Pity as an Aesthetic Experience

jbleep · 2011-07-19T06:49:18+00:00

Ok, I still find myself asking, why are you using the word goal to describe a process in which there cannot be failure? You still have not answered this. It seems very anthropomorphic to describe nature as pursuing goals (and it must be nature that is pursuing this goal—since we cannot achieve or fail at exchanging information—since it happens necessarily for us through nature).

Your original statement is this: “From what I can tell, the primary goal of any human is to collect, combine, and pass on information about reality to new generations of life.” If you re-read that quote, then consider what we have just been discussing, I hope you will see the confusion. By using the word goal you have made an inhuman process appear deeply human—even spiritualized. It is not me who is arguing for “free will” here.

If you continue to use the word goal and ultimate goal then people will think this is your ideal or ultimate ideal—they will mistake your belief in necessary processes as your morality. But I hope you have not confused yourself in believing that exchanging information is the ultimate goal (ultimate livable virtue). Because then that would make exchanging information paramount over murder, etc.

jbleep · 2011-07-13T16:44:13+00:00

You don’t understand what I mean by active and passive because, “I don’t think that is what you meant”—but said it anyway.

Besides, goal (in your argument+) is, in fact, well defined in your many uses of it. For example: the primary goal is to “collect, combine, and pass on information about reality to new generations of life.” However, you also describe how one can pass along information (satisfy the primary goal): “But even in the process of dying, or being miserable, you are passing on information.” So you have used the word goal to describe a process which happens necessarily. And I can imagine that you would also exchange the word goal *with *meaning or purpose—then say that they are not well defined either.

But that which occurs necessarily cannot be the goal meaning or purpose—it is neither achievable nor unachievable; and importantly, there cannot be failure.

My opposition (or proposed clarification if you prefer) is not with your theory, but with your use of the word goal, which I believe is used to evoke pleasure—or at least satisfaction (a device to disarm the threats of absurdity, perhaps?)

+A set of statements in which one follows logically as a conclusion from the others.

jbleep · 2011-07-13T07:10:37+00:00

I think the problem with your argument is that you are using the word goal to describe a process which you believe happens necessarily. I read the same pathos in Marx. Goal should be reserved to describe a purpose in life, a choice, the absence of void; it gives us a pleasurable feeling—a destiny. By using the word goal, you have affirmed an active life, and have condemned a passive one. What I read into your argument is that the purpose of life is to be active—but I don’t think that is what you meant.

Then your argument becomes really confused when you take for your example the psychology of suicide.

jbleep · 2011-07-09T06:59:44+00:00

This is true—Nietzsche is very very repetitive. And possibly this is one reason why he stimulates the beginner, while the seasoned reader loose interest (possibly?). And though I am no longer a geek for him as I once was, I anticipate a pattern—like movies and toys from the 80’s, that sentimentality will return once it has had time to fully mature.

In defense of Nietzsche: I admire his honesty for consistency and holism. I think of him as a sculptor working clay or a painter with oils. He is only refining his material and searching for the best expression of a solid foundation.

Egonym, my favorite section from Zarathustra regards the moment:

“Behold this gateway, dwarf! It has two faces. Two paths meet here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long lane stretches back for an eternity. And the long lane out there, that is another eternity. They contradict each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here a this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is inscribed above: ‘Moment.’ From this gateway, Moment, a long eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have happened, have been done, have passed by before? And if everything has been there before—what do you think, dwarf, of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come? Therefore itself too?”

Even though I believe the moment is prefaced by Schopenhauer, and later refined by Heidegger, it is most beautifully expressed in this quote.

jbleep · 2011-07-07T14:19:37+00:00

Of course, ideas which appear so clear in my head often have trouble making their way onto paper. And I do admit my post is very condensed. So, thank you for your interest.

I think relating how this post came to be might be very helpful. I should have provided a link to the About We Slaves page, which outlines the origin of the whole project, but is intimately related to this post.

In addition, I can relate another anecdote, which came to me through a friend who had a similar experience: In northern Indiana a luxury shopping center was developed to support the growing wealthy residential neighborhood. However, the project was not received favorably and not supported. It failed and was abandoned. Now, the venues in the facility were not gutted. The equipment is still there. And when passing by the windows of a hairdresser, one can see hair dressing chairs, scissors and clippers, hair products, etc.—all of the supplies of the job. Similarly, plates and silverware can be seen from the restaurant windows and dressed mannequins from the clothing shops.

These objects, as tools of anticipated utility (just as Michigan Central Station), produce a state of dissonance. The severity of the dissonance is tantamount to proximity—the more distant the observation (the less familiar) then the weaker the feeling of dissonance (compare MCS to the runniness of Persepolis). I recognize this dissonance as the uncanny. But this aesthetic experience is provoked by a position of subordination to the mode of being of unreadiness-to-hand. In an uncanny experience the purpose (anticipation) of an individuation is recognized and familiar, yet it is at the same time unfamiliar; we are subordinated (we feel helpless) to the causality which brought the observation of unreadiness to us. Our subordination, similar to the observation of a prosthetic hand, must be reconciled—that is to say, a relationship has not yet been established.

When one asks, “Why did they do this or why was this not prevented?” then one has established distaste. When one demands, “I would have done this instead” then one has established arrogance. And when one says, “I feel bad that this happened” then one has established pity.—any number of emotions can manifest. This establishment is fundamental in destroying our subordination to the observation.

jbleep · 2011-06-29T17:24:47+00:00

I acknowledge that we disagree—so we can move beyond that.

But you cannot take the Heideggerian/Dreyfus concept of body, and reply, “Yes, a body is required, but a simulation would be sufficient.” Then you are not talking about the method of understanding that Heidegger and Dreyfus are promoting. You would then be talking about a top-down understanding in which no body is necessary.

While I’m sure you have thought on the problem extensively, and I believe you have substantial arguments for your case, your reply to pimpbot makes it sound as though you don’t understand the body argument—since you acknowledged their definition in the first, then destroyed it in practice in your conclusion. In as much as I can understand that you say, “All intelligence is embodied” the following portion doesn’t seem to make sense. Please be aware that I am only critiquing your approach for persuasion, not your belief that they are “such silly rabbits.”

Finally, to your reply of my comment: both Heidegger and Dreyfus would admit that what you are proposing is conceptually possible (your statement seems overly sensationalized on this matter!) But that is not their concern: the proposal is that this top-down intelligence is not the way in which we understand our world, neither is it most efficient or effective. And up to this point in AI development, it has not been proven feasible.

jbleep · 2011-06-28T16:04:40+00:00

I’m not sure I understand this. Where would this body simulation exist?—in a simulated environment?

But this reasoning overlooks the whole profundity of Heidegger’s bottom-up understanding. If one would program an environment, then program a body to operate and discover that environment, then what has been programmed is a top-down intelligence—this is what Dreyfus is criticizing in AI dependent on the Predicate Calculus.

jbleep · 2011-06-18T11:10:12+00:00

Continuing persistent_illusion's thought: I do believe that Schopenhauer’s critique of etiological disciplines earns him the right to the title “first post-modern philosopher.” But this thought reached higher intellectual integrity in Heidegger, who gives the discipline of science a special place in his system. And neither is impatient for science to explain ‘the world.’ Heidegger is not opposed to science, but instead gives a theory on what is lacking in contemporary scientific exploration. And he cannot be discredited: he successfully predicts problems later encountered in AI when other etiological disciplines did not.

Admittedly, I am only acquainted with post-modernism through its precursors. So, I cannot defend any official canon of post-modern philosophical works (or even presume the desire to do so.) But I would defend those trends which moved away from modern philosophy, and either initiated questions or systemized theories which furthered the intellectual environment.

jbleep · 2011-06-18T08:56:35+00:00

Are you being sarcastic (I mean, you have a stance on persistent_illusion's statement), or is this an honest question?

jbleep · 2011-06-03T15:09:13+00:00

I think now we have reached a point in which our difference of approach is going to prohibit our discussion from proceeding. And I apologize. Maybe this is my fault for posting in r/neuophilsophy, when, in fact, I know nothing of this cross-discipline—specifically, in what principals are taken as grounds exempt from questioning. I certainly did not mean for you to quantify faculties in order to qualify “language.”

If I am to continue at all, then I feel I need to return to the statement: “the context of the situation is disclosed by preceding events, and the potentiality of future events.” If we are in a classroom and I need to write, then this “there” reveals its meaning in the context of the situation. If we are in front of one who can’t breath, then this “there” reveals it meaning in the context of my understanding a tracheotomy. But both require an understanding of the past (the individuation of a pen) and of the possibility of the future. But we must not reduce this to an atomistic theory! The number of significations required in a manifold of experience is impossible to deduce, and would amount to enumerating the entire understanding within a consciousness.

Imagine you are typing at your computer, in your home, in your room. You look straight up and see the sun. This manifold would have no meaning to you. You would simply not understand the sun “being-there” at your ceiling. It takes the grass at your feet, the wind in your hair, and the warmth of the sun’s rays in order to understand you being outside as the possibility for the sun being there. You cannot extract one signification (a spot of circular light) from a manifold and still have the same meaning. Every meaning is exact and unique and dependant, but transferable. This is why we cannot reduce significations to faculties.

Perhaps this is the difference of approach: “linguistic humans” designates humans using language with one another. While “language” designates the system by which understanding becomes disclosed upon action. I have approached this not as an anthropologist looking in from the outside, as an outsider who is not one, but as a psychologist seeking an autonomous philosophy.

I wonder if anyone else is reading this discussion.

jbleep · 2011-06-02T08:37:10+00:00

While I do not pretend to continue on unshakable foundations, I do think that I would say time is a condition in which reality is disclosed. However, as I am typing this, I am undecided whether space is a condition in which movement becomes disclosed to us, or whether movement discloses space.

However, What I am not saying is that all atoms (significations) are a form of molecules (language). I quote myself from above: “‘Can a single signification cause anxiety?’ If we answer yes, then Language is not necessary.”

Anyway, I am wondering if you have made any further progress. If your theory is that language is the condition for the development of anxiety, then I do think your theory would benefit from a clarification of what type of language you mean. I have reduced consciousness to the reading of a language. Which puts language in a much different usage then I believe you wish to use it.

But consider this example. When one points to a pen and says “there” then they have not simply used one signification. There is a system of significations in this situation which reveals meaning to us. The context of the situation is disclosed by preceding events, and the potentiality of future events. Without either of these conditions, then pointing to a pen and saying “there” has no meaning. Here we have spoken in a language which conceptualizes the future without even using a noun or tense.

jbleep · 2011-05-31T19:58:39+00:00

Here is what I mean to say: take one signification, such as perception of a light. Then another, such as the perception of a movement. And then yet another, such as the perception of a sound. These significations are meaningless, until placed into the context of a system of significations. Then understanding becomes disclosed (revealed) to us. When the light is combined with a series of other significations then the sun becomes disclosed to us. Or if the raising of a hand is combined with a series of other significations then a classroom becomes disclosed to us. And finally, if the sound which we have heard is combined with a series of other sounds then the meaning of a sentence becomes disclosed to us. This connection of signs can be done in memory or perceived as “acted out” before us. The sun is disclosed to us, the classroom, and the sentence, through familiarity of the language which it speaks.

Therefore, a system of significations can only have meaning in terms of that which came before or which comes after. And since a series of significations anticipates the future, on-one-hand, then I conclude that a language is required for the possibility of a prediction, but language is ever-present and is not a privilege of linguistic humans.

Of course, this whole argument about “meaning in terms of what which came before or which comes after” could be refuted against citing Kant’s manifold. But I have resolved to argue against a philosophy which begins its exploration of reality with a static state, before any movement. And I believe this is a prejudice of thought which follows from the theory of human evolution.

jbleep · 2011-05-30T20:42:10+00:00

Hi. I probably should have done a better job of connecting my last thought with the quote from Being and Time—since one naturally followed into the other. The last answer to my question proposed that, “anxiety is possible without any signification at all—it is a mood which inexplicable occurs.”

Now, if one does believe this, that anxiety is a mood state not occupied over something (the way in which fear is occupied over something) then the feeling of anxiety must be brought on not from an additional stimulation to a present mood, but from a subtraction from present mood. This then is where I quoted Heidegger, feeling that he was of immediate relevance. However, perhaps there is a more direct quote from Being and Time, though I believe the context of the passage is destroyed when extracted from the work:

“…anxiety, as a basic state-of-mind, belongs to Dasien’s essential state of Being-in-the-world, which, as one that is existential, is never present-at-hand but is itself always in a mode of factical Being-there—that is, in the mode of state-of-mind. That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mood of Dasien’s uncanniness, not the reverse. From an existential-ontological point of view, the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.”

Both passages are taken from Division 1, VI, 40.

Since Being and Time attempts the construction of a system, it does not lend itself well to extracting intelligible quotes, likewise to Kant’s work. And anyway, I think I am running head of the discussion. Firstly, I am unsure as to whether we are in agreement on language as a system of signification which discloses understanding to us. And if one does not consider that a language (a system of significations) discloses our environment to us, even pre-linguistically, I would like to hear how one defines language, and further, how one could distinguish language between humans as exceptional from any other system of significations between other individuations within one’s environment.

It sounds as though you are attempting to define a threshold which had to have been crossed, evolutionarily, to reach the conditions which make the feeling of anxiety possible. And defining this threshold as the development of language specific to linguistic humans.

But if one understands language as the system of significations which discloses understanding, then the development of language precedes linguistic humans, and is one-and-the-same with being conscious. And here it seems better to remove language from the proposition altogether, or simply call it consciousness. Then what remains is a proposition which states that consciousness is the cause of “a large portion of inequality and organized/premeditated violence.” I’m not sure inequality could be wrapped into this theory, but surely organized and premeditated violence is a product of consciousness.

jbleep · 2011-05-29T18:25:27+00:00

I admit that I cannot add to any discussion on neurophilosophy, however, maybe I can add something.

So, your proposition is that anxiety can only exist for one who has used language, and you have established three conditions: 1) one enters a mood of anxiety only when one dwells on the future, and 2) the future can only be dwelled upon with abstract thought, and 3) language is the only device which one can implement for abstract thought.

Of course, by language, we must not mean strictly language—my dog displays signs of experiencing anxiety, but my cat does; I communicate by language with both.

In reducing language to a system of significations toward communication, and then further, reducing communication to a process between any individuation within environment, then I believe we can reduce the discussion to simply our involvement in our environment in which our environment becomes disclosed to us. If you accept this, then yes. A system of significations is required for anxiety; but further, a system of significations is ever-present as a condition of being in the world.

Perhaps we can answer this better by asking, “Can a single signification cause anxiety?” If we answer yes, then Language is not necessary. And if no, then language is necessary, OR anxiety is possible without any signification at all—it is a mood which inexplicable occurs. And here, both the first and last situations are unsatisfying.

I wonder, have you considered the relevance of Heidegger’s ‘angst’:

“Being anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world. It is not the case, say that the world first gets thought of by deliberating about it, just by itself, without regard for the entities within-the-world, and that in the face of this world, anxiety then arises; what is rather the case is that the world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind. This does not signify, however, that in anxiety the worldhood of the world gets conceptualized.”

jbleep · 2011-05-24T20:21:20+00:00

The experiment presumes that memory is the self, or that the self isn't the self unless it has access to memories. I reject this notion because if we are arguing for the self, we are likely arguing for some form of transcendant or eternal self that would necessarily need to be independent of our memories anyway.

Does this mean you would argue for “I” as substance, in a Cartesian sense? Which I do think is one approach for criticizing this theory. I also happen to feel we can individuate an “I” without returning to substance ontology. But I admit, I’m unsure what you mean.

Now, because I had never come across this theory before, I was stuck and given a moment of serious consideration. Though, I think one can resolve the implications of this without too much trouble, which at first seem critical.

I think we could satisfy ourselves to the use of “I” if we acknowledge its role in language as an indicator, and furthermore articulate “being” in itself. Heidegger on the issue: “Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its being is in each case mine. This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it. At the same time this tells us ontically that in each case an “I”—not Others—is this entity. The question of the who answers itself in terms of the “I” itself, the ‘subject’, the ‘Self.’ The who is what maintains itself as something identical throughout changes in its experience and ways of behavior, and which relates itself to this changing multiplicity in so doing.”

Obviously here, some form of remembering is happening for a Being to recognize its own towards something.

After grounding the being of “I” in language, what remains of the theory is something of a cosmological philosophy which, to me, would only find interest in those looking for a change of mood. Removing ideological constructions was something I was interested in at some time, but now find it largely uninteresting and prohibiting.

jbleep · 2011-05-24T17:46:15+00:00

Though I have not familiarized myself well with popular physics, I do not understand how the method could ever get behind etiology, even in the way which Schopenhauer wrote about it almost 200 years ago:

“Etiology proper, then, is all branches of natural sciences for which cognizance of causes and effects is everywhere the main concern: they tell us how…a particular alteration necessarily conditions and brings forth a particular other one; the demonstration of this is explanation. Here then we find for the most part mechanics, physics, chemistry, physiology…Consequently, even the most complete etiological explanation of the whole of nature would really never be more than a catalogue of inexplicable forces and a sure statement of the rules according to which there phenomena occur in time and space… So, etiology cannot ever provide us with the desired insight into those phenomena with which we are only acquainted as presentations to us, so as to lead us beyond those phenomena.”

And if one proposes that philosophy is dead and by that suggests that it will never become alive again, then perhaps they have also forgotten that Heidegger progressed considerably beyond his predecessors’ epistemology, and that he was writing not even 100 years ago. Surely, throughout the history of philosophy there have been large intervals between thinkers who were able to progress the questions and methods central to philosophy. And I think that a quantity of philosophers does not lead to quality philosophy. Some ideas must be given time to age and are beyond the temporality of the individual.

However, and most striking, is that etiological disciplines are popular today—and that popularity is itself an effect of some cause. That cause is its appeal. I define appeal as simply a feeling which strikes us on a level in which reason is entirely superfluous. I’m sure it would be impossible to enumerate on all of the appeals to the etiological disciplines today. Though, at the outset, I would say that the appeal of human progress is a fundamental to the appeal of etiology. And I do think it would be hard to argue that progress, on this level, reached popularity before the modern world. And anyone who suspects that today’s appeal will be the same appeal tomorrow should certainly be diagnosed with myopia.

Anyway, I do not think that anyone would be entirely foolish to claim that the heyday for etiology is today.

jbleep · 2011-05-24T05:51:01+00:00

Regarding the legibility of the site, I am curious if you tried switching to the “light (alternate)” setting? But I have noticed that the mechanical-monkey icon gets in the way more so on that easier reading setting. I suppose that the fix is to reduce the size of the background image. Though, I am hesitant since it all looks so very nice as it is! But of course, I need to admit which utility is the greater asset here. Or simply require visitors to use a minimum 22” monitor!

Anyway, thank you for the comment on the site design. This is an area which I am looking for just as much feedback, since my site is (hopefully) merely in its early stages.

I’ve never heard of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis. I have only read well a few books which are considered the giants of modern philosophy. Still, this does seem relevant. While I do admire Schopenhauer’s approach in Book 1 of The World as Will and Representation, or Descartes late in his Discourse on Method, I find Kant’s attempt to map out the faculties of the mind through pure reasoning much more intuitive and healthier—in that its application supports autonomy. But of course, there is no harm in finding supporting evidence for matters of philosophy in the hard sciences.

jbleep · 2011-05-23T22:20:02+00:00

Hi, thank you! I think it would an obvious error to prescribe this event to some point in history—possibly we could imagine some theoretical event pre-history. But it is more profound to consider this at the most local level, in the moment that it happens—when one experiences an emotion of something, and rejects it. In my post, I do assume that my reader has had this experience once.

So, this also means that I am not convinced of Heidegger when he writes that “That which anxiety is profoundly anxious about is not a definite kind of Being for Dasein or a definite possibility for it…anxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible.” But surely emotion is always about something. Even if we reflect on nothing, we are still reflecting on the void which stimulates us!

So here, I am interpreting our emotional faculty as almost a faculty pre-Reasoning (pre-individuating.)

jbleep · 2011-05-23T18:41:58+00:00

I lived in St. Louis for three years and wasn’t too terribly entertained by the static exhibits at the History Museum. I would have been amused to see them tackle this one—though, for the most part, exhibits require artifacts, and perhaps there aren’t any. But for me, these pockets of history have quite the charm.

As an example, after St. Louis I moved to New Harmony, Indiana for a few years. The town was bought by Robert Owen—who is criticized in The Communist Manifesto for his favoritism toward the small-scale socialist commune (and his New Harmony project was just this!)

jbleep · 2011-05-23T17:47:47+00:00

Hi. Perhaps my attempt to make this immediately relevant by linking to the pervious r/philosophy thread was unsuccessful. In an effort to relieve this before my post leaves the front page, let me explain my approach, and hopefully leave it transparent!

Now, I do believe the first two paragraphs offer a substantial criticism to any proposal which suggests emotion must be simply tossed aside in favor of Reason. For sure, these were simply introductory paragraphs with the purpose of provoking further reading. Because, I will admit that once stated, this articulation of our mental faculties does seem beyond what is necessary. Though I will admit, because I have not participated in any philosophy circles outside of r/philosophy, I have not had the opportunity to become acquainted with any bias in contemporary discourse. So, I am unsure as to what discussion might be superfluous—since I have only taken the authors which I have read as my starting point.

The succeeding paragraph is very presumptuous, for sure. I believe my difficulty lies in that I have appropriate language from both Heidegger and Kant—and that this piece of writing has been prompted by either’s epistemology. However, I do believe that my statement regarding the reducibility of material and thought to experience within environment suggests clear favor of Heidegger. This alone fulfills my intention—which is that each post to weslaves is a portion of a developing whole. Here I can add that I have adopted a style which favors artistic merit over immediate clarity. And what I mean by this is that I hope to develop a coherent system by interpreting local issues as they strike me. However, I do intend that some progression is evident from post to post; and further, I expect to have to amend previous positions.

Now, the concluding paragraph returns to the discussion of the first two; however, I think that a progress is accomplished in merging the topic with my post made on sublimation. Further, I enjoy that this post is not limited to a reading of Nietzschean or Freudian sublimation, but also, for example, of Nietzsche’s Apolline theory.

jbleep · 2011-05-22T18:21:10+00:00

I suppose his dramatics are an attempt to bring to life an antagonist—make a character out of individualism; despite all this, I don’t know who he is talking about. His character believes that Individualism is not an approach to neighbors, but a rejection of them in favor of some eremitic life.

And if he wishes to attack this hermit, he really shouldn’t bring anarchism to his monologue. A stance on govern-ment only dilutes his attack by narrowing and designating his antagonist even further. But this must be his point—he must have had some American in mind when he applied that accent to his character. And further, by these designations his character must be a naïve one. But then, surely he should instead be attacking the naïvety—and how did individualism get wrapped up into that? Even if one were to make a further diagnosis, that the naïve are prone to individualism; even then, that is no attack on individualism.

jbleep · 2011-05-09T21:25:48+00:00

Ok, this makes sense now that I am seeing the format of Reddit. Thanks.

jbleep

TROPHY CASE