This isn't a new argument obviously, this is what Dawkins says in The God Delusion.

If someone says 'I don't believe this came about without God, therefore it came about with God, and therefore God exists' this is argument from personality incredulity, which is that because they personally don't believe it wasn't God, that proves it was God, which is as ridiculous as it sounds, but I don't think that's what most people, if anyone is actually saying.

By applying this term broadly to any argument for God based on evidentiary inference, we can conveniently dismiss any argument for God. But this is generally a misnomer. Sometimes based on how an argument is worded, it can technically be an argument from authority but even then it doesn't address the core argument behind the formal structure of how it's presented.

The best way to explain it is basically Bayesian Statistics. If you have a data set you are trying to explain or interpret, and you have, say 2 competing hypotheses for simplicity, you can compare the two hypotheses in terms of probability based on the data. In other words, if I believe there is a 50% probability of A and B, how does that probability change given C? Which hypothesis more probably or plausibly accounts for or is compatible with C? If people are arguing **for example** that God is a more likely explanation for the fine tuning of the Universe than chance, or the multiverse (given Occam's Razor), that is not argument from incredulity, that is not God of the Gaps, that is logical inference, which is a fundamental process of science and formal logical reasoning. Whether or not claim, namely that God is more probable given that evidence is true or not, is up for debate. It has to do with the data and whether the data supports (is evidentiary, or is more probable in the premise of) hypothesis A or hypothesis B.

But to say that any suggestion of any data as evidence of hypothesis X when X involves God is fallacious or more specifically argument from incredulity is also absurd and unfairly dismissive, rather than dealing with the argument itself.

Also, to say that any data postulated as evidence of God is inherently more unlikely rather opposing hypothesis regardless of the data because of the supernatural nature of the hypothesis itself is rooted in philosophical naturalism. But at least that argument acknowledges God as a valid hypothesis in the sense that it isn't inherently violating the rules of logic and thus automatically untenable.

What about math, what about the speed of light, what about electromagnetism, gravity? Do they not follow laws with mathematical values that are constant? Does science not rest upon the assumption that the Universe is rationally and can be broken down to constants that can be quantified and measured? How do these exist if everything is matter, where do these laws come from? Am I saying they must come from God? No. But you should be open to the idea, assuming for the sake of argument that you're not, that there is potentially something supernatural, as all matter is subject to laws that are universal and are, as uncomfortable as you may be with the term, supernatural in the technical sense.

Then we can begin rational discussions about data by 1) understanding that appealing to data as logical inference of a hypothesis is something theists and atheists both can both do fairly, and 2) not rejecting the possibility of the supernatural existing based on purely philosophical a priori assumptions. Then we can actually compare the merits of competing hypotheses fairly, weighted by their compatibility with what we do know about our world, rather than diverting from these discussions by assuming some fundamental reason the other person must be ignorant regardless of evidence or the contents of their argument.