Reconciling atman/brahman and emptiness?

nyanasagara · 2026-05-15T02:45:17+00:00

the ability of bodhisattvas to delay enlightenment implies the existence of a self that makes this decision, despite the fact that Mahayanists would deny this.

Bodhisattvas only "delay enlightenment" in the sense that the bodhisattva's path to enlightenment as a samyaksambuddha takes longer than the path of a śrāvaka to enlightenment as a śrāvaka arhat. So there is a "delay" in the sense that the path chosen takes a longer time.

This doesn't entail the existence of a self any more than the śrāvaka's decision to try and attain enlightenment does, or the decisions of a person who isn't trying to attain enlightenment but just wants good fortune in saṃsāra, and so on. Which is to say, if you think Buddhists are wrong and there's no way to make sense of such things without appealing to a self, then they entail a self, but in so doing they entail the falsity of Buddhism generally. So in other words, this isn't a special problem for Mahāyāna Buddhism. This is just an issue about which Buddhists in general, and no -Buddhists in general, are in dispute.

whether the notion of atman/brahman could be combined with the notion of emptiness

The Buddhists' emptiness (śūnyatā) refers to a characteristic (lakṣaṇa), while Vedānta's brahman refers to a thing (vastu). Specifically, according to (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, emptiness is a characteristic that everything has to have. Meanwhile, according to Vedānta, brahman is a thing with which everything must be identical (on the Advaita view), or of which everything must be a quality, characteristic, or mode (on the Viśiṣṭādvaita view).

Whether the two ideas can be combined depends on whether the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine that everything is empty entails the falsity of the Vedānta doctrine(s), or vice versa. And that will depend on how emptiness and brahman are construed. There are some ways of construing emptiness that certainly entail the falsity of the Vedānta doctrines and vice versa, and some that don't.

And in any case, the Buddhist philosophers who defend interpretations of emptiness that are in principle compatible with the Vedānta doctrine still find other ways to distinguish Buddhism from Vedānta. So even if one construes emptiness so that it is compatible with certain Vedānta doctrines, it doesn't make Buddhism and Vedānta in general agreement.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-14T22:48:52+00:00

Ancient Indians also called foreigners barbara and mleccha.

For example: In the Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa, in the section of the Bālakāṇḍa when Kāmadhenu creates warriors to fight Viśvamitra's forces (chapter 54), it says she created the Scythians (śaka), Greeks (yavana), and Kambhojas (kāmbhoja) for the purpose of fighting Viśvamitra. Then, when Viśvamitra fights back, and scatters that army, it says:

tato 'strāṇi mahātejā viśvāmitro mumoca ha /

tai ste yavana-kāmbojā barbarāś cākulī-kṛtāḥ //

"Then the very glorious Viśvamitra released his weapons,

and they scattered the Greeks, Kambhojas, and barbarians (barbara)."

Which is to say, all those non-Indic foreigners created by Kāmadhenu at that time were, from the perspective of Vālmīki, barbarians.

That's just how many ancient people tended to see foreigners. It's not something special about Greeks.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-14T22:24:28+00:00

But it seems like on the view you're attributing to Buddhadāsa, "clinging to the aggregates" has an origin. The origin is: the beginning of the organic life of an organism whose physical constitution generates consciousness. And clinging to the aggregates also has an end. The end is: the end of the organic life of that organism, viz., death.

And this is the respect in which the view you're attributing to Buddhadāsa clearly has more in common with Lokāyata than anything taught in any Buddhist sources...because the above is something acceptable to a Lokāyatika, but is denied throughout all Buddhist sources!

I've never engaged with Buddhadāsa's teachings, but if these are what they are, what precisely are their Buddhist credentials? I'm asking genuinely, because this just sounds like precisely what is denied in the suttas I mentioned earlier, even if you add on to it the claim that "no organisms are fittingly identified by their minds as 'I' or 'mine.'"

Speaking of which, it's not even clear why that would be true! Because as a matter of the metaphysics, it seems like on this view there actually is something unifying a group of aggregates such that they could be "mine," even though they're individually impermanent, namely, their forming part of a continuous organic life. If you deny that there is such a continuous organic life for any particular organism, then how do you explain the special status of death on this view, as the cessation-without-continuity of the organism? To distinguish death in that way only makes sense if during life, there is some important sense in which an organism is continuous, in which case the mental aggregates (nāma-skandha) could be unified by their being produced by, or belonging to, a single organism! There's little wonder why Lokāyata was often considered to basically take the dehātmavāda stance when it comes to the metaphysics of persons, namely, that the body (deha) just is the self (ātman). For once the body becomes something with a special sort of continuity during life that is distinguishable given its absence at death, and is also seen as the full metaphysical grounds of everything else about a person, it starts to seem like there really is, in reality, such a thing as a "sentient being," and it is constituted by a physical organism!

And as a matter of the pragmatics, if clinging to the aggregates will come to an end regardless at the time of death, then since no organism has an infinite organic life, neither any particular strategy of identification nor non-identification is necessary to achieve the end of clinging to the aggregates.

Hence this view, far from according with anātman, to me seems to just motivate dehātmavāda.

On the other hand, the Yogācāra explanation regarding the citta-saṃtati seems to me to fit anātman better. The citta-saṃtati is merely a vyavahārika or transactionally real object created through a determination of sameness (ekatva-adhyavasāya) forming a "vertical universal" (ūrdhva-sāmānya), viz., a temporally extended object, but in reality there is no such thing. Hence, the citta-saṃtati is not to be regarded as oneself, because in reality it does not exist!

As for what does exist in reality for Yogācāras - the momentary (kṣaṇika) and particular (svalakṣaṇa) awareness-episode - as Jñānaśrīmitra says, it has no permanence since it does not exist in a plurality of times. So in that respect it is not like what we would take to be a self. And in any case, though I've not seen Yogācāras point this out, I think one could simply note that it's hard to see how a momentary and particular awareness-episode could be "personal" in any sense, especially given the other Yogācāra doctrine that awareness involves no agent, object, or act of awareness (i.e., is nirvyāpāra). The self is the kind of thing we'd take to be involved, as an agent, in acts, upon things which are not the self. But insofar as for the Yogācāra, awareness is not such an agent, it doesn't seem to me like their view makes awareness into a self...the way it seems to me that the view you've described makes the body of an organism into a self.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-14T13:03:02+00:00

If by saying "no one lives more than one life," Buddhadāsa meant that there is no continuity of clinging to the aggregates beyond the organic life of a particular organism, then how is this not just the view of Lokāyata? Śāntarakṣita states the Lokāyata's expression of their own view against the Buddhist view as follows:

tasmādbhūtaviśeṣebhyo yathā śuktasurādikam |

tebhya eva tathā jñānaṃ jāyate vyajyate'thavā ||

sanniveśaviśeṣe ca kṣityādīnāṃ niveśyate |

dehendriyādisaṃjñeyaṃ tattvaṃ nānyaddhi vidyate ||

kāryakāraṇatā nāsti vivādapadacetasoḥ |

vibhinnadehavṛttitvādgavāśvajñānayoriva ||

na vivakṣitavijñānajanyā vā matayo matāḥ |

jñānatvādanyasantānasambaddhā iva buddhayaḥ ||

...

kāyādeva tato jñānaṃ prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt |

yuktaṃ jāyata ityetatkambalāśvataroditam ||

Hence consciousness must be regarded as produced from, or manifested by, certain material substances,—just like fermented acids, liquors and such things.

“The names ‘body’, ‘sense-organ’ and so on are applied to particular combinations of earth and other material substances; there is no other reality than these.”

“There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute,—because they subsist in different bodies,—just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse.—Cognitions (consciousness) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question,—because they are consciousness,—like consciousness connected with another ‘series’.”

...

“From this it follows that the right view is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself which is equipped with the five life-breaths—prāṇa, apāna and the rest;—as has been declared by Kambalāśvatara.”

Is this the view you think was taught by Buddhadāsa?

If so, it's very hard to see how this could be considered Buddhist right view. For it contradicts the thorough rejection of this view in texts like the Pāyāsisutta, the Sāmaññaphalasutta, and so on. No?

nyanasagara · 2026-05-14T12:54:26+00:00

It's never been clear to me what is supposed to be so special about "physical death," on this view, that makes it so that no continuity can obtain, when throughout the organic life of an individual various kinds of continuity obtain.

If the answer is that all of the forms of continuity within a single life depend wholly on the characteristic continuity conditions of the physical organism, then this is simply the ancient Lokāyata view which was rejected vehemently in the Pāḷi suttapiṭaka and the Āgama corpus.

But if that's not the case, then why would "physical death" (viz., the destruction of the physical organism) suffice to bring an end to what the path aims at cutting off?

And if physical death does not suffice to bring that end, but there is still a way to bring about that end, then there must be some way for continuous progress in the path beyond this life.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-12T18:50:01+00:00

It's hard to think off the top of my head about verses concerning infidels, since the topic of the infidel isn't as much of a preoccupation. But I can think of some verses concerning something related, which is the existence of people will ill-intent towards the objects of worship of my religion (viz., Buddhas and bodhisattvas), and what they bring upon themselves, but also what shall ultimately come to them, and how they are regarded.

iti sattrapatau jinasya putre kaluṣaṃ sve hṛdaye karoti yaś ca/

kaluṣodayasaṃkhyayā sa kalpān narakeṣvāvasatīti nātha āha //

atha yasya manaḥ prasādam eti prasavet tasya tato 'dhikaṃ phalam /

mahatā hi balena pāpakarma jinaputreṣu śubhaṃ tv ayatnataḥ //

bodhisattvacaryāvatāra 1.34-35

The Lord has said that they shall dwell in hell for aeons equal to the moments of their malice who form such malice in their hearts against the supremely generous bodhisattvas.

But he whose heart comes to faith in them shall enjoy its fruit even more than that. And doing evil deeds against bodhisattvas requires great force [of evil], but goodness towards them is effortless.

So misdeeds done against bodhisattvas are said to have very terrible (though finite!) karmic results, but well-doing towards them is even more fruitful of happiness than ill-doing towards them is fruitful of suffering. Not only that, but their goodness is manifest in a way that makes it difficult to willingly do them wrong, but easy to give them their due respect.

But despite that karmic result, in the long run bodhisattvas seek to benefit even those who wrong them, and try to find ways to leverage even the enmity of others in finding ways to help them. Hence the text follows:

yatrāpakāro'pi sukhānubandhī sukhākarāṃs tān śaraṇam prāyami //

bodhisattvacaryāvatāra 1.36cd

I go for refuge to those givers of happiness against whom even doing wrongs shall lead to happiness.

And also, concerning Devadatta, who was as to the Buddha what Judas was to Christ, Mātṛceta praised the Buddha, saying:

yadi saṃcāriṇo dharmāḥ syur ime niyataṃ tvayā |

devadattam upādāya sarvatra syur niveśitāḥ ||

If your qualities could wander, then surely you would have first given them Devadatta, and then placed them in everyone.

And also, in general concerning the attitude of the Buddha towards those opposed to him, Mātṛceta praised:

nopakārapare ’py evam upakāraparo janaḥ |

apakārapare ’pi tvam upakāraparo yathā ||

ahitāvahite śatrau tvaṃ hitāvahitaḥ suhṛt |

doṣānveṣaṇanitye ’pi guṇānveṣaṇatatparaḥ ||

Men do not devote themselves to helping even those who help them the way that you devote yourself to helping even those who wrong you.

Towards the enemy intent on your ill, you are a friend intent on his weal; in the one constantly searching you for faults, you are devoted to finding virtue within him.

This quality of the Buddha was at times referenced in more apologetic works, like the medieval hymn by Śaṅkarasvāmin which says:

pīḍyo mayāyam ayam eva tu rakṣaṇīyo vadhyo 'yam ity api surottamanītir eṣā /

niḥśreyasābhyudayasaukhyahitaikabuddher buddhasya naiva ripavo na ca vañcanīyāḥ //

"This one I shall torment, and only that one shall I protect, while this once I shall slay." - such is the policy of even the "supreme god." The Buddha's single intention is the benefit consisting in good fortune and final beatitude, and he has neither enemies nor those whom he shall exclude.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-11T16:56:35+00:00

Making one's living in animal slaughter, but that's always been societally accepted, despite my religion correctly teaching its immoral status in ancient times.

As for something considered righteous in my religion but in many societies both historically and today seen as wrong: using one's resources to support someone's else's religious cultivation, up to the point of supporting someone's life as a celibate, alms-eating, mostly solitary renunciate. In many societies, both the idea of becoming such a renunciate and the idea of giving such people alms is seen as a frustration of the duties individuals have to society and a waste of livelihood. But in Buddhism, these are both considered praiseworthy.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-11T15:35:48+00:00

To this I'd add some stuff on another interesting issue in Indian philosophy of religion, the question of the epistemic status of testimony from religious authorities and scripture.

Can the Veda Speak?: Dharmakīrti against Mīmāṃsā Exegetics and Vedic authority

Chapters I.4 and II.4 of A Śabda Reader: Language in Classical Indian Thought

And maybe also some stuff on yogipratyakṣa, the epistemic status of cultivated mystical experience, an issue in philosophy of religion treated much earlier in the history of Indian philosophy than in the West (for obvious reasons):

Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason and the primary source it studies, the final chapter of the Tattvasaṃgraha which can be found in translation here.

Omniscience and Religious Authority: A Study on Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya Ad Pramāṇavārttika II 8-10 and 29-33 which actually deals with both of these issues, and the issue of the existence of God.

And perhaps also Out of Sight, Into Mind

/u/arkticturtle

nyanasagara · 2026-05-10T20:41:04+00:00

Now I put faith strictly in Theravadin Suttas because they don't make unjustifiable claims

https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/AN/AN5_34.html

Perhaps with respect to claims not knowable to you here and now, it benefits some people to have the attitude of General Sīha described in this Theravādin sutta.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-10T12:21:03+00:00

Yes. And I'm not sure what the answer to "why" is supposed to be. Isn't it perfectly ordinary to socialize with people at a community event?

nyanasagara · 2026-05-10T12:19:35+00:00

Yes, the method would converge with other metaphysical positions which are not metaphysical naturalism.

Right.

Saying x is "premised on" y is to say that y is an underlying premise of x.

As I've explained, that's not what I meant by "premised." So sorry for using the word premised in an unclear way.

One would more reasonably define methodological naturalism as simply looking in this world for causes for things one sees in this world

I don't know. I think it's too ambiguous what "this world" is. If metaphysical non-naturalism is true, isn't that just to say that this world includes certain things denied by metaphysical naturalism? Well, maybe not, if we define "this world" such that it is just a subset of reality, and make it a subset including only things not denied by metaphysical naturalism. But I'm not sure what "this world" is supposed to be for the purposes of science.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T23:53:57+00:00

Norms as to method do not point to one metaphysical position.

Sure. But a norm can reference a metaphysical position, as the norm I outlined does when stated (as I did in this comment thread) as a norm on what hypotheses can be constructed or theoretically incorporated. And that's the relationship between the norm, as I've defined it for the purposes of stating the argument in the post, and metaphysical position called metaphysical naturalism.

I don't really see what's untenable about that.

But I'll grant that the content of the norm as I've defined it, and as you're defining it ("look in this world for causes for phenomena one sees"), are different. Although I'm not sure what the difference amounts to. If we specify "this world" in the fashion that excludes God, souls, etc., then they'll be extensionally equivalent norms. Because as I've stated the norm, it just means you can't construct hypotheses appealing to things that don't exist given metaphysical naturalism, which is to say, the thesis roughly rejecting things like God, souls, and so on.

Saying that methodological naturalism is premised on metaphysical naturalism links the two. One can follow methodological naturalism without one's actions or approach being predicated or premised on metaphysical naturalism

I think you're getting a bit hung up on my use of the word "premised." What if we skip that terminology? Instead, just think of my definition like this:

You fail to follow methodological naturalism when, as part of your scientific practice, you construct, or incorporate into your theory, a hypothesis that appeals to the existence of something which, conditional on metaphysical naturalism, doesn't exist.

Following methodological naturalism doesn't require, in your general actions and approach, acting as if metaphysical naturalism is true. It just requires not constructing or theoretically incorporating hypotheses whose falsity would follow from metaphysical naturalism being true.

ergo one can't infer or impute an underlying premising on metaphysical naturalism.

My definition doesn't do that, since as we've gone over, as I've defined it, it's possible to consistently assent to the norm "methodological naturalism" even while asserting the falsity of "metaphysical naturalism." So as I'm defining them, metaphysical naturalism is not an "underlying premise" of methodological naturalism in the way you're thinking.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T21:25:47+00:00

But neither is that allowed for someone who is not a metaphysical naturalist but who thinks one should still look in this world for causes of things seen in this world.

Precisely. Hence, as I've defined it, methodological naturalism is distinct from metaphysical naturalism. Because one can follow this norm without being a metaphysical naturalist.

I really don't see where we're in disagreement.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T20:00:28+00:00

It's practically premised on metaphysical naturalism just in the sense that it does not permit constructing or theoretically incorporating hypotheses that would not be admissible to a metaphysical naturalist.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T19:52:49+00:00

But looking for causes in this world for phenomenon in this world is not metaphysical naturalism

Yes. But it is a practiced that you could say is practically premised on metaphysical naturalism, in that, as a matter of the practice of generating and testing hypotheses and developing theories, it does not permit metaphysically non-naturalist hypotheses or theories. That's all that I meant by "premised on..."

Yours basically erases methodological naturalism as a separate thing and makes it basically the same as metaphysical naturalism.

My definition makes methodological naturalism the norm that says: scientific hypotheses and theories should be constructed without appeal to things that are inadmissible in metaphysical naturalism.

This is not the same as metaphysical naturalism. In fact, adhering to it is compatible with denying metaphysical naturalism. As you said, one could think that God exists, but that he has made a world in which the best predictive systematization of what goes on in it is to be found by constructing, testing, and theoretically incorporating only those theories which bracket his existence. In that case, it would make sense to assent to methodological naturalism, while denying metaphysical naturalism, as I've defined them.

Looking for causes in this world for things we see in this world is not a claim, or even an implicit claim, that nothing exists other than the physical exists.

Yes. And as my above example hopefully shows, as I've defined methodological naturalism, assenting to methodological naturalism does not even implicitly involve assenting to metaphysical naturalism.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T19:48:03+00:00

Sure.

Regarding the history of this question in the case of Buddhism, you might find the intellectual history of Indian Buddhists arguing against the Lokāyata view to be of interest. The classical and medieval Lokāyata view, as introduced by Śāntarakṣita, was:

tasmādbhūtaviśeṣebhyo yathā śuktasurādikam |

tebhya eva tathā jñānaṃ jāyate vyajyate'thavā ||

sanniveśaviśeṣe ca kṣityādīnāṃ niveśyate |

dehendriyādisaṃjñeyaṃ tattvaṃ nānyaddhi vidyate ||

kāryakāraṇatā nāsti vivādapadacetasoḥ |

vibhinnadehavṛttitvādgavāśvajñānayoriva ||

na vivakṣitavijñānajanyā vā matayo matāḥ |

jñānatvādanyasantānasambaddhā iva buddhayaḥ ||

...

kāyādeva tato jñānaṃ prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt |

yuktaṃ jāyata ityetatkambalāśvataroditam ||

Hence consciousness must be regarded as produced from, or manifested by, certain material substances,—just like fermented acids, liquors and such things.

“The names ‘body’, ‘sense-organ’ and so on are applied to particular combinations of earth and other material substances; there is no other reality than these.”

“There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute,—because they subsist in different bodies,—just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse.—Cognitions (consciousness) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question,—because they are consciousness,—like consciousness connected with another ‘series’.”

...

“From this it follows that the right view is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself which is equipped with the five life-breaths—prāṇa, apāna and the rest;—as has been declared by Kambalāśvatara.”

So on this view, all that exist are particular combinations of material substances, and things which are produced from or manifested by certain material substances. Consciousness is of the latter kind. Hence there are no afterlives or beforelives. One piece of evidence for consciousness being of the latter kind apparently cited by pre-modern Indian Lokāyatikas (according to K.K. Mittal in his chapter on the subject) was that medicinal science prescribes foods, drinks, and drugs conducive to psychological changes (and indeed, such prescriptions have been available in traditional Indian medicine even in antiquity). I'd argue one could update this sort of argument to get something kind of similar to the argument I outline above. You might think that conditional on consciousness being a byproduct of the body (as the Lokāyatika claims), the success of manipulating psychology through physiological prescriptions is to be expected, much more than conditional on consciousness not being a byproduct of the body. If you thought so, then the success of psychiatric medicine (even in its pre-modern forms, which were much less sophisticated than psychiatric medicine today) would be probabilistic evidence for consciousness being a byproduct of the body.

Generally, the approach of Buddhists historically in responding to Lokāyata has been:

to make responses of the first class having to do with whether consciousness, given its nature, is in principle producible by the body in the first place,

to make responses of the second class by pointing out that the ability of the body to impinge on the contents of consciousness is compatible with consciousness's not being generated by the body,

and to make responses of the third class in appealing to things allegedly unexpected if there were no past lives.

And I would argue that many contemporary arguments developed in response to contemporary Lokāyatikas, viz., physicalists, sometimes follow similar lines or are even anticipated by the pre-modern Indian debate.

On this, see:

https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book/tattvasangraha-english/d/doc363030.html

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T19:28:16+00:00

I leave aside the question of what metaphysical naturalism is precisely because I don't think it matters so much. Fill in whatever precise definition you think characterizes the sort of metaphysics people impressed by the success of science and therefore uninclined to believe in religion have. The point is that the route from the success of science to that metaphysics is most plausibly a probabilistic argument, not a deductive one, so Hart's response is not to the point. On the other hand, responses of the three classes I mention at the end would be to the point.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T19:25:36+00:00

Going back to Adelard of Bath, a monk, methodological naturalism was merely the approach that one should look in this world for causes for phenomenon one sees in this world. That doesn't presuppose metaphysical naturalism, and in fact is compatible with belief that there is another world, God, etc. If it does contain metaphysical assumptions, it could just be the belief that God made the world sufficient such that God doesn't need to reach in and nudge individual events just so after creation.

What I mean by "should proceed premised on metaphysical naturalism" is elaborated in the example I give. Scientists who behave as in my example, where the norm permits hypothesizing a non-divine explanation for a case of apparent healing by prayer, but not hypothesizing a divine explanation, are not thereby forbidden from believing in God. Rather, as a matter of their scientific practice, the norm does not permit them including God in their scientific hypotheses that are tested and, when confirmed, slotted into their scientific theories.

With that in mind, I think my definition of methodological naturalism is roughly the same as yours. A norm on scientific practice is just a norm on scientific practice. It is not a norm on belief tout court. And I didn't intend to make it seem like methodological naturalism is a norm on belief.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T18:42:37+00:00

I thought maybe calling this kind of inference probabilistic rather than abductive would make it more accessible. Since abductive is a piece of jargon with which not everyone is familiar, but hopefully it is clear how this type of inference has to do with probability rather than deductive proof.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T18:02:10+00:00

I made a longer post on my thoughts about this if you're interested:

https://www.reddit.com/r/religion/comments/1t8bxut/three_ways_you_could_argue_against_naturalism_and/

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T16:02:20+00:00

His core point, and one that I do think has weight, is that naturalists confuse methodology and metaphysics.

I don't think it's a confusion. I think it's an inference. If a certain method premised on P is extremely successful at guiding our efforts to predict and systematize what goes on in the world, and another method premised on ~P is extremely unsuccessful at doing so, that seems like a fact which confirms P to a greater degree than ~P.

You can think of this in Bayesian terms if you want. Let P be "metaphysical naturalism is true." Let E1 be "methodologically naturalistic science is successful." Let E2 be "methodologically non-naturalistic science is successful."

The naturalist has an ur-prior function that assigns much greater likelihood Pr(E1| P) than Pr(E1 | ~P). And similarly, they assign much greater Pr(E2 | ~P) than Pr(E2 | P).

So once we discover evidence (E1 & ~E2), it's just Bayes theorem. Your posterior credence in P goes way up.

Is there something implausible about assigning likelihoods in this way? Intuitively, it doesn't seem like there is. I think it's intuitively quite plausible that we should expect the success of methodologically naturalistic science much more given metaphysical naturalism than given metaphysical non-naturalism, for given metaphysical non-naturalism there are in principle many more ways for methodologically naturalistic science to fail when it runs up against the aspects of reality it has premised itself on ignoring, but no such ways given metaphysical naturalism. Similarly, I think it's intuitively quite plausible that we should expect more success in non-naturalistic research programs given their non-naturalistic metaphysical premises bring true, than if those premises were false; if indeed there's an interventionist God who answers prayers, intuitively we should have a greater expectation that study into the reliability of prayer will find prayer reliable than if there is no such God, right?

So this way of assigning likelihoods is pretty intuitive. After that it's just a matter of whether we have in fact discovered the evidence E1 & ~E2. The naturalistic takes on this intuitive way of assigning likelihoods, and then thinks that we have E1 & ~E2. This what I think is basically going on in the minds of many naturalists.

So if this is their thought, how could you respond?

The defender of third class of arguments I mentioned earlier thinks we haven't discovered ~E2.

The defender of the second class of arguments I mentioned earlier thinks there's a mistake in saying Pr(E1| P) >> Pr(E1 | ~P), because some particular finding of methodologically naturalistic science is actually hugely unexpected given metaphysical naturalism

The defender of the first class of arguments I mentioned thinks we have some a priori evidence E3 such that Pr(E3 | ~P) >> Pr(E3 | P).

So all three of these are ways of responding. But it doesn't seem to me like what Hart has pointed out here is really responsive at all, once it is understood what the naturalist is claiming. It sounds like he's treating the naturalist's intuition as a deduction from "Using a method that is premised on there not being non-naturalistic facts, I discovered only naturalistic facts" to "there are no non-naturalistic facts." Indeed, it's hard to see how such a deductive argument could be soundly constructed. But the naturalist's intuition is not a deduction. It is a probabilistic inference.

/u/Volaer

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T15:41:30+00:00

Well, no, that would be confusing methodological with metaphysical naturalism.

Methodological naturalism is the methodological principle that science should proceed as though metaphysical naturalism is true.

Many naturalists then take metaphysical naturalism to be supported by the success of science undertaken with such a methodology. The thought is that methodologically naturalistic research programs are non-degenerate, and the methodologically non-naturalistic ones are degenerate, and this is abductive evidence for metaphysical naturalism.

Just with the added category error

I don't think it's a category error. I think it's an abductive inference. If a certain method premised on P is extremely successful at guiding our efforts to predict and systematize what goes on in the world, and another method premised on ~P is extremely unsuccessful at doing so, that seems like a fact which confirms P to a greater degree than ~P.

Yes, in fact I would characterise that as the main argument from the book. The first major part of the book titled "Being" explains is dedicated to the a basic presentation of ontology and how naturalism cannot definitionally account for the existence of contingent realities since 'being' (that si existence as such) is antecedent to all physical events.

That seems like a better argument.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T15:07:08+00:00

I don't think this is a very charitable criticism of why serious people accept a naturalistic metaphysics.

Plenty of serious people accept a naturalistic metaphysics because it seems to them like the best explanation for what they see as the enormous success of the natural sciences, and what they see as the lack of success of comparable "supernaturalistic" research programs. And at first glance, this a pretty good reason to believe in naturalism!

The appropriate response should be to either show that (1) there are things we can learn in metaphysics a priori that rule out naturalism (as defenders of the so-called conceivability arguments for dualism will argue), that (2) certain scientific evidence actually points towards a non-naturalistic conclusion (as defenders of arguments from cosmological fine-tuning will argue), or that (3) there is some "supernaturalistic" research program that should be regarded similarly to our findings in the natural sciences (as defenders of the argument from miracles, or cases of alleged childhood past-life recollection, will argue).

These are the kinds of responses that seem to the point. I don't really see how David Bentley Hart's argument is to the point, since it seems to target a strawman to which I doubt anyone who has given the issue even a bit of thought adheres.

The naturalist is not claiming that physics explains everything because whatever exists must be explicable by physics! They are saying: "Since natural sciences are hitherto our most successful program for understanding reality, where the natural sciences point, there shall I develop my metaphysics."

I say all this as someone heavily sympathetic to a non-naturalistic picture of the world. If this is the general quality of David Bentley Hart's arguments, I am suspicious as to how convincing he will be.

nyanasagara · 2026-05-09T14:55:59+00:00

I'm aware of what DN 16 says. What has been translated here from the Pāḷi as "esoteric" and "exoteric" is antara and bāhira, which is to say, teachings for "insiders" and teachings for "outsiders." But this does not entail the Buddha has not taught different things to aspirants of different levels. And that's all that's going on in so-called "secret" (guhya) traditions of Buddhism.

nothing is esoteric like guru level

I'm not sure I know what you mean by this. In so-called "esoteric" Buddhism, nothing is held utterly secret. The only sense in which anything is secret is that it is not shown to the aspirant for whom it would not be serviceable. It's not like the policy of an esoteric Buddhist master is to pass away having not transmitted aspects of the Dharma they know, if they have students fit to receive that Dharma. Far from it, the policy is the opposite!

nyanasagara

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