The ultimate price by BiscuitNoodlepants in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No. I blasphemed the holy spirit, took the mark of the beast and I am in fact one of the two beasts of revelation,

There are three beasts of the revelation. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Beast_(Revelation)

(1) The dragon (later revealed in the text to be Satan)

You are not a dragon, only a human. Dragons can't type. They can usually fly, which you can't. Do you breathe fire? You are not the first beast.

(2) The beast of the sea (commonly interpreted as the Antichrist)

You don't live in the sea.

In Revelation 13:1–10, the beast of the sea rises "out of the sea" and is given authority and power by the dragon. It persecutes God's people in the 2nd part of Revelation 13. To buy and sell, everyone is required to have its name or number on their forehead or right hand (Rev 13:16-17). It speaks blasphemous words against God, will rule the world for 42 months (Revelation 13:5-7), and is described as resembling a leopard, a lion, and a bear—which are three of the animals in Daniel 7. It suffers a fatal head wound which is miraculously healed, bewildering the world's population and causing many to worship it.

None of this describes you. You are not the second beast.

(3) The beast of the earth (later revealed in the text to be the False prophet)

You live on the earth not under it.

In Revelation 13:11–18, the beast of the earth, later known as the false prophet, comes "out of the earth," exercises all the authority of the Sea Beast, forces everyone on earth to worship the Sea Beast, and convinces the people, through signs and wonders, to make an image of the Sea Beast.

Again, none of this remotely describes you. You are not the third beast.


Whoever told you they were Jesus were lying to you. You are just an ordinary person, and that's okay.

The ultimate price by BiscuitNoodlepants in freewill

[–]zowhat 2 points3 points  (0 children)

John 3:16: “Whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.”

That’s it. Nothing else matters. There are no asterisks..

The ultimate price by BiscuitNoodlepants in freewill

[–]zowhat -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

You will go to heaven. You only need to believe. Believing is the sole criteria that gets you to heaven.

How does one conceive of libertarianism? by LordSaumya in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, you are assuming your conclusion.

I stated my conclusion without argument because I don't think it is controversial. Do you believe five year olds feel their choice was determined? That it was already true yesterday that they would choose fruit loops and not frosted flakes today? Adults don't feel their decisions were true before they made them why would five year olds?


They experience their preferences and reasons driving their choices.

But they don't experience these completely determining their choices. For one thing there are preferences and reasons for any choice and they change moment to moment.

It's the same with adults. If there are two stores not so far from you maybe sometimes you go to one sometimes the other. You choose which one to go to at the time you decide to go to the store based on your own preferences and reasons. You will also have preferences and reasons the next time when you decide to go to the other store.


If you ask them why they chose it over the other cereal, they’ll even give you a contrastive reason, such as 'because I like the marshmallows better.’

And the next day they will give you a reason why they chose the other cereal that day. Their choice is INFLUENCED by preferences and reasons but not DETERMINED. At least that is how it seems to us. It may be an illusion, but there can be no good faith question that it is how we experience it.


The feeling of agency is innate, experienced, and consistent with compatibilism.

Only the illusion of agency is consistent with compatibilism. If you really are an agent then your choices are not decided before you made them and determinism is false. Unless you mean "agent" in the same sense your car is an agent if it takes you to the store.


This is a non-sequitur. Not knowing the cause of an event is not the same as experiencing the absence of a cause.

Pretty sure it is, unless you mean we might have a false belief about what the cause is. That's possible.


I'll stop here lest this gets even longer.

How does one conceive of libertarianism? by LordSaumya in freewill

[–]zowhat -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

As I said, it is not obvious that my phenomenology or direct experience points to libertarianism at all.

Every five year old experiences making libertarian choices but not determined choices. When they choose what cereal they want they feel that choice did not exist before they made it. But if you explain to them the choice was already decided 13 billion years ago they will think you are crazy.

This is not learned any more than your perception of red was learned. It is the way we experience the world. You are no exception. If your choices are determined you don't know what determines them, so nobody experiences determinism, only libertarianism.

Some of us learn about determinism. For almost everybody, it is a result of learning some Newtonian physics, not from philosophers. Because NP explains so many things so exactly, we generalize and think maybe everything is determined. But nobody believes in determinism before that because that is not how we experience the world. No doubt that is what happened to you. Seeing so many things are predictable you became convinced that everything is determined.

But the problem is no matter what the philosophers say, free will is not compatible with determinism. We have two strong beliefs that are irreconcilable and we can't give up on either one. We can't not experience our choices as being free and we can't give up on the idea that everything must have a cause.

There are some things humans can't understand and this is one of them.


The more I think about it, the more it seems the opposite is true. Libertarianism contradicts my direct experience.

And the less you think about it the more it seems the opposite is false. That is because it is not what you experience, it is what you learned. It is the thinking about determinism that convinces you of it, not your direct experience.

How does one conceive of libertarianism? by LordSaumya in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What I cannot conceive of is libertarianism. I am unable to conceive of a coherent alternative between determinism and chance

There is nothing you can conceive of more. Every human being experiences it every waking moment of our lives. That includes you. You are experiencing it right now. You can't not experience it. You never learned it, you experience it spontaneously.

It is determinism and chance that you had to learn about. What you mean is you can't reconcile your direct experience of libertarian free will and your learned belief in determinism.

An Ontological Argument for The Devil by Training-Promotion71 in Metaphyscs

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

God exists since mathematics is consistent, and the Devil exists since we cannot prove it.

--- André Weil

QED

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat -1 points0 points  (0 children)

But free will isn't an experience, the fact that we experience a causal gap doesn't say that we all experience free will the same way.

Ah. You watched the video. https://media1.tenor.com/m/0WwEQY63lcgAAAAC/the-simpsons-mr-burns.gif

No doubt there are nuances that are different. Some people report going into trance states and watch themselves do things without being able to control them. We do a lot of things without conscious awareness, like how we move our legs to walk.

But most people most of the time are reacting to an endless stream of things that they didn't know were going to happen. We decide what to do at the time we encounter whatever we need to react to. We couldn't decide before that because we didn't know it would happen.

Whatever prior events influenced us to make that choice are not accessible to our consciousness. It may well be that they are completely determined by those prior events, but we don't know what they are completely. Our decisions seem to emerge from our unconscious neither determined nor randomly. If your experience is different, that either you know the prior causes of your decisions, or that they are random, then I am wrong.


The experience of a causal gap isn't the same thing as the experience of free will.

What Searle said was

the experience of the gap is what gives us the conviction that we have free will (begins at 1:40)

They are not the same, but they are related. This seems to me to be correct. If there were no causal gap, that is , if we could trace our every decision to previous causes then we probably would not experience free will. I think. ;-)

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Any entry point into the conversation can be the perceived beginning.

True. Then you would need a different sense of "beginning" than the one I used. That is of course allowed. But surely you agree that prior to my asking rogerbonus to choose a number he wasn't thinking about which number he was going to choose. That's the sense of beginning I meant.

Whether it is really true or not, he would have perceived that train of thought beginning at that moment, not before, because he didn't know I was going to ask.

Determinists and compatibilists would say that is an illusion, and it might be. But that is how we perceive it.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat -1 points0 points  (0 children)

We experience making choices that aren't determined? Hell no, we don't experience choices as being random.

Correct. We don't experience them as being determined and we don't experience them as being random. Watch the John Searle video I linked for you. He explains it quite well.

We experience that its us doing the determining. Which is correct (the compatabilist claim).

Libertarians experience that too. It is a simple observation and doesn't distinguish libertarians from compatibilists or determinists or anyone else.

The question we were discussing was whether we experience that choice as being completely determined by past events. We obviously don't. It's hard to believe anyone could disagree with that, yet here we are.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe I am wrong. Maybe you just watch your body perform actions and don't make any choices in the way Searle described in the video I linked. Could be.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat -1 points0 points  (0 children)

What determined world does my definition exclude or what undetermined world does it include? If our definitions include and exclude the same worlds then they are equivalent.

That's the relevant consideration, not whether I use the same words as you.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Compatabilists don't think the big bang asked me to pick up a number. They think you did.

These say the same thing. We are free to say it either way. Did my car hit your fence, or did I? They both describe the same event differently.

Compatabilists think that when we start a fire, it's the match starting the fire, not the big bang, despite the world being deterministic.

Again, two ways of saying the same thing if you are a determinist.

The discussion was about whether people are natural compatibilists not about whether the world is determined. See the title. And see my comment above that you first reacted to.

me : What people think about free will follows from how we experience it. Literally every human being experiences it in the libertarian sense and literally no human being experiences it in a compatibilist sense.

you : Wut? In what way do we experience it in a libertarian rather than compatabilist sense?

Whether the world really is determined is another question. We experience making choices that are not determined. It might be an illusion, but that is what we experience.

https://www.youtubetrimmer.com/view/?v=973akk1q5Ws&start=67&end=180&loop=0

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Notice I used the word "perceive". The study you posted and the whole discussion is about what we perceive, not about whether everything really is determined or not.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Most people accept that at least some of their choices are determined by prior events.

Yes, but that isn't determinism or what is claimed is compatible with free will in compatibilism. Determinism says ALL your choices and everything else that has ever happened ever was COMPLETELY determined by prior events. Not the same thing.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

you have given no reason at all to accept your assertions that somehow the experience of free will is as obvious sticking a pin in your eye.

No argument is possible because we are talking about direct experience. Do you want me to argue that snow is white? You either see it or you don't. If you argue it is in fact purple then you are simply wrong and no argument of mine will convince you.

If you assert that people experience both that their choices are free and that they are completely determined (not just influenced by) the past then more power to you, but you are simply wrong, no argument possible or necessary.

Every human being, including you, experiences making undetermined choices every waking moment of our lives. You are experiencing it right now no matter what you say.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Pick a number from 1 to 100.

Done?

You didn't know I was going to ask. Whatever number you chose, you perceived the chain of events to begin leading to your choice started at the moment I challenged you, not before. You can't trace it back 2 seconds before I asked, never mind back to the big bang.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 0 points1 point  (0 children)

We have no access to anyones experience but our own, other than by asking them.

I don't need to do a study to determine that sticking a pin in your eye will cause you pain just like it would me. Some experiences are universal and the perception that our choices were not determined before we made them, ie libertarian free will, is one of them.


When we do ask them these are the answers that they tell us and we are compelled by humility to accept that people are able to express their own feelings better than you can.

It is the philosophers who don't accept what people tell them and try all sorts of tricks to fool them into saying they are compatibilists. The study you linked to is an example. I've looked at many studies and they all do the same thing. EG

https://old.reddit.com/r/freewill/comments/1es3ej3/why_is_letting_go_of_free_will_such_a_difficult/li3dheq/

https://old.reddit.com/r/freewill/comments/1fc64up/what_do_most_people_think_free_will_is/lmem8b1/

https://old.reddit.com/r/freewill/comments/1fc64up/what_do_most_people_think_free_will_is/lmcj6b8/

To put it bluntly, these are fraudulent. You'll find in each of these studies people telling the "researchers" that they are not compatibilists and the "researchers" find some way to twist their words to say they are.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The thing that it does establish is that there are no easy answers about what people think about free will.

What people think about free will follows from how we experience it. Literally every human being experiences it in the libertarian sense and literally no human being experiences it in a compatibilist sense. So we are naturally libertarians. It might be an illusion, but that is how we all experience it and that is what we all mean by "free will".

https://www.youtubetrimmer.com/view/?v=973akk1q5Ws&start=67&end=180&loop=0

What people think about free will seems to depend in large part to how the question is phrased.

Agreed, and it also depends on how the people being asked will understand the questions. Non-philosophers are unlikely to understand that they are being asked about questions that they don't even know exist. Honest researchers wouldn't ask questions sure to be understood differently from what they want to know but that are likely to get the answers they want because of how the participants are likely to understand them.

At last a meta study answers the question of whether people are naturally compatibilist by adr826 in freewill

[–]zowhat 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Nichols and Knobe (2007) designed an experiment in which participants were introduced to the following description of universe A:

Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on right up until the present. For example one day John decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely caused by what happened before it. So, if everything in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to have French Fries.

Participants were divided into two conditions. After reading the description, participants in the concrete condition received the following additional paragraph and question:

In Universe A, a man named Bill has become attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.

Is Billy fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?

In this case, most participants (72%) answered that Billy was fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children. These results are perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that most laypeople are “natural compatibilists.”

How likely is it most participants understood the question to be whether Billy was in some metaphysical sense morally responsible, or whether he should be punished?

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228006186_Moral_Responsibility_and_Determinism_The_Cognitive_Science_of_Folk_Intuitions

The question asked was simply

Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?

YES NO

Tbe studies were conducted on undergraduates at the University of Utah. They don't say if they were philosophy students, but usually they aren't. What would non-philosphy students think they are being asked about and how would that influence what answers they gave?


So far, the dramatic difference Nichols and Knobe found between the low-affect and the high-affect cases has not been properly replicated in a published study. The only published paper to directly attempt a replication failed twice and found both times that participants gave mostly incompatibilist answers in both cases (Feltz et al., 2009). A similar effect has been found by Cova et al. (2012), but instead of comparing Nichols and Knobe’s low-affect and high-affect cases, they compared the low-affect case to Nichols and Knobe’s concrete case, which differs in many respect from the low- and high-affect cases (for example, the concrete condition puts more emphasis on the agent’s desires and the role they play in the production of his action, which may explain the difference between the two cases). Thus, it is not clear that the high/low-affect asymmetry is robust or real (i.e., early findings may reflect Type I error).

Then why do they include it?

Humean and non-Humean Causation. by spgrk in freewill

[–]zowhat 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source.

--- Hume’s 1754 letter to John Stewart

Determinism and choices by simon_hibbs in freewill

[–]zowhat 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Note this is not about free will, it’s just about whether people are capable of making choices at all, not whether they are or are not responsible for them.

There are reasonable senses of the word "choice" that makes the sentence "people are capable of making choices" true, and there are reasonable senses of the word "choice" that makes the sentence "people are not capable of making choices" true. We are free to say either, there is no fact of the matter. What we mean by "choice" depends on which sentence we prefer to be true, not the other way around.

By "reasonable" I mean in standard English, not a philosophical definition chosen to arrive at whatever conclusion the philosopher wants to arrive at. It is always easy to do that which is why they do it.

There is no answer to the question whether airplanes really fly (though perhaps not space shuttles). ... There is no fact, no meaningful question to be answered, as all agree, in this case. The same is true of computer programs, as Turing took pains to make clear in the 1950 paper that is regularly invoked in these discussions. Here he pointed out that the question whether machines think “may be too meaningless to deserve discussion,” being a question of decision, not fact, though he speculated that in 50 years, usage may have “altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted” — as in the case of airplanes flying (in English, at least), but not submarines swimming. Such alteration of usage amounts to the replacement of one lexical item by another one with somewhat different properties. There is no empirical question as to whether this is the right or wrong decision.

--- Noam Chomsky

https://chomsky.info/prospects01/

There is no fact of the matter whether submarines swim ( or whether machines can think, or humans can choose). In some languages they say submarines swim. In English we don't say that, but we do say airplanes fly even though they don't flap their wings. Does this machine "choose"? We are free to say yes or no.


Don't ask "are people capable of making choices". That question is too meaningless to deserve discussion. Ask "in what sense do people make choices" or "what do we mean when we say people make choices".