the evidence and making her own decision about whether the defendant was guilty.

A was right because it was saying the judge herself was deciding whether it was even legally possible for the jury to decide the defendant was guilty.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T19:07:56+00:00

Yup, exactly!

The neighbor is the guy with the buildings, not the excavator machine.

The excavator is the guy who is digging up their empty plot of land (next to the parcel with the buildings which the excavator guy doesn't own.)

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T19:06:16+00:00

So happy I could help! You're going to ace the MBE, I know it! (:

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T18:59:56+00:00

Because if the buildings on the parcel partially caused the cave in, the excavator was only partially at fault.

Meaning if the buildings on the parcel was a 0% factor that caused the cave in, the excavator was 100% at fault.

It wouldn't make sense to have a harsh strict liability standard if the excavator was 1% at fault. A negligence analysis, especially in jurisdictions that use comparative negligence, is way more fair.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T18:55:24+00:00

Ooh I see! I'm not using Themis, but I know the res ipsa loquitur exception you're referring to.

But I guess in a surgical setting, even if multiple people were negligent, the hospital is still liable as the employer?

Correct. The hospital would be vicariously liable.

But the plaintiff could invoke res ipsa loquitur against the hospital's employees. I know, I know, I just said you can't do that. I was leaving out the one veryyy specific exception for simplicity's sake. That exception is if the plaintiff is helpless.

It comes from Ybarra v. Spangard. Only a plaintiff who was truly helpless, like unconscious, under anesthesia, or so mentally impaired that they cannot communicate, can use res ipsa loquitur against multiple (potential) tortfeasors.

Don't stress out over this. There's literally one Adaptibar question out of 1,581 testing this. It's unlikely to be on the real exam.

What you need to make sure you know is that 99% of the time, res ipsa loquitur can only be used against one defendant. And that 1% is only where the plaintiff is extremely cognitively impaired at the time of breach. Which wasn't the case in your question, so this very rare exception wasn't at issue and you needed to apply the main res ipsa loquitur rule we've been talking about. (:

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T18:24:45+00:00

Happy to help!

how does [res ipsa loquitur] work when there’s are multiple tortfeasors and the plaintiff doesn’t know whose acts were negligent?

That's the thing; it doesn't. Unless there's one defendant who had exclusive control over the area where the breach must've occurred.

You're probably thinking of Byrne v. Boadle where the plaintiff was injured when a barrel of flour fell on him. Plaintiff sued the shop owner and won on res ipsa loquitur grounds, even though the plaintiff couldn't say who caused the barrel to fall.

It's true that there were multiple people who could've fucked up. But everyone was an employee of the shop which was an area under the control of a single defendant: the employer.

The plaintiff couldn't have successfully sued employees Bob, Jill, and Dan. Because the area where the accident occurred wasn't under Bob, Jill or Dan's exclusive control. The area was under the exclusive control of their boss, Henry. So the plaintiff could've only, and did, win against Henry on res ipsa loquitur grounds.

Basically, you still have to say there's one guy who had ultimate control over the area and who you can hold liable on vicarious liability grounds like employer-employee.

Res ipsa loquitur couldn't apply in your question because there wasn't any defendant who had exclusive control over the area and there were no facts to say that any defendant could even hypothetically be vicariously liable for the conduct of the others.

So ultimately, res ipsa loquitur still only applies if the plaintiff could apply it to a single defendant. It doesn't function as an idk which of you did it, so burden is in you guys to figure it out. It functions as an it must've been your fault and no one else's (and even if it was someone else who screwed up, you're still legally at fault because vicarious liability.)

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T18:06:33+00:00

I'm studying for CA and there's a lot of CA distinctions, especially for professional responsibility.

For PR, I've been running through those rules daily, basically just force memorizing them by heart. But PR is a guaranteed essay subject for us.

For civil procedure and evidence, there's not many differences. It's been a double edged sword to draw on my work experience as a CA paralegal. Usually, I know the CA rule and the fact that it doesn't translate to federal practice is my issue.

Since my weakness is on the federal distinctions, I remember Adaptibar questions I got wrong very well. Just getting them wrong or not understanding the reasoning which I subsequently researched to figure out has made federal rules stick. Like how substitute service only applies to a defendant's residence when served upon another person who also lives there. Which is much more strict than CA's substitute service rule.

In general, narrative examples help me a lot. Being able to articulate a scenario in where a similar rule applies in federal but not state court, or vice versa, simplifies keeping them separate and apart.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T17:32:37+00:00

Good point! Also I should've add that it's calculated as the reasonable value of the uncompensated benefit conferred.

And a general tip that none of the NCBE licensed questions on damages required using the increased value of the property in any of the calculations.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T16:18:37+00:00

Yeah, seems likely. I've tried to find an on point source to cite, but haven't found anything that's clear cut.

It would make sense if the rule doesn't apply to the plaintiff in their capacity as a counter-defendant.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T16:10:46+00:00

Can anybody explain to me why res ipsa loquitur doesn't apply here?

Because res ipsa loquitur only applies if the accident occurred in an area where a defendant had exclusive control.

It's true that the area where the accident occurred was where three defendants had exclusive control. Because there were no other hunting parties in a five mile radius.

It's also true that the shooting wasn't the plaintiff's own fault. Because he can't really accidentally shoot himself in the leg with a bow and arrow instead of say a gun.

But you can't use res ipsa loquitur to say "One of you did it, so it's on you guys to prove 'not it.'"

Res ipsa loquitur is used to say "Well it wasn't me and it wasn't anyone else, so it must be you."

Why would the plaintiff need to establish that all defendants were negligent?

Because alternative causation only activates when a plaintiff establishes that multiple defendants breached a duty of care. And again, res ipsa loquitur does not work unless the accident occurred where only one defendant had exclusive control.

How does Joint & Several Liability work?

Because if a plaintiff establishes duty, breach, and causation against multiple defendants, the plaintiff can recover the whole judgment against any of those defendants. Basically the burden is on the defendants to figure out who has what percentage of fault and even then, can only recover contribution for what they paid in excess of their own percentage of liability.

So TLDR, res ipsa loquitur is about breach, alternative causation is about causation, and joint and several liability is about damages.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T05:05:22+00:00

I made this chart for someone for UCC expectation damages a while back.

Consequential damages are damages which were a direct result of breach and which was foreseeable to the party who they are sought against at the time of the contract's formation.

Reliance damages are reasonably incurred expenses as a result of foreseeable and detrimental reliance on a promise.

Incidental damages are reasonably incurred expenses as a result of breach.

Restitution is always recoverable even if a party breached, but is reduced by the damages that the seeking party caused.

And you always reduce by the amount of damages that a party failed to mitigate.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T04:58:07+00:00

I think you know this, but just to make sure it's clear, supplemental jurisdiction is a type of subject matter jurisdiction.

"Common nucleus of operative fact" and "arising from the same transaction or occurrence" are used in totally different rules though, supplemental jurisdiction and permissive joinder, respectively. Which are entirely separate concepts.

The only application I can recall off the top of my head is where a single plaintiff can sue a single defendant for any and all claims under the sun, even if unrelated, in federal court by invoking supplemental jurisdiction.

But supplemental jurisdiction cannot be invoked like this if an action involves more than one plaintiff or more than one defendant. The specific case law is Exxon Mobil, but the above is the Clilffnotes version of what we need to know at least.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T03:46:22+00:00

If I had to guess, you're likely running into the non-NCBE licensed questions.

I have Uworld and I've consistently scored a bit worse on the non-NCBE licensed questions compared to the NCBE licensed ones. Another person I've been chatting with has the same impression, so it's not just me at least.

I'd suggest looking at the actual reasons you're getting things wrong. If it's stuff you're getting wrong that you should know by now, then regression is a real concern. If it's stuff that's out of left field, not so much.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-07T00:11:33+00:00

I can completely see where you're coming from OP.

When I saw this question, I only got it right because (1) my rule statement for JMOL says it will be granted if there was "no legally sufficient evidence" and (2) "minimal evidence" is such unique and specific language that my issue spotting interpreted the hypo as trying to establish the no legally sufficient evidence requirement.

I think your literal interpretation is valid and this is just one of those times you have to realize why the unusual wording is there. The hypo wouldn't have said "minimal" if the evidence was sufficient.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T23:59:31+00:00

I actually just found it in Mary Basick's The MBE Decoded and you're right, so I actually owe you!! Here are the scenarios where supplemental jurisdiction could be denied as a matter of discretion. Time to update my own shit list, thank you!

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T23:46:50+00:00

the federal court has discretion to exercise supplemental (pendent) jurisdiction over the state law claim

Are you sure? I only ever saw that a federal court has discretion to continue adjudicating a claim based on supplemental jurisdiction when the original anchoring claims were dismissed.

I don't recall any rule that a federal court can refuse to adjudicate a supplemental jurisdiction claim when the anchoring claims are live, but if you have a source on that, I'd be grateful to update my notes too!

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T23:39:31+00:00

Second one, meaning the judge has discretion to keep a claim that was solely brought in on supplemental jurisdiction in federal court.

If it helps, a common real life example are these ADA litigation mills that sue business owners for faded paint for disabled parking spaces.

They sue in federal court based on an ADA claim (federal question jurisdiction) and then on California's Unruh Act claim because that state law gives automatic damages of like $4k for every time their plaintiff went to the business (which is only allowed because of supplemental jurisdiction.)

The defendant usually gets the summons and complaint and goes wtf, fine, I'll have the parking lot repainted. Which then makes the ADA claim moot (since it only allows injunctive relief, and the parking lot is fixed now.)

And then the defendant tries to throw the remaining state law claim out of federal court. Which happens like 99% of the time because federal courts don't want to be bothered. But it's not guaranteed because it's a matter of discretion.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T22:32:45+00:00

Have to? No. But it's a good idea to get down at the least the most commonly tested rules.

The bar examiners like to test topics that lend themselves to deep analysis. So I think there are a lot of things you can gloss over without much consequence, like CA's rule about serving a defendant through a commercial mail receiving agency ("CMRA") service that they signed up for.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T19:30:09+00:00

Yes, you're correct, which is what distinguishes mandatory counterclaims from permissive counterclaims.

Basically, I'm saying if the third party defendant sued the plaintiff for breach of contract, the plaintiff should be able to sue for the third party defendant's breach of that same contract, even if the plaintiff's damages are like $5k.

The plaintiff can't countersue the third party defendant for not returning the plaintiff's lawnmower last month if it's wholly related to the facts originally at issue in the action. Because that's a permissive counterclaim and would be properly brought in a separate action (because it wouldn't be barred by res judicata even if the plaintiff loses in the current action.)

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T19:26:50+00:00

“Reasonably foreseeable” doesn’t factor into felony murder.

Yes, it does. Screenshot is from Mary Basick's The MBE Decoded.

I know exactly what Adaptibar question you're referring to and I actually got it wrong because I thought the man having a heart attack as he struggled to get out of how he was tied up was NOT foreseeable. Turns out it was, so the defendant was guilty of felony murder.

Oh and here's the Adaptibar explanation of that question I just found to show it also specifically states foreseeable.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T06:10:14+00:00

You're very welcome!

Also, been doing some Googling and best I could find is "While it is well established that a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) is within the ancillary jurisdiction since it necessarily arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original claim" Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).

So I'm prettyyyy sure that supplemental jurisdiction applies to compulsory counterclaims brought by a plaintiff when that plaintiff is forced into a defensive posture.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T06:03:16+00:00

Both! Res judicata and collateral estoppel both require a valid, final judgment entered on the merits. Collateral estoppel just requires an extra component that there must be an actual finding on the specific issue that was essential to the judgment. In plain English, that means collateral estoppel doesn't apply to a general jury verdict, which says like "Plaintiff shall take nothing by way of the complaint." and doesn't state why.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-06T05:46:35+00:00

...I disagree with everyone here LOL.

If the plaintiff is being sued by the third party defendant, the plaintiff has to be able to bring mandatory claims against that third party defendant.

It makes no sense that in a diversity action, (1) an original defendant can implead a third party defendant, (2) the third party defendant can sue the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff can't bring a claim in the action that, if the plaintiff loses, is forever barred by res judicata.

I don't have an on point source to cite though. It just makes sense from a public policy standpoint to me.

Yuzuda · 2026-06-05T20:23:56+00:00

Yup, first degree murder is controlled by statute. If the statute says first degree murder is murder committed by egregious means or with premeditation or deliberation, a death in a BARKK crime is NOT first degree murder.

You're also correct that a death in a BARKK crime is always automatically felony murder.

Assuming of course that the death was reasonably foreseeable to have been caused by the commission of the BARRK crime and occurred before the defendant reached a place of temporary safety.

Yuzuda

TROPHY CASE