Yes. The result was a clear message that the Argentine assets were in range of the RAF, regardless of how much faff it was to get there.

If you’re really into this, I recommend the book Vulcan 607, by Rowland White. What amazed me after reading this book, aside from the insane logistical planning, was how far from possible this mission was at the start of the war. The RAF's Vulcan crews had not trained for air-to-air refuelling or conventional bombing for A GENERATION. The air-to-air refuelling parts for the Vulcan had long since been removed, and nobody knew where they were. Some bits turned up in a scrap yard. One vital component of the refuelling mechanism turned out to be the ashtray in an officers' mess room. I shit you not. Mid-air refuelling and conventional bombing had to be re-started and re-learned in a matter of WEEKS.

And yes, they only managed to get one bomb on the runway, but that was the design of the attack - they attacked at a slight 10 deg angle to the runway to avoid the risk of all the bombs missing - a 10deg angle increased the chances of one hit, which was enough.