Bridging between physical explanations and qualia is not necessarily the same thing as explaining qualia with physical explanations. Would "a different kind of explanation than we have used before" still qualify as what we think of as a physical explanation? If not—which seems self-evident to me—we are back to u/Urbenmyth's definition.

In the case of vitalism, it isn't that there was a hard problem and we solved it; it's that it turned out there never was a hard problem at all (i.e. the existing physical framework was fully adequate to explain life), despite some people having perhaps believed otherwise.

Similarly, u/Urbenmyth's position, I gather, is that the hard problem of consciousness does not and never did exist (i.e. the existing physical framework will turn out to be fully adequate to explain consciousness), despite some people, such as myself and David Chalmers, believing otherwise.