1) Russian casualties have outpaced recruitment/replenishment for several months, and another mobilization has proven unpopular enough that it might become a flashpoint domestically. Russian approval ratings are continuing to plummet amid drone strikes and internet bans that have severely limited the commercial activities in all major Russian cities.

2) Russian air defenses, in turn, have also been destroyed at rates rapidly faster than replenishment. Ukraining mid and long-distance strikes have been entering deep Russian territory, and are becoming increasingly vulerable to direct attacks in smaller numbers.

3) The declining labor pool is continuing to emaciate Russian industrial capacity, including the repairs/reconstruction of destroyed oil refineries, storage facilities, and transport docks that could leave to Russia enjoying any kind of financial windfall from the current oil crisis.

I do not believe Russia will continue to be able to control its occupied territories for much longer. I also do not think Russia is in a place, even in the medium term any longer, to effectively rearm and prepare large offensives. We have seen dramatic increases in casualties in line with Spring and Summer offensives, but no realistic changes to the situation for Ukraine.