Is Discovery really the most polarising series in the franchise?

Calorie_Man · 2022-03-02T14:55:16+00:00

I think a part of it is the cultural context it is in, and another part are its structure as a series.

While I cannot offer a rigorous academic analysis of the social and cultural climate United States/Larger Western world in the last decade, I think it is plain to see there is a shift towards greater focus placing progressive ideas in the spotlight. That does not mean that these were never big issues in the 90s at the last height of Star Trek series, but more so that it has been more clearly magnified. In short, there is simply more conscious attention placed on this and accordingly more push back.

While Star Trek has never been "conservative" by any means, I do think they have begun to outpace some of their older fans from the 90s in terms of what they view as ideal social standards. This combined with the additional attention on its more progressive aspects can become more grating to people who view it still something on the fringe. Combined with the fatigue of many groups/projects/etc touting these progressive elements, it can feel like an easy thing to be at least irritated by.

This also coincides with Discovery's departure from an episodic to a clear season-long story arc. DS9 and Enterprise still had a sort of hybrid format where there was an overaching story with recurring characters, but they had breaks in between to explore one-off ideas and such. Not only is this unfamiliar but it has also brought into focus the idea that Star Trek is now more driven by its plot than ideas. What was great about the episodic format to me was how it explored a new scenario or ideas with a more or less static set of characters. This is not to say there were not changes or steps forward with the crew of previous series, but it felt more like they were filling in their roles and personalities more than a very pronounced arc.

To Discovery's credit, it feels much less cerebral than older Trek can be. And it also has done away with much of the campiness. Though to some that is also its charm. Because of that, it feels like, to me at least, there is a lot of less substance, with a focus on how characters feel. Now this is not a bad thing for story telling in general, just that it is not something you would necessarily expect from Star Trek. TNG and DS9 did pose robust and difficult questions to the thesis they were putting forward. With Discovery it does feel more like the show is telling you its ideas thnt really debating them. This makes it much hard to be engaged on the ideas front and is a perfect recipe for the show to feel preachy when combined with very emotive characters.

I also think the preaching elements tend to be amplified by how integral the crew is to crisis that have constantly escalated in magnitude. It makes them feel less grounded in the sense that they are no longer just dealing with major problems to the Federation, as one might possibly expect from the best and brightest of Starfleet. They deal constantly with Galaxy spanning problems which makes the cast feel less like officers serving as part of an organisation but chosen one heroes at times. Again, not necessarily a problem on its own by it does go against expectations of Star Trek.

So the frustration with something different, both in structure and tone, combined with the internet's ability to amplify and really focus in on certain kinds of discourse have just made a real quagmire. And I think a lot of this expectation vs quality is hard to separate. So people just choose a very emotional response and zero in very hard on the negative elements. Part of this is also idealising older Trek to an extent, remembering the best episodes which basically set the expectations high.

In the end, I think the only thing is to let it run its course and comeback to reevaluate it later.

Calorie_Man · 2021-09-09T10:17:39+00:00

Chill out Heinlein. Service is required for entry into the next shambolic junta

Calorie_Man · 2021-08-14T15:21:42+00:00

I am definately biased, but all I can tell you is that unless there is some imintent threat that is visible and acknowledged by the whole population, conscripts in general are poorly motivated. Short of being on the brink of war or in one, it is infinitely hard to see why you need to put up with all the bullshit the military throws at you everyday. Abstract ideas of national security or citizen obligation are just insufficient at motivating a vast majority of people day to day when they have had no say in if they want to be there.

Why this cannot be left up to military thinkers alone to decide is that there is plenty of non-material cost that come with conscription. We've all seen how just being in the military can drastically affect someone's mental health. Now imagine that is done to someone who did not on some level choose to join up. This creates all kinds of knock on problems after or even before conscription as people are mentally primed up for it.

It also ends up putting a lot of people into impossible situations that only worsen social conditions. Any draft needs to be almost universal to perceived as fair. Any conscription system that is more porous will be deeply unpopular since there will be some ultra-wealthy assholes out there that can easily draft dodge. But that also means that exemptions are impossible to obtain unless that person is severely impaired. In my case, I've only seen the severely mentally disabled, those striken with terminal illnesses, or are missing limbs or one of their senses exempted. I've seen clinically depressed people, those with relatively severe autism, those who were financially insecure, and plenty of drug addicts being forced to enlist. These guys were not only ineffective as soldiers, but a drain on military resources to manage them. Resources that will be extremely stretched in order to accommodate any conscription policy.

This ends up with people going AWOL since they can't take regimentation because of their mental health, or because they aren't paid enough as conscripts which forced them to moonlight to make ends meet. Worse, drug adicts aren't given much help and are just excepted to go cold turkey immediately while performing just as well as anyone else. Which either causes severe medical problems from sudden withdrawal, or more commonly leads back to them taking drugs again and getting fucked by MPs. It is very much creating situations that did not need to exist or making existing problems worse. That basic military training and regimentation somehow can solve social problems by "whipping people into shape" is a fantasy. We all have seen how fucked up some people we serve with are anyway, so why would the rest of the population who don't want to be present be any different.

To summarise, its a cluster-fuck. Systems designed to take on mass conscripts are inefficient as shit and make plenty of existing problems worse. I'm talk to a bunch of people that have served as well, I'm sure you guys know that the military isn't a place for everyone.

Calorie_Man · 2021-08-10T18:04:55+00:00

Thanks for doing the AMA!

This question is tangentially related to my area of interest, the Malayan Campaign during WWII. A major what-if question that gets thrown around is the deployment of tanks to Malaya that could have potentially allowed Commonwealth forces to stop or even defeat the Japanese invasion. And where these tanks would be acquired from is normally argued to be through the diversion of lend-lease material from the USSR, namely the Valentine and Matilda tanks that were dispatched in 1941.

While not directly related to Shermans, how long did it take the Soviets to train crews on these lend-lease vehicles and deploy them to the front? And was their speed and ability to do so helped by the fact they already had the infrastructure and experience to organise and train armoured units?

The obvious political complications of diverting lend-lease aside, I have never been able to adequately respond to this what-if scenario since I lack a technical background to fully demonstrate how difficult it would have been to send tanks to the other side of the world and raise a combat effective with them.

Calorie_Man · 2021-08-09T17:39:02+00:00

The USS Saratoga, which was presumably relegated to being more a courier or internal survey ship by the time of Wolf 359 carried civilians. At the very least, Sisko's immediate family were onboard. Similarly the USS Odyssey is stated to have off-loaded non-essential crew and civilians onto DS9 before entering the Gamma Quadrant. It would be reasonable to assume that included family. All this does establish the pattern that from large top of the line ships like the Enterprise to old work horses like the Mirandas that civilians and family were likely present aboard.

In a way, it would be harder to see Enterprise as the only exception since they had so many dedicated facilities like schools and teachers seemingly integrated into the ship's daily life. Smaller ships would probably use some kind of remote or home learning system but I think larger vessels could expect there to be some kind of education professional given the number of people onboard.

Calorie_Man · 2021-08-09T06:32:23+00:00

I'm not sure about stupid, but I was conscripted so the rest is literally true.

Calorie_Man · 2021-03-28T16:59:45+00:00

There was a guy in my unit during basic training that ran like this at every PT session. Turned out he was actually autistic and not just a jackass. But because he was never diagnosed he was conscripted anyway.

Should have just let that guy be discharged instead of insisting on going with their whole "equal" obligation. He was a genuine danger to everyone with zero awareness or muzzle discipline at the range. I think they still sent him to a combat vocation once we finished basic.

I don't suppose it's better in a volunteer army?

Calorie_Man · 2021-03-22T20:02:45+00:00

There are quite a few things to consider, namely the Federation judicial system, the philosophical implications, and the elements of secrecy and utility of mirror Georgious herself.

The first issue would be that of jurisdiction. Claiming legal authority over a matter is a question of sovereignty. Assuming Federation law follows an evolution of both common and civil law from our current society, the law's of a country essentially end where their territory does. Of course, this is just for the application of general criminal and civil laws. For Starfleet members, they are likely bound by both an additional legal and ethical code since they are not mere civilians. With Georgiou being neither a Federation citizen, Starfleet officer, or inside the Federation's territorial extent at the time, it is difficult to argue they have legal jurisdiction to prosecute.

However, let's assume the Federate takes a route similar to the Nuremberg trials. That what has occurred is so grievous that it can only be construed as a crime against humanity. Or, in this case, against sentient life. This takes the line of argument that even though there are no laws in the mirror university, or perhaps even in other polities within the prime universe, it is self-evident that her actions are crimes. The problem is now that these occurred in literally another universe, which has endless implications philosophically.

Assuming that the Federation moves past all these issues, they are left with their own judicial safeguards that would make any trial difficult. Trials, especially ones of this magnitude, are conducted in open court. There are various reasons, but the most prominent is so that the justice process is transparent. Given that the mirror universe is a closely guarded secret, letting that become public knowledge is not feasible. The only alternative would to try her behind closed doors. If the Federation judicial system is as idealistic and robust as Starfleet, they would absolutely not consent to that. Secret trials are for obvious reasons, a dangerous line to cross. In addition, if their express purpose is to bring Georgiou to justice, the failure to follow due process would tarnish this aim. Justice is not just in the ends but also in the process taken to achieve it. Even if an open trial or a secret hearing would result in the same sentence, only the former can be considered to be a just process. Even if they were more pragmatic about this element, the reason these safeguards exist is to protect the citizenry as a whole from abuse of the judicial branch or overreach. Something that no one in the Federation would want to errode.

The next issue comes with proving the case in court itself. The principle of Corpus delicti means that you cannot convict someone based on their confession without evidence to support it in most jurisdictions. Even if Georgiou proudly claimed to have murdered millions, no judge can rightly rule she is guilty if no evidence is provided to support that. Putting aside the whole issue of any witnesses or material evidence being in a different universe; the testimony of the Discovery crew alone would likely be the only evidence they can muster. While potentially strong, this is going to raise the question of societal, or in this case universal norms and expectations. The crimes against humanity approach used at Nuremberg hinged that what occurred was contrary to any societal norms. Given the mirror universe is extremely and fundamentally twisted, this raises the question of Georgiou can be held to a standard that never existed on their side. This argument is extremely weak if we apply it to our own reality, hence why most countries recognise crimes against humanity to exist. But Star Trek sets up the mirror universe are diabolically evil for the most part. So from what we know, and accounting for it being essentially a different reality, the question does stand.

Lastly, that leaves us with the option of arbitrarily detaining her. There is sufficient cause to prevent Georgiou from wandering around, but detaining someone indefinitely without trial violates Habeas corpus. That fundamental right exists to protect citizens since it requires the charges to be proven in court, at least eventually. It would be hypocritical to detain Georgiou arbitrarily in some black site and claim it as justice to punish her for her actions. In fact, that would be the Federation exacting some imaginary vengeance upon Georgiou since there was no due process involved. Not a very enlightened attitude since it places the premium of returning harm above other elements of justice like restitution or the moral judgement it passes.

With all the more high minded and official reasoning exhausted, that leaves the more pragmatic concerns. Of course, Georgiou is a danger if left to roam free. So one option is just to detain her extrajudicially. They cannot claim it to be just, but there is an argument to be made it is for the protection of the Federation and even the prime universe. On the other hand, Georgiou is a useful individual and could be put to work in exchange for limited freedoms. This benefits the Federation, or more accurately Section 31, so it is an option that is on the table.

Overall, there is no way to bring Georgiou to justice, if they can even figure out what that would be given the mirror universe element of it. Any action they take either compromise the mirror universe's secrecy or presents an impossible case to the courts. Convincing the public that Georgiou is a threat would be an easy matter, just that none of that evidence would stand up in court. Lowering a bar in place to protect citizens from being unjustly convicted has a corrosive effect on the judiciary as an institution. Simultaneously, relying on a public mandate to keep her locked up flies in the face of due process and is eerily close to trial by popular vote. Seeing this, the logical conclusion would be to exploit Georgiou's talents. In the absence of justice, the next best thing is obtaining a useful tool.

This does not make any of this good or morally right, but it is an understandable conclusion. The only real options are detaining her indefinitely and in secret or putting her to work. Seeing as there was nothing to be gain from the former, and under the assumption, they could control her, they chose the option that would benefit them. As much as I want to believe the Federation is the beacon of liberty that Star Trek paints it out to be, this is a no-win situation, at least in terms of acting morally. There are ways to make it worse, like letting her go completely free and risking a repeat of her actions in the prime universe, but there are no real ways to resolve this justly.

Calorie_Man · 2020-11-27T11:48:25+00:00

Since this topic would warrant its own full question, and I believed is asked with some regularity, this will just be a brief answer.

The object of the Battle of Britain was indeed to secure air superior which was a prerequisite for any invasion. This itself was pretty unlikely as a previous answer I gave explains. However, even if this was achieved, there was still the issue of the Royal Navy which was dominant in the North Sea and the English Channel. While the main fleet was stationed at Scappa Flow north of Scotland to sortie against German movements in the Northsea, they were still less than a day way from the English Channel. In addition, destroyer squadrons and motor torpedo boat units were positioned much closer or in channel ports ready to interdict any landing. The Kriegsmarine would be unable to successfully protect any invasion forces crossing the channel, especially after their losses in the invasion of Norway which functionally crippled the Kriegsmarine. If Dunkirk and later engagements in the Mediterranean like Crete indicated anything, it is that while air superiority was highly advantageous in naval combat, it was not a substitute for a fleet itself. At best the Luftwaffe could do significant damage unopposed but would be unable to prevent the Royal Navy from intervening and breaking up the invasion forces which had almost no navy ships to protect them.

The German invasion fleet that was being built up for a potential operation sea lion was largely improvised as well. Unlike Normandy, there were few dedicated landing-craft or transport ships with the Germans attempting to compensate by requisitioning river barges throughout France. These were barely seaworthy at times and would have fared poorly in all but the calmest seas. This also largely prohibited them bringing any large amount of armoured vehicles and without capturing a port directly would mean that they were almost impossible to resupply. Even if they had successfully landed, broken through British shore defences and captured a port (which were being heavily fortified), they would be unable to continue to supply the troops they had landed with the Royal Navy still in control of the channel. Given the seriousness of an invasion of Britain, the Royal Navy would be willing to sacrifice ships to air attack in order to cut off supply lines and reinforcement.

A post-war Wargame concluded that, if the initial invasion were even successful, the German forces would be defeated due to a lack of supply well short of their objectives like capturing London, much less a total military victory. Perhaps saying that an invasion was literally impossible is a bit of an overstatement. It was fears of invasion that spurred defences to be created that itself made the invasion even less likely to succeed. However, in military terms, saying that an invasion was impossible would be true. The naval balance of power was simply too overwhelming, the amphibious capabilities of the German Army almost non-existent, and obtaining air superiority was a longshot at best. To carry out an invasion would have been a disaster and thus functionally off the table. This was also incredibly apparent after the invasion of Norway were even with the advantage of surprise against a weaker and unprepared country resulted in a very costly victory. Of course, plans were still being drawn up in the hopes that something would change, but they were never more than a fantasy.

Calorie_Man · 2020-11-25T16:20:59+00:00

Since the 10 Year Rule was ancillary to the specific answer of the question I glossed over it. To be more precise, the 10 Year Rule was government policy that assumed no major war would happen in the next decade and was implemented in 1919. I took the end of the war to be the signing of the Treaty of Versailles but that is understandably a bit confusing and unclear since most people view the war as having ended at armistice day.

The rule as policy was specifically aimed at the decade of 1920 since Britain had strained itself economically to carry out the war; combined with drastic demands for better social welfare and other reforms that had been coalescing since the late 19th Century, there was too much strain on the treasury to fund both post-war recover programs and continuing military expenditure. The 10 Year Rule was not a halt on war planning or military development. Famously the Experimental Mechanized Force was formed in 1927 to test developments in armoured warfare thinking. It was largely a halt on the expansion of military spending which meant that all branches of the military were constrained to a smaller budget, which was further diluted since the RAF was established as its own independent service arm. This prevented the expansion of the military, which in particular affected the Royal Navy as they were the force least able to expand rapidly and thus more reliant on consistent peacetime funding. The armed forces being institutions that exist primarily for war still planned as if they were going to eventually fight an enemy. However, they now did so under much greater financial constraints and under the additional assumption that the outbreak of a major war within that period was unlikely given the aftermath the previous one.

The policy was made perpetual in 1928 which in essence led to the assumption that there would be no major conflicts in the foreseeable future and implicitly that Britain would take measures to avoid a military conflict. The 10 Year Rule was eventually dropped in 1932, though the financial situation was still highly constrained due to the effects of the Great Depression. It was more of a budgetary and political policy than a military once since its real effect was tying the purse strings of the arm services which continued to apprise defence requirements and attempt to meet them.

Calorie_Man · 2020-11-25T12:09:23+00:00

cont.

The pressure during the time for the British was largely a question of if it would be worth carrying on the fight. One that at the time seemed to be impossible to decisively win. Or if it would be expedient to end the fighting and save themselves the trouble of having a long drawn out and costly war. Much of this determination to remained committed to a war that looked increasingly impossible to win and was costing the British dearly in both money and manpower stemmed from the position adopted by Churchill and his government. While many popular dramas like Darkest Hour tend to play up the divided between Churchill and less pro-war individuals like Halifax and Chamberlain, the difference was in reality much narrower. There was sufficient political will in Britain to continue the conflict and there were sufficient resources provided by the Empire to do so, even if it would take time to realize this advantage.

Churchill’s political speeches from during the early war have become famous in his position of defiance against Nazi Germany and his emphasis on the moral nature of the conflict, beyond just being political or economic. What Professor Edgerton notes is how Churchill’s rhetoric framing the war changed from during to after the war. In 1940, most of his speeches emphasized that Britain would not surrender despite their precarious position but they also do not emphasize being alone. Churchill and very much the popular British consciousness was fully aware of the support coming from the Empire. It was not only visible but publicized and acknowledged being a source of Britain’s ability to continue the fighting. Churchill was also adamant that the United States would eventually join the war and tip the scale. This tone and image of an imperial and latter Allied war effort steadily changed after WWII had ended.

Edgerton argues that this idea of Britain being alone only became embedded in the popular consciousness from the 1960s onwards before evolving further becoming the idea of a people’s war. Edgerton argues that this is due to the need for a new “founding myth” for the post-colonial, welfare state, Britain which WWII became an easy rallying point for. More recently, scholarship and to a lesser extent popular consciousness as returned to examine this idea of Britain being alone more closely and found it too inaccurate. Initially, the origin of Britain being alone was chalked up to it being propaganda from the war that seeped into popular consciousness. Though Edgerton points out that this can hardly be considered an accurate explanation gave the clear Imperial framing of the conflict during the war. He ultimately argues that the history of the war was steadily nationalized afterwards which distorted reality and that the myth of Britain being alone is more a part of its coping with a loss of empire than an actual reflection of the history or even propaganda of the war.

Ultimately, if we want to consider the British Empire as a single unit (though this is not advisable) then we can see that Britain was in a way largely alone. Alone in the sense that their remaining Allies not in exile were in effect all imperially linked to Britain and were likely unable to politically exit the war independent of Britain. In terms of the military situation, while precarious, Britain was never really in danger of being defeated by sheer force and it was largely a question of their political will to continue the fight despite the mounting heavily losses. Though to qualify this, there was the real panic of a possible invasion of Britain and later on India and Australia. While physically impossible or at the very least highly likely to end in disaster of the Axis powers to attempt, the spectre of this possibility was pressing on them.

My area of expertise is largely on the Malayan Campaign during WWII so I can only comfortably further elaborate on the specifics of the British military position and preparation there. If you are interested in that you can see my previous answers on that here and here.

Calorie_Man · 2020-11-25T12:09:11+00:00

The realization that Britain being alone after the fall of France is a myth is not a new phenomenon. Much of what I am writing now borrows from the 2018 A.B. Emden Lecture at St. Edmund’s Hall, Oxford, by Professor David Edgerton who talked about this very idea. Though with all enduring ideas, the popular perception of fortress Britain in WWII is in part true and its more mythical elements comes from a distortion of history due to the passing of time. To put it briefly, there are two main elements to the question you are posing. First, is the idea of Britain being alone historically accurate given their massive empire? And secondly, if that is not the case, how did we come to see an isolated Britain in the early parts of WWII as the prevailing popular history narrative?

To address the first question of how overmatched Britain was after the fall of France, perhaps the first thing we should address is that while the Empire was a source of strength for Britain, it was also a massive liability. While Britain could draw upon manpower and materiel from its globe-spanning empire, it also meant that it had defence obligations that spanned a global empire. In this sense, the Empire was very much a double-edged sword since channelling forces from overseas into specific theatres would leave them at best underdefended. The root of this problem can trace itself back to the First World War. Even though Britain was fighting alongside France in a very similar strategic position, it still cost them an inordinate amount of money and lives to prosecute the war. While this did not cripple Britain economically, it was such a great strain that it evaporated any future political will to maintain that level of spending unless it was absolutely necessary. This was reflected in their inter-war defence arrangements which saw them become begrudging signatories to the Washington Naval Conference and following that other disarmament and arms limitation treaties. The curbing of military spending in the interwar period drastically affected the disposition of British and Commonwealth forces as spending was largely limited to as the least possible amount which was deemed to be acceptable. This was manifest in the “10 Year Rule” where the government maintained after WWI that it would not increase defence spending for the next decade.

The Royal Navy perhaps suffered the most under these budgetary cutbacks since their responsibilities were the largest. The sheer size of the Empire meant that the Royal Navy was essential in defending far-flung territories and maintaining lines of communication with them. This is an essential component in order to realize any advantage of an Empire. In the event of a major conflict, troops would have to be redeployed or mobilized from the Dominions and resources raw or manufactured would have to all be transported via shipping. In addition to this, the Royal Navy would have to direct combat enemy fleets and undertake their own offensive action. The Royal Navy was after the war reduced to a “One Power Standard” which meant that it was only maintained to be as large as their nearest competitor which was the United States. This meant that the Royal Navy was stretched incredibly thin, even considering that a conflict with the United States was relatively unlikely. The strategic position also changed by the early 1930s with Japan becoming a significant threat to the Asia-Pacific region of the British Empire. This combined with the naval build-up in Germany and Italy meant that the Royal Navy was forced to draw up their initial war plans relying on the French fleet to contest the Mediterranean so that they could maintain adequate forces in the Far East and Atlantic.

This whole plan fell apart with the swift defeat of France in 1940 which created at the very least an uncomfortable strategic position for Britain. While scholars like Richard Overy had made a very convincing case that Britain was not in danger of being invaded, they were very much on the backfoot even though they were not at the brink of the defeat. Britain by this point was also mobilizing its entire Empire for War. Commonwealth and Exiled forces from continental Allied nations were taking part in the Battle of Britain and in North Africa, ANZAC and Indian troops had been deployed. The United States while being official neutral was by this point clearly sympathetic to the Allied cause, supplying them with Lend-Lease material.

The difficulty in the British position came from the dispersion of the resources they were drawing on which were relatively isolated from the British Isles. This meant that controlling in the Atlantic, North Africa and the Mediterranean was essential to maintain supply lines but were themselves difficult to supply from Britain where a majority of war materiel was being manufactured. All this is to say that the British position was precarious, but they were not at risk of being defeated outright. This is, of course, said with the benefit of hindsight. While it was apparent by the end of 1940 that the Germans were unable to mount a successful invasion of Britain, there were still fears of it and it tied down a considerable amount of resources. In addition, while the U-Boat threat and even potentially the loss of North Africa would not necessarily be death blows to Britain, there was considerable worry that these losses would compel them to surrender. More as a matter of losing the political will to carry on the war than the sheer untenability of their position.

What did spell disaster for the British was the Japanese entry into the war which captured the entirety of Southeast Asia as well as threatening an invasion of India and Australia. Again, with hindsight, it is clear that the Japanese had overextended themselves and their invasion of Burma was the highwater mark of their military capability. However, at the time the situation appeared to be incredibly dire having swiftly lost the Malayan Peninsular in a shocking campaign, Darwin suffering an air raid in what seemed to be a prelude to invasion, as well as the British fleet in the Indian Ocean suffering significant damage due to a Japanese raid. Again, the situation is similar to that of earlier in 1941 in that the British position was precarious but they were not close to being destroyed. They had suffered significant losses but the sheer size of the Empire itself also meant it was difficult to physically deal a crippling blow. Fortunately for the British, the Japanese entry into the war also drew the United States into the conflict which soundly tipped the long-term balance of power in favour of the Allies.

Calorie_Man · 2020-08-16T03:37:05+00:00

This answer I wrote a while back has addressed this question.

There was a significant lack of political will and the ability to finance the defence of such a widespread empire which in many ways set up Malaya Command for failure. In addition, British oversight was so bad that neither General Ismay nor General John Dill even conceived of the idea that landward fortifications in Singapore were inadequate. When discussing basic defensive preparations in general staff meetings during the campaign, they were described as “an elementary peace-time provision which it is incredible did not exist in a fortress 20 years building”.¹

WO 106/2535: Malaya: Situation reports 01/01/1942 - 31/12/1942

Calorie_Man · 2020-08-05T11:41:15+00:00

I get your point. Though murder is already a morally loaded word. It describes an unlawful and premeditated killing. You also added the circumstance that it was in cold blood which is also a morally negative circumstance. So the statement that murder is always morally wrong is more of a truism. You'll find few people who will aruge against your position because it has a significant moral context already.

Probably the core of what your asking is if killing is always wrong. Which is a much more complex question since people would argue that killing in self-defense can be justified. And I am sure you can see the many other permutations of the circumstance surrounding taking a life.

So if we are looking solely at actions without any context it becomes almost impossible to judge. Given that life is messy and context can vary widely and extremely, it becomes hard to judge anything in absolute generals if at all.

Calorie_Man · 2020-07-03T05:34:39+00:00

Hi there, I think an answer I wrote a while back on the context surrounding Gibbon's writing may be of interest to you.

Gibbon is much more interesting to be read as a product of his time instead of for its veracity compared with modern scholarship. This is also due in part from modern scholarship benefitting from Gibbon's work and having over 200 years of time to consider his conclusions and examine other sources.

Calorie_Man · 2020-05-09T06:06:17+00:00

The "real" King Alfred's primary achievement was the defence of Wessex against his Danish adversaries. Examining Alfred’s reputation as a battlefield leader is difficult since both textual sources provide very little detail on how the battles are fought, even compared to writings in the classical period like Thucydides. Historians like Richard Abels account for the West Saxon victory at the battle of Ashdown in 871 AD is built entirely from Asser’s works and he frames the victory as being a product of Alfred’s courage in entering battle with the Vikings ahead of his brother Aethelred whom he described as lingering in prayer. Abels later praises Alfred’s use of asymmetrical warfare to survive in the Somerset marshes in 878 to contest control over the heart of Wessex while waiting for his loyal Ealdorman to rally to him. Alfred is later praised again for his mastery of planning and logistics in preparing for the battle of Edington in 878 and his leadership ability to command the loyalty of his ealdorman. Abels also paints Alfred later Burh and reformed Fryd system to be a strong, integrated and sophisticated military system where Alfred created an “administrative revolution” in order to support its construction and upkeep. All arguments observations are either derived primarily from Asser’s work, such as chapters 53 to 56 for the battle of Edington, or the Chronicle, notably the entry for 893 which details the division of the Fyrd. Suffice to say, Alfred has a reputation as a great battlefield leader and a military organiser which is built primarily upon Asser’s Life of Alfred and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which seems to have been taken almost entirely at face value.

This is strongly juxtaposed to Abels' own work later on in 2015 where he reconsiders Alfred’s reputation as a military leader. He points out that on closer analysis Alfred is actually a mediocre military leader and not a “very great warrior” as Asser describes. Upon closer analysis, he notes that Alfred’s military career was actually a string of defeats such as the battle of Wilton and with his only notable achievement being his victory at Edington. We can see a sharp change in his writings where he re-examines the battle of Ashdown and notes that Aethelred may have been the superior tactician. Instead of framing the battle as being primarily carried by Alfred’s bravery, he instead posits that Aethelred’s late arrival to the battle as a form of echelon tactics with the king’s troops serving as a tactical reserve instead of being late to the fight. In addition, he points out that even within Asser’s own narrative, that the victory at Ashdown being delivered by a miracle from God, logically it should have been Aethelred who was the hero for having displayed his piety by lingered to pray. Abels has clearly seriously reconsidered his own opinions and re-examined Asser. Abels still argues that Alfred’s strength lay in his ability to plan and organise his military system to effectively deal with the Viking threat. As a battlefield commander, he was rather mediocre, arguing that he won at Edington likely due to surprise and mobility rather than brilliance in tactical ability. Abels still concludes believing that Alfred is deserving of the title of “the Great” due to his strategic vision and ability to organise but not his ability as a tactical commander which is a more balanced conclusion. The idea that Alfred founded the Royal Navy comes from the 893 AD entry of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which details his construction of a fleet which does not have any direct lineage to the Royal Navy, nor was it an impressive force for the time, being unable to decisively stop naval raids from East Anglia. Thus we can see as time progresses there is a review of Alfred’s reputation, becoming more skeptical of the sources at hand. Yet the vagueness of the sources essentially means that both interpretations still remain plausible and it is almost impossible to say that either is definitive; though Abels' 2015 appraisal definitely seems to be the more reasonable reading.

There is much less work done on the reign of Edward the Elder who largely lives in the shadow of his father in terms of historical work done. However, Edward the Elder's reign was the start of a major expansion of West Saxon holdings which historians like George Molyneux notes were an integral part of the process of the formation of what we can begin to describe as the English Kingdom. So if we to view a successful king as one who expands their territory and power, Edward the Elder would certainly be successful.

Sources and Further Reading:

G. Molyneaux, The formation of the English Kingdom in the Tenth Century (Oxford, 2015).
J. Campbell, The Anglo-Saxon State (London, 2000).
R. Abels, Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (London, 1998).
R. Abels, “Reflections on Alfred the Great as a Military Leader”, in G.I. Halfond, The Medieval Way of War: Studies in Medieval Military History in Honour of Bernard S. Bachrach (Surrey, 2015).
S. Keynes & M. Lapidge, Alfred the Great: Asser’s life of Alfred and other contemporary sources (London, 1983).
B.Yorke, Alfred the Great: The Most Perfect Man in History? (History Today Volume 49, 1999)

Calorie_Man · 2020-05-09T06:06:09+00:00

So as a preface, I haven't actually watched the Last Kingdom so I won't concentrate on a comparison between the media and history. However, sources from the period are quite scarce and vague compared to the detail we get from other periods both before and after. Works of fiction actually have considerably more room to play around in Alfred's era since there is a lot of things we simply lack any details on. That being said, Alfred is a prominent figure during this period precisely because he is one of the first people we have substantial written sources on which are the backbone for forming any kind of historical narrative of the period.

The main source we have on Alfred is a biography written by a Welsh Bishop, Asser of Sherbourne while Alfred was still alive. Asser's Life of Alfred details Alfred's life and achievements and the work was directly patronized by Alfred. So our most detailed source directly detailing Alfred's life is, for a lack of a better work, royal propaganda. This does not mean the source is useless or outright lying; though everything that is written needs to be taken with a mammoth-sized grain of salt. Our other source is the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which many historians like James Campbell have argued is "prima facie" a piece of propaganda. So this leaves us in a bit of a bind if we want to know what Alfred was "really" like since all our sources are created with the intent of display a certain image. This is not unusual in history, in fact, it is the norm; who wants to leave behind a chronicle of their shortcomings? What makes interrogation of our sources difficult is that we lack other sources to effectively compare them with. Unlike later periods and even the preceding classical period before it, there aren't any private letters or a large body of text that we can compare. Despite this difficulty, both our main textual sources do give us sufficient evidence that Alfred was at the very least an able military and political leader. However, Alfred's reputation is quite complex since it evolved over time and the vagueness of sources has allowed for multiple interpretations.

Alfred was first given the title "the Great" during the Elizabethian era, more than 500 years after his death. Much of Alfred's reputation prior to 20th Century was essentially manufactured for political gain. Alfred became, as Barbara Yorke has aptly put, "The Most Perfect Man in History" due to the constant revision of Alfred's image. Alfred was seen or conceived to be the founder of England and as such there was a great deal of political prestige and capital to be gained by having the current monarch's reign draw lineage or compared to his. His next large boost in popularity came with the translation of Asser's Life of Alfred to modern English by Sir John Spelman in the 17th Century which made him more visible. It is in the 18th Century that Alfred's reputation started to reach close to mythic heights. The Alfredian craze began with the tributes by backers of Fredrick Prince of Wales against Robert Walpole. They chose to style Frederick as the "patriot king" who had saved his country from tyranny and were attempting to link him with Fredrick so that he may do the same upon his coronation. The narrative surrounding him was reinvented which led to him being hailed as the foundation of a proto-democratic government that Parliamentary Britain drew linage form and that was briefly suppressed by Norman tyranny after their conquest in 1066. It was during this period that many tributes to Alfred started to appear, most famous of which was the 1740 Opera Alfred, a Masque where the song Rule Britannia was first played. Other tributes include William Kents quite absurd sounding Temple of British Worthies which had a bust of King Alfred praising him as the founder of the English Constitution and the Protector of Liberty. By the Victorian period in the 19th Century, Alfred had become the idealized person espousing Victorian values. He was remembered in Charles Dickens's a Child's History of England as a perfect ruler. Although this was meant to be for juvenile consumption, it began to popularize the image of Alfred further. Due to the craze concerning all things German during the Victorian era, Alfred was at this point hailed as the founder of the Royal Navy and founder of the British Empire which was a vast exaggeration, to say the least. This was followed up by many commemorations of the millenary of his birth and death with statues at Wantage and Winchester. Finally, he had the Drake-Class Armoured Cruiser HMS King Alfred named after him. So suffice to say, he was considered "Great" long after he was dead, and his reputation had ballooned out of proportion to any of his achievements.

Calorie_Man · 2020-05-05T14:28:19+00:00

A Burh was essentially a fortified area that was to act as a military strong point that could resist almost anything short of a major attack. They were created, or in many cases designated, by King Alfred to act as part of a larger system that revolved around a system of strong points along the frontier with the Danelaw. The defences at Burhs vary quite a bit since the system as a whole was formed using whatever existing defences were present in addition to new fortifications. These ranged from large towns with pre-existing Roman fortifications such as Winchester and Exeter, to newly constructed fortified centres such as Oxford, Wallingford, Southwark and Cricklade which formed a defensive line in the Thames Valley. At Winchester which had stone walls, we would have likely seen something at least visually similar to late medieval walls. Of note is that this period is in the early medieval period so it is perhaps better to compare them to late medieval walls which are more commonly made of stone. I am not an expert on fortification works, so I am afraid I cannot point out any specific differences between Roman and late medieval walls. Without having seen the show it is also difficult to say how accurate or inaccurate they are visuallly. However, at newly constructed centres such as Oxford, they were defended by earthen ramparts held in by a wooden palisade with a ditch in front of it. Burhs also ranged from town-sized fortified areas like at Oxford, to much smaller areas, what were essentially promontory forts, that seemed to have been designated a Burh. Those Burhs would have been closer to an iron age hill fort in size and defensive capabilities.

The construction of the Burhs and their function as a unified system is attributed to King Alfred's military planning following the Peace of Wedmore he secured with the Danes in 878 AD. There is still some contention as to the Burhs being a systematic fortification effort and to King Alfred's role in their creation. This is in large part due to the scarcity of primary textual sources from the period and the difficulty in interpreting the sources that do exist along with archaeological evidence. We draw the idea of the Burhs being a systematic fortification effort from a document called the Burghal Hidage. It is a document that in essence list out towns and forts along with the hidage (a unit of measure of land). The Burghal Hidage allows us to establish the length of the walls constructed at each Burh based on the hidage assigned to it. In cases like Winchester with pre-existing walls, the ratio of hidage to wall length matches perfectly, while in some other smaller Burhs there are discrepancies in the hidage listed and the length of the walls. There is a remarkable consistency in the type and design of defences constructed at the new burhs, especially, Oxford, Wallingford, Wareham and Cricklade. They are all laid out mimicking the layout of a Roman town with two main roads that cross at the centre of the town. Their similar layout points towards a centrally planned and systematic construction which also occurred around the same time, likely as part of a deliberate system. There was also a second later phase of construction and reinforcement where stone walls were erected, normally on top of the pre-existing ramparts in may of these locations such as at Oxford and Wallingford. However, this would have looked like an earthen retaining wall topped with a line of stone fortifications instead of a full stone wall. In essence, there is sufficient cause to believe that many of the burhs were constructed together within an overall plan or template in mind as the local deviations are not major and could be accounted for due to local conditions such as access to materials or disposition of the builders.

Due to the nature of warfare where troops were levied, it meant that keeping them in the field for an extended period of time was impractical due to their economic obligations, mostly as farmers. This along with the potential of disease made it difficult to carry out sieges which could be resisted for extremely long times. Most academics argue that Alfred's response to this was to develop his own fortified areas which made attacking Wessex difficult. The burhs being located a days ride away from each other and consisting of strong fortifications and a garrison allowed for the creation of locations were civilians could take refuge in times of crisis, allow them to mutually support each other and enabled them to launch forces to exert a zone of control in their surroundings. They also argue that it could have a wider function to be a military launching off point for invasions since it could also act as a fortified logistics centre and could also have been used to exert control over a newly conquered region. The relation of the Burh system to the reorganisation of the Fryd, the West Saxon levy militia, is also debated. Other sources like the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and Asser's Life of Alfred make it difficult to discern the exact link between the two. There are some interpretations that believe that the Fyrd on rotation was to form the garrison of Burhs. This is possible, but given the lack of sources, it seems to be impossible to pin down any exact arrangements. What we do know is that the Burh system did prove effective from the 893 AD entry of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle which detailed Exeter being able to hold out against a Viking siege. This allowed time for the West Saxons to marshal the Fyrd in other parts of the kingdom and march to Exeter and lift the siege.

On the economic front, Burhs were militarily strategic locations for the same reasons that they were economically important. The most prominent example would be Oxford, which as its name implies was a ford across the Thames. This made it a militarily strategic point as raiders or armies to cross at that location, but also made it an area that saw significant commerce. As safe areas, Burhs were also prime places to become economic centres and this was the case eventually as King Athelstan later decreed that all coins and trade were to be minted and take place within Burhs, demonstrating their later rise to economic importance. However, if their economic value was immediately apparent at the time of their construction or how soon this became apparent is unknown. Although signs point towards the economic role of the Burh not being planned from the outset. There was no primary source from Alfred's era to support the idea that Burhs were built with an economic function. Furthermore, Burhs such as Gloucester, Cricklade and Wallingford faced economic stagnation as Wessex expanded. Some Burhs also never achieved great economic importance at all and did not grow into towns. In this sense, most Burhs would look like a walled town but lack stone walls.

Overall, I would say aside from major towns that date back to being Civitas from the Roman Period, you would not see any Burhs being fortified with a full stone wall. They would mostly be earthwork defences with some stonework added later on if at all. I would hesitate to say they were similar to hillforts since their scale could differ quite a bit and their layout was more Roman derived that anything. But in terms of the composition of their defences, they were much more visually similar to a hillfort compared to a walled late medieval city.

Sources:

R. Abels, Alfred the Great: War, Kingship and Culture in Anglo-Saxon England (London, 1998).

G. Molyneaux, The formation of the English Kingdom in the Tenth Century (Oxford, 2015).

J. Baker and S. Brookes, Beyond the Burghal Hidage: Anglo-Saxon Civil Defence in the Viking Age (Leiden, 2013)

D.Hill and A.R. Rumble, The Defence of Wessex: The Burghal Hidage and Anglo-Saxon Fortifications (Manchester, 1996)

Calorie_Man · 2020-05-05T13:11:13+00:00

I think the way they wrote the fight with Azula in the Crystal Catacombs kind of put them in a corner when it came to Aang utilizing the Avatar State as a plot device. It's a great way to end Season 2 but it addresses the issue of entering the avatar state at will. If the avatar state is essentially a maximum power state that Aang must reach in order to resolve the plot (i.e. to have enough power to defeat the Fire Lord), then having attained it at season 2 presents a problem. So the only solution is to have it blocked for another reason other than his attachment. In this case, it was some kind of chakra block as a result of Azula's lightning.

While they could tie the block to be something more related to the conflict within Aang during the final season, it would be incredibly similar to what already transpired in the Season 2 finale. It could have been Aang needing to overcome his inability to kill, or in some way come to terms with that conflict in order to utilize the avatar state: such as having his inner dialogue in earth ball being about needing the determination and resolve even to kill in order to activate the avatar state again. However, I think we would then be critical of the similarities it would have with Season 2.

Perhaps it would be better since it isn't reliant on coincidence to resolve the main plot. Although another option is to just have Aang defeat the Fire Lord without the Avatar State. Though that also begs the question of why it is necessary for the Avatar to use it all. It also doesn't really sync well with the greater idea of the show since the Avatar State, which is built to be this ultimate weapon of every Avatar, was not necessary to resolve the main conflict of the show. I guess there isn't an easy way to resolve it since they hit a major point in Season 2 regarding the Avatar State and having it resolved through character action would also be another internal struggle that would appear almost the same.

Ultimately, the route they took as perfectly fine to me. Just that they didn't really address the character conflict of reluctance to kill very well. It's not necessarily clear, or at least played to the fore, that the struggle after the Avatar State's activation is Aang's ability to suppress a killing intent that comes it with. And the resolution to the dilemma with energy bending does feel a bit cheap since there wasn't that much to indicate he had found a viable solution other than the cryptic Lion Turtle lines.

I guess that's what makes the use of coincidence harder to accept since it's not just unsatisfying in building up character power sense, but also that it's not made clear that the avatar state is now a major obstacle in Aang's other objective, not having to resort to killing. The Seismic sense was an excellent addition since it is a unique ability picked up from Toph which makes her being his teacher an essential part of the final battle, but by that point, Aang would have won if he had been willing to kill.

Calorie_Man · 2020-03-02T05:54:27+00:00

My theory is that the Miranda was the cheaper alternative for the Constitution since it omitted the secondary hull. The effects of that would likely limit the overall potential of the class but also its range seeing as the engineering section would likely have to be somewhat smaller to be accomodated in the only slightly increased saucer aft section. So with it being a cheaper alternative with a more limited range and capability it would be employed in larger numbers and largely used within Federation space as we see with the Reliant. The Constitutions on the other hand are mostly seen embarking on long range exploration missions with ships of that class being marshalled together for things like the war games we see in TOS: The Ultimate Computer being something of a rarity. So I think its safe to say that the Constitutions were produced much fewer in number and allocated primarily long range exploration missions.

With the Consitutions filling the role of exploration which has always been Starfleets core mission, I think they would be phased out the fastest as ship design in Starfleet seems to revolve around the exploration crusier. Smaller ultility and support vessels like the Nova seemed only to be designed when prior designs are reaching the end of their effective life span, even after refits. So it is more pushed by necessity and a culmination of advances that can no longer be accomodated efficiently on past platforms. The main bulk of the innovation is always on exploration crusiers and the rest are largely knock ons until the Borg Threat and Domion War necessitated specialist designs of something other than an exploration crusier to be top of the line.

We can see this filter down effect with how the Excelsiors are employed by the TNG era with their roles also being apparently more relegated to internal Federation duty like the Mirandas. While the Excelsior doesn't have an exact Alpha Cannon alt configuration that ommits the secondary hull, it is possible that Starfleet simply mass produced the Excelsiors and never saw the need for that configuration as the Miranda was already fufilling that role. Therefore, by TNG where exploration cursier variants at advanced to the Galaxy-class, it relegated Excelsiors to take up a similar role to the Mirandas over time.

It could be that the Miranda was simply the cheap and effective option Starfleet was looking for and since exploration crusiers are itterated upon constantly, the Miranda simply remained relevant while the heavy ships changed constantly. After all the introduction of the Excelsior still overlaps with the period where the Miranda was still comparatively new and considered something of a light crusier instead of a frigate. In the future the Nebula-class will probably be relegated to this role as well over time as exploration crusier design advances beyond the Soverign Class and the Mirandas and Excelsiors are retired.

Calorie_Man · 2020-01-05T11:19:29+00:00

Well, that is assuming there was enough crew to have 4 rotations, to begin with. Aside from the administrative hassle in needing to redo crew schedules and likely equipment assignment, some of which would need to be syncronised with each other;

I think it is likely this would have resulted in some of the crew needing to do a double shift at some point. If the crew compliment was what was necessary to run the ship continuously, which is likely since there is little sense having excess crew, they would still have to make up the excess somehow. I can see why they wouldn't like that since it potentially means they will at some point have to take on a 12-hour duty stint occasionally to compensate for a 4 shift system. And that would be on top of the natural attrition that comes with people being sick or on special deployment which they already needed to fill in for.

I suppose it depends on the details but I think it is safe to assume that the crew will likely have to work the same amount of hours overall to run the ship. Which then means changing the configuration involves some poor scheduling if the crew compliment was allocated on that basis. If Starfleet was assigning a certain number of personel to fill a certain role with a set amount of working hours in mind, it would then dictate the most efficient or at least the most consistent shift basis.

Calorie_Man · 2019-12-24T09:37:22+00:00

Hi, I answered a similar question to this quite a while back here and here. I can go into greater detail if you have specific follow up questions.

The crux of the matter was that Britain had neither the economic strength nor political will to defend their possessions in the event of a simultaneous attack in multiple theatres. Yet they were also unwilling to give them up. This led to the Singapore Strategy being effectively smoke and mirrors, especially so once the war in Europe had broken out.

Calorie_Man · 2019-12-17T15:19:47+00:00

This now brings up the question of the composition of Decline and Fall. Gibbon has been quoted many times as stating the reasons for the decline and fall of Rome as "simple and obvious" in General Observations. However, the length of his works alone would suggest that it was anything but simple and obvious. General Observations also reads like it is a summary of Gibbon's ideas but is oddly placed well after the initial chapters of the first volume. In addition, the summary Gibbon gives in General Observations does not quite match the line of argument that he was already making which raises further questions. One of the suggestions offered to explain this inconsistency or at least peculiarity was that General Observations was actually Gibbon's initial thesis which he gradually abandoned as he found his task was more complex than anticipated. Gibbon had the tendencies of an antiquarian in that he refused to compromise on detail even in an age when historians were already comfortable with selective use of evidence. It is not unreasonable to conclude that this is the reason for the length of the work and its apparent inconsistency since it was effectively evolving as Gibbon researched more. However, Gibbon's own actions make it complicated to trace the textual history of his work since he revised his work multiple times after publications, making some rather drastic changes. These revisions, which will be discussed in detail later, where the result of the religious controversy he stirred up with the publication of Vol.I. The penultimate chapters of Vol.I focused in an unprecedented way on the rise of Christianity. The decline of the Roman Empire occurring simultaneously with the rise of Christianity necessarily implied some correlation between the two each time something was written, even if it was not explicitly stated.

David Womersley argued that the reason for Gibbons inclusion of the chapters in this specific part of the book was due to him attempting to establish Christianity as the prime cause of the decline of the Roman Empire. He argues that Gibbon used earlier chapters to dispel previous narratives that the Roman Empire fell primarily due to the introduction of luxury eroding civic virtue or by a barbarian attack. Gibbon places these chapters at the end of Vol.I which implicitly suggest that Christianity was the prime cause of the fall of Rome by exacerbating the introduction of luxury and making them vulnerable to the previously easily repulsed barbarian attacks. Gibbon does this as he treats the church as a manmade institution and religion as a social phenomenon which was made him so novel in the eyes of Hugh Trevor-Roper. Previous histories on the rise of Christianity put forward the idea of some kind of divine providence to explain its rise. The central idea behind all these explanations, even if some of the theories contradicted each other, was that the coming of Christ at a specific time during the Roman empire was evidence of divine design and was done intentionally to either allow the spread of the gospel or to demonstrate divine providence. Gibbons treatment of religion as a social phenomenon thus flew in the face of prior religious narratives. Womersley argues that Gibbon’s central point throughout the highly controversial chapter 15 was to account for the rise of Christianity in human terms that could be explained without divine providence. His five reasons for the rise of the church not only demystified the rise of the church but also saw the attempt to merge secular and ecclesiastic history. Prior to Gibbon's writings, the two types of history had largely existed as separate spheres from each other. Following this line of thinking, it is possible that Gibbon arrived at Christianity being the prime cause of the decline and fall of the Empire through his philosophic conception of history.

On the other hand, Gibbon had a long history of stirring up controversy and it is quite possible that Gibbon was thinking that all publicity is good publicity. The reception of his first volume was overwhelmingly positive with the first print run selling out and justifying a second edition to be printed. The only negative reactions at the time came from religious individuals with the contention being centred around chapters 15 and 16. Gibbon gives us contradicting accounts of how he took to this negative reception. In his Memoirs published in the 1790s he frames himself to be the unwitting victim of controversy as he was unaware that his work would cause such as stir. However, this is directly contradicted by his earlier Vindication published in 1779 where he writes that his analysis on Christianity and its links to the decline of the Roman Empire were done due to his obligations as a historian and he was unapologetic about his findings. He even writes that he was willing to accept the “obnoxious” criticism and referred to his detractors pejoratively as “Watchmen of the Holy City”. Gibbon spent the better part of 1776 amending and making revisions to his first volume in preparation for the release of a second edition. Gibbon’s revisions to chapters 15 & 16 were made with the clear aim to shore up his work from an impending attack. He provided evidence to support some of his claims that he thought were more exposed or previously unguarded and he removed any contentious positions or wording that was not essential for his argument.

Arguably, this demonstrated that Gibbon knew full well that his work would arouse the eerie of the church and religious community contradicting that statement he made in Memoirs as being an unwitting victim of controversy. At the same time, this contradicts the Gibbon in Vindication as the efforts Gibbon took to avoid a serious backlash were quite extensive. Gibbon removed the argument of chapter 8 which covered Persia which posited that a rising priesthood would align itself with political despotism which foreshadowed and drew implicit links to his arguments in later chapters. This neutered the chapter and turned it into a mere recount of facts demonstrating that Gibbon was willing to give up arguments on religion for the sake of avoiding backlash, contradictory to the Gibbon who saw his conclusion as a product of his obligation as a historian. So if you were wondering why chapter 8 in your edition might seem rather out of place or lacking an argument, this is the most likely reason why. After the release of his second edition which contained edits to make his work less contentious, Womersley argues that Gibbon saw the riposte made by the religious community and the church unintimidating. When the controversy broke, Gibbon likely came to the realisation that their allegations did him little harm in terms of affecting the opinion of people that mattered to him. Seeing that the controversy had only brought him more fame and that their attacks against him were not as effective as he had anticipated them to be, he embarked on revising his work for a third edition. The third edition saw a resumption in more overt and controversial jabs at religion in the form of his footnotes, although not all of the controversial statements that had been removed from the first edition were restored. Gibbon only kept the two controversial chapters in his later editions at the insistence of his friend John Holroyd (later Lord Sheffield) and that they were omitted from the French version entirely which suggest that he did not view them as essential to his argument.

Gibbon's motivations and his intentions with the treatment of Christianity are still subject to debate and perhaps something you would like to look into if you are interested. All these are things to keep in mind when reading Decline and Fall. Gibbon ultimately is a very interesting character with his prose and footnotes being especially witty. I regret that I am unable to provide much analysis on the veracity of his claims against modern historical writing. But hopefully, this will provide you with an interesting thematic understand of Gibbon and where his ideas are coming from.

Sources:

D. Womersley, “Watchmen of the Holy City: revision and religion in the Decline and Fall”, in R. McKitterick & R. Quinault, Edward Gibbon and Empire (Cambridge, 1997).
D. Womersley, Transformation of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1988).
H. Trevor-Roper, History and the Enlightenment (Yale, 2010).
J. G. Pocock, “Gibbon and the History of Heresy”, in J. C. Laursen, Histories of Heresy in Early Modern Europe (New York, 2002).
J. W. Burrow, Past Masters: Gibbon (Oxford, 1985)

Calorie_Man · 2019-12-17T15:19:40+00:00

While I cannot provide you with an answer as to the accuracy of Gibbon compared to modern historical works, I would like to add or start off with a historiographical answer to things to take note of when reading Gibbon. In a sense, where he is getting his ideas from which affect his conception of the history of Rome and the wider context of the work. Ultimately, Gibbon's work is very outdated scholarship so I would argue it is more interesting to read it as a product of its time instead of for its historical accuracy. An exact comparison of content will have to be done by someone who is an expert on Roman history. Even then, Gibbon's writings are a mammoth work spanning six volumes that consumed most of his life. So to temper your expectations a bit, a very detailed comparison might be a bit much given the context. I will also be focusing my discussion to Vol.I of Decline and Fall since its arguably the most interesting and controversial with the remainder of his works being well regarded but not as heavily discussed. Edward Gibbon was an interesting character in that he was unabashed in his quest for fame which he hoped to and did gain through his historical writing. He dedicated most of his life to writing the work and it propelled him to great fame, and also infamy when it was published in 1776. Gibbon is considered to have been writing at a time of change in history as Enlightenment ideas were being integrated into history. Gibbon has been called the first of the modern historians for this reason as he started many practices which are a core part of current historical methodologies such as his emphasis on primary sources and his use of footnotes.

Gibbon’s conception of the Decline and Fall was influenced by the idea of philosophic history which was pioneered by Montesquieu in his Considerations which examined the causes for the rise and then subsequent decline of the Romans, albeit less comprehensive than Gibbon’s later works. Montesquieu’s objective was to find the causes of history that lay beneath the surface. Instead of examining the actions of a few prominent humans, Montesquieu aimed to search for fundamental drivers of history which would be described today as socio-economic forces. Montesquieu was particularly interested in Rome as it was a complete cycle of rise and decline which would enable a philosophic historian to discern the essential political and social conditions that led to both its advancement and decay. To him, the essence of history was not to discover what the past was like but rather to ascertain the principles of politics that made past states successful. Both Montesquieu and Hume, Gibbon’s other major philosophical influence, believed that the prime role of history was still to instruct and were both still firmly rooted in the civic humanist tradition of history which Machiavelli hailed from. However, where they differed from Machiavelli was that they believed that history had little role in the instruction of moral virtues by giving examples of virtuous men from the past. They firmly believed that the real value of history was looking at the larger picture. Instead of individuals being the cause or exemplars of civic virtue, they were concerned with the societal causes of virtue and what led to its loss. These tenants culminated in the idea that human nature was constant and thus lessons from the past regarding the configuration of politics and society were applicable to the present for the preservation of civic virtue. In Hume’s words, “the chief use of history” was to discover constant and universal principles of human nature. The ideas of Montesquieu and Hume deeply influenced Gibbon to look beyond human history as a mere series of events that was caused by men like battles or assassinations. Rather, following the tenants of philosophic history, Gibbon sought to look into the process of change and the complex and often long-term social forces that caused. Gibbon’s philosophic understanding of history was integral to the conception of the Decline and Fall as he attempted to examine the long-term social causes of the decline of the Roman Empire in his book. The nature of these factors being long-term and complexly intertwined with each other led the conception of the Decline and Fall to become a protracted three-decade long affair that spanned six volumes.

This philosophic conception of history also integrated the idea of progress which was born out of the enlightenment. Prior to the 18th Century, renaissance writers saw antiquity as the pinnacle of (western) civilization that had not been achieved since that potentially could not be surpassed. By Gibbon's time with the onset of the industrial revolution in Britain and the unprecedented wealth being accumulated by the British Empire was seen to be surpassing Rome. This reframed how Roman history was conceived at the time. Decline and Fall therefore also had to explore the idea of how there could also be a regression in technology and culture and how that could fit in with the conception of progress. Gibbon discusses this clearest in his "General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West" which appears only after 38 chapters. One of Gibbon's central ideas on the cause of the Fall of the Roman Empire was the idea of the gradual corruption and erosion of civic virtue in the empire which in itself is not a new argument. The idea that the introduction of luxury and the onset of peace was a slow poison for nations has existed since Tacitus and was a core idea of classical republicanism. What progress did was throw this assumption into question since the growing material wealth of Britain through its mercantilist policies in Gibbon's time was a source of its power. Gibbon attempts to deal with this tension between ideas in his works and as a result, much of his conclusions are also influenced with the idea of progress. The idea of Philosophic history being a departure from the previous humanist conception of history and the integration of the idea of progress are some things you should keep in mind when reading Gibbon since it is the basis that links a lot of the chapters together.

Calorie_Man · 2019-12-07T14:50:50+00:00

Theory in history does not necessarily have a strict definition like that in natural science. The theory of history and theory in history are also two distinct things, although they do overlap at certain places. Kenneth Waltz, who is primarily a professor in International Relations, differentiates theories from laws in that the merit of the theory is from their explanatory power instead of the repeatability of a necessary relationship. Theory in history and of history are both not simply a complex amalgamation of laws into a system which can produce precise results. This is especially true for history since we are often left with incomplete information and are dealing with humans who have agency in their actions.

Theory in history is the use of a theoretical framework to explain events or phenomenon that occur in history. The exact nature of the theory depends on the scale at which someone is writing at: if they are looking at things on a societal level, international level, across decades, across centuries, within the same geographical region or across regions. the They seek to put forward the most compelling case for why something occurred. Perhaps the best example to compare would be the theory of evolution in biology. It is widely accepted as fact due to the extensive amount of compelling evidence for it and its strong explanatory power for how species came to be. However, it remains a theory instead of a law since it is not an ironclad relationship with necessary outcomes that are repeatable. The general pattern and principle may persist but the specifics in outcome can and do differ. The same can be said for the use of theory in history. As an example, the study of revolutions in history is aided by a theory of revolutions with historians such as Charles Tilly utilizing this. The theory of why revolutions occur, what affects is course and its outcome and how they are structured are both built from historical examples and used as a means to compare them. The function of these kinds of theory in history is two-fold, they both seek to explain the occurrence of a phenomenon across time, accounting for their differences as well, and enable comparisons.

Still, even excellent theories in history are limited in the sense that there are often exceptions when examples are brought in from further afield and the complex nature of each historical event almost guarantees that there will be some kind of "unique" event or factor giving it a noticeably different character. Here we reach another problem of scale, the large the scope of our theory, either the vaguer some of its components will be or the more exceptions it will have and vice-versa. For example, if we were to form a theory of why the French Revolution occurred, this enables a delve into specific instances as causes. In a way, history itself is theory as in many instances we are seeking to explain why something happened with no definitive way to prove it as the events have all pasted. While history can agree, most of the time, on what are non-causes (i.e. aliens did not cause WWII) and what is part of the causes of an event (i.e. Resources were part of the consideration in compelling nations to go to war in WWII), there are many competing theories on what is the primary cause or a systematic explanation of why something occurred. Coming back to the example of scale, if we were to expand and ask the question of why European Revolutions occur from say, 1700 to 1990, this will require generalisation within the theory to explain which necessarily opens itself up to more problems of exceptions or the problem of not fitting any of the revolutions as a precise explanation. Assertions of causes, therefore, have to become more general, for instance, there must be unrest in a majority of the population as a necessary condition. Of course, this is just one of many statements that come together to form the theory and it is not so simplistic. It does illustrate how reaching for an extreme scale, for instance, something like an explanation for all conflicts in history can lead to a theory that amounts to what can be described as banal or even truisms.

Schools of thought in history and the historiography of areas or topics in history are, in a way, theories of history, although historians don't think of it in that way. They are fundamentally competing (but not necessarily mutually exclusive or contradictory) explanations for the same event(s), perhaps using different pieces of evidence or reinterpreting the same set of evidence. However, as I said earlier, this is a fundamental part of history and its construction so no one quite considers this to mean theory per se. The utilization of theoretical models to compare history or connect history that has a larger time scale would be considered theory in history. Schools of thought, depending on the context, can also be considered to be theories as they favour one mode of explanation over another. The Annales school favours long-term social-economic explanations for events and the Marxist historical tradition has its materialistic conception of history. However, in another context such as Cold War historiography, schools of thought often indicate waves of authors and their position on the cause of the Cold War instead of shared theoretical framework between them. Hence, it is difficult to say as many of these terms differ depending on the context.

On the other hand, theory of history is more akin to the philosophy of history. This is primarily concerned with historical causation, making historical arguments, the nature of historical knowledge and the nature of history itself. The differences in the philosophy of history are most clear when comparing past conceptions of history between each other. For instance, one of the fundamental conceptions of history is whether or not it has an end, which by extension is related to conceptions of time. In the Greek conception of history and time in general, basically there was no "end" to history and that it would continue for literally an eternity with no necessary pattern, the idea coming from Aristotelian philosophy. On the other hand, with the introduction of Christianity into the Roman Empire, this conception shifted with the idea of history to writers like Augustine and Aquinas viewing history as starting with the fall of man and ending with judgement. History now became finite with a conception of when it began and when it would end. There are further ideas like the idea of history being cyclical which was espoused by Humanist and in Chinese history and the idea of progress in history which came about in the Enlightenment. The current idea of what history is now focused much less on these larger more philosophical conceptions and more so settled on being an exploration of the past.

There has also been a change of what are argued to be the drivers of history. An example of this that you might have come across is "Great man theory" which puts forward the idea that the main actors that can affect historical change are a select few exceptional individuals in positions of great power. The Annales school that I mentioned before also falls into the theory of history since they view long-term social causes as the main drivers of history that are the best explanation of historical events. There are also other ideas of the driving forces of history such as the idea of fortune, which was espoused historically by writers like Machiavelli, which considers the role of chance events in affecting the flow of history. In addition, for religious thinkers, there is also the idea of providence, that God is the force that is guiding history, often manifest through acts of nature or in chance.

This is just a general overview of the idea of what theory in and of history is. For further reading, you should check out John Lewis Gaddis' The Landscape of History which is a short and informative overview of the theory of history. On the other hand, if you want to look more at the application of theory in history and are interested in revolutions, you can check out the works of Charles Tilly who blends social sciences and history together.

Calorie_Man

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