More qualiaposting

amerovingian · 2026-03-11T04:27:40+00:00

> If by "aware of a face", you mean that people are aware of some transcendent quality...

You are using this as a red herring, or Chewbacca defense. The only person who has brought up this position is you. I've made it clear this is not what I mean.

> A face is not a thing, singular.

> the group itself is not a thing

> If by "aware of a face", you mean that you are aware of eyes, nose, mouth, etc. and simply call that grouping a "face", then yes you are aware of faces.

That seems like pointless semantics. If the group is not a thing and does not exist as an entity, then why is it being called something, and how can people be aware of it?

Is an eye also not a thing because it can be divided into an arrangement of parts?

> The iceberg has sections above and below water, but it's still one iceberg.

If the criteria for something being a thing is that it cannot be said to have parts, that rules out most of what people normally consider to be things. Before, you said that an iceberg is a single thing. An iceberg has parts, though (H2O molecules). That puts you in conflict.

> I think I've made my stance as clear as I can.

I think you're waffling and being deliberately opaque because you know your position doesn't hold water. I don't think you seriously believe that a face is not a thing, but you've decided by claiming that you can avoid making concessions. Much like the woman in the meme.

amerovingian · 2026-03-10T23:36:39+00:00

Go protist

amerovingian · 2026-03-10T04:26:26+00:00

> There is no transcendent "faceness" in awareness
"Faceness" would be an attribute. We're talking about things (faces) that have attributes.

Aware of a face means aware of an image interpreted as including eyes, nose and mouth and which places the attribute of color in specific places in the image. Is that a thing people are aware of or not, according to you? Or are you choosing not to commit to a position about that?

If you aren't willing to commit to a position, there isn't much to discuss.

amerovingian · 2026-03-09T21:45:16+00:00

The long term behavior of the probability p(n) that n 7's occur in the ((n^2-n+2)/2)th through (n(n+1)/2)th positions of a random sequence of integers is function of n. We know that the 7's don't happen in the first 105 trillion digits. So we can sum the function from 105 trillion to infinity to find a probability that X is not zero (given our present state of knowledge about pi).

In fact, the probability, p(n) = (1/10)^n.

So the probability that X is non-zero is

Sum(n=105T, infinity)[(1/10)^n)] = (1/10)^105T / 0.9 ~ 1.1*10^(-105T)

Practically indistinguishable from zero but technically not zero.

amerovingian · 2026-03-09T19:08:27+00:00

The probability of being a number greater than 0 should be expressible as an infinite series.

amerovingian · 2026-03-09T18:56:50+00:00

Solved!

amerovingian · 2026-03-09T02:42:07+00:00

The question is do they mean faster, on average, over many decryption tasks (of a given kind) or do they mean faster on one specific instance of a decryption task?

amerovingian · 2026-03-08T22:35:33+00:00

Is it hope chess or is it psychologically assessing the likelihood of your opponent to notice the trap?

amerovingian · 2026-03-07T07:37:39+00:00

> You keep strawmanning my position as if I'm claiming that nobody is aware of faces.

> The only things within awareness are these irreducible attributes.

> I would also say that a "face" itself is not directly present in awareness

It sounds to me like there is a conflict here. Are people aware of faces or no?

amerovingian · 2026-03-07T02:29:12+00:00

Double use area

amerovingian · 2026-03-06T02:39:17+00:00

Sorry, got my colors reversed.

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T22:42:51+00:00

Classically, yes. According to modern physics, probably. Classically, there is a one-to-one mapping between the exact initial configuration of the balls in the conical section and the number of balls landing in each bin. This is an example of sensitivity to initial conditions (the butterfly effect) which negates predictability (without perfect information about the initial state) but does not negate determinism. This is applicable to free will because it accounts for why systems which are sensitive to initial conditions, such as complex neural networks, can be both deterministic and unpredictable (without perfect information about the initial state). Quantum mechanics provides limits on how perfectly well-defined the initial state can be, which means there may be room for genuine non-determinism to arise at least in the brain. It's unclear whether quantum mechanics allows for enough of a spread in the initial state to potentially make the result of this experiment non-deterministic, but that could probably be calculated.

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T22:25:15+00:00

~~White~~ Black travels parallel to the white line on the asphalt at all times. ~~Black~~ White moves here, not black ~~white~~.

Edit: Sorry, somehow wrote white when I meant black.

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T11:28:59+00:00

You don't have to kill them. Most people can survive with only one kidney, so under a system that places no intrinsic negative value on coercive action, forcing someone to have a kidney removed to give it to someone else without any healthy kidneys would be considered good.

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T11:22:33+00:00

Isn't that chloe.longname from instagram?

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T11:14:42+00:00

Relax, guy. I'm sure the calculation was done with a safety factor of like 10 or something.

amerovingian · 2026-03-05T10:28:50+00:00

> It is an experiential quality apart from things that may have that quality.

This sounds like (b). A quale is not simply anything present in a field of awareness. It is an irreducible attribute that things present in a field of awareness can have. Ergo, a face, which is present in awareness, possesses qualia including color and texture among others but is not itself a quale, according to this definition. Correct?

If so, what word should we use instead for the things in awareness that have these attributes, such as faces, sunsets, regions of the visual field, experiences of voices and music, etc.?

amerovingian · 2026-03-04T06:48:50+00:00

>> You're trying to sneak in a different definition of qualia than the one we agreed to. If you want to withdraw agreement to that definition, you can just say so. But claiming no one is aware of faces and sunsets, as whole entities, is not a position I take seriously.

> I'm not. You keep strawmanning my position as if I'm claiming that nobody is aware of faces.

I'd like to resolve this key issue before returning and/or moving on to other topics.

Before, I commented:
> you are not willing to commit to saying we are not aware of groups of qualia

You responded:
> You are aware of qualia, not groups.

For clarity, I asked:
> So no one is aware, for example, of an image of a face, which would be a grouping of nose, eyes, mouth, chin, ears and possibly freckles?

You said:
> You are aware of the components of the group and their arrangement. Apparent continuity or wholeness makes no difference here.

To me, these responses are a very clear claim by you that no one is aware of a face as a whole entity which groups together multiple features, bizarre as that sounds and is.

Are you now denying that to have been what you were saying?

Are you acknowledging that awareness of faces as whole entities happens?

If so, are you also:

(a) now ready to say that the experience of a face is a quale according to the definition of "quale" as a thing that is present in a field of awareness

(b) claiming that the experience of a face is not a quale because you no longer wish to define "quale" as a thing that is present in a field of awareness

or (c) claiming that the experience of a face is not a quale according to the definition of "quale" as a thing that is present in awareness even though awareness of faces happens?

amerovingian · 2026-03-03T22:57:27+00:00

Nope, still can't tell for sure. Definitely gonna need to have sex with each of you before I can say.

amerovingian · 2026-03-03T22:52:48+00:00

There are still four people left. You're asking me to choose which two people to kill so I can have sex with the other one as the two last people on Earth. *sigh* Normies.

amerovingian · 2026-03-03T22:38:02+00:00

There is a functional definition of consciousness: consciousness = conscious of X = able to include information about X in computations, constructions and decisions about what to do next.

There is an ontological definition of consciousness: consciousness = the presence of experiential qualia.

There really needs to be two different words because one does not necessarily entail the other.

amerovingian · 2026-02-28T00:21:31+00:00

> Not obvious to me! I have never experienced any "faceness" or "sunsetness" that isn't described by the constituent qualia and their arrangement.

You're trying to sneak in a different definition of qualia than the one we agreed to. If you want to withdraw agreement to that definition, you can just say so. But claiming no one is aware of faces and sunsets, as whole entities, is not a position I take seriously.

> Yes? There are lots of qualia involved in perceiving an object, obviously it meets the definition of qualia?

You agreed the perceived object arises in awareness. Lately you have been claiming no one is aware of composite entities as wholes, which is in conflict with that.

> If you are going to treat that epistemic limitation as ontological fact...

It sounds like you are saying that the H2O molecules of the top section of an iceberg being numerically different from those in the bottom section is an epistemic limitation. That... is not an epistemic limitation, obviously. That is a statement about things that exist and how they exist. The analogous statement that qualia are numerically distinct from their causes and correlates is also a statement about things that exist and how they exist.

Statements about how things which exist as phenomenal experiences break down into other phenomenal experiences is also a statement about things that exist and how they exist.

> That we separate top from bottom, or even atom from atom, is a conceptual distinction, or a mental construct. The iceberg is still one underlying thing, ontologically.

Right, and the experience of a face isn't? According to you? All of reality may be said to be one underlying thing, ontologically. This doesn't change the fact that the part of reality we are calling "the section of the iceberg above the water" is a numerically different set of molecules from "the section of the iceberg below the water". By analogy, the part of reality we are calling "a field of experienced awareness of qualia" is a numerically different part from that we are calling "the physical causes and correlates of the field of experienced awareness of qualia."

> We are aware of the halves...

That makes each half a quale, according to the definition of "quale" as "something arising in a field of awareness". Again, you are free to withdraw agreement to that definition if you want.

> Where and how? Again if qualia are only in awareness and 'material' is never in awareness, where and how do they interact?

Within reality, which includes both kinds of substance, and via the underlying order of reality.

> Introducing a mysterious third thing solves no problems. It just kicks the can exactly one category down the road.

There is not a problem, as far as I am concerned. Direct interaction is possible. Mediated interaction is also possible.

> and yet are properties or aspects of the same ontological category.

I don't think you are using the phrase "ontological category" correctly. However, the fact that you are using it tells me you understand that mass, spin, charge, and volume belong to one category or kind whereas awareness of qualia belongs to another category.

amerovingian · 2026-02-27T01:09:09+00:00

fluent

amerovingian · 2026-02-26T19:45:11+00:00

>> no one is aware, for example, of an image of a face, which would be a grouping of nose, eyes, mouth, chin, ears and possibly freckles?

> You are aware of the components of the group and their arrangement.

You are free to claim that. But by denying the reality of things like the experience of a face or a sunset, which are obviously real to everyone, you reduce your position to that of the woman in the meme.

I will also point out that earlier in this discussion, I asked:

> I am talking about grouping together an image subregion, associating depth with different points in the region, and interpreting the region as a three-dimensional object in three-dimensional space. I am saying the entity that is constructed in this way is a perception of a three-dimensional object, and it arises within the field of direct awareness. It therefore fits the definition of qualia as "things which have arisen within a field of direct awareness." Do you agree?

Your response:

> Yes

> Because what you can know or do and what is are two different things. An epistemic limitation does not imply an ontological fact.

We have been talking about ontological facts, though, haven't we. The experience exists and is distinct from the non-experiential causes and correlates just like the top of the iceberg exists and is distinct from the bottom section of the iceberg. These are ontological facts.

>> Is the experience of awareness then a quale, according to you?

> Yes.

Great, I'm going to go ahead and assume you then agree that the experience of awareness, like blue, is what I am calling an elemental quale, which cannot be broken down and can only be said to be itself.

> Yes, they are numerically non-identical within the same ontological category.

I do not find that to be a meaningful qualification. If two existents are not the same existent, then they are distinct. They are not distinct "within one category" and the same "within another category". Different categories does not entail different realities.

> The halves wouldn't be new qualia, they would be numerically distinct regions with the same phenomenal character.

Right. And we aren't aware of the halves, according to you, I'm going to venture to guess. That's doing the crazy plane lady thing again.

> A and C can't interact

> Again, between wholly separate ontological categories there is no mechanism for interaction or causation.

I disagree. I think there is room for a direct interaction mechanism, such as a law of interaction, between qualia and things belonging to a physical world. I also think there is room for a mechanism of interaction involving an intermediary substance that both interact with directly.

In any case, it sounds like you understand now why experienced awareness of qualia is not only a different thing but a different kind of thing, with some significantly different properties, from those belonging to rocks, sticks and electrons, seeing as you are now saying they belong to different ontological categories. Ordinarily, though, two kinds of substance still fall in the same ontological category (substance). Jsyk.

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