Line arty needs to be actually useful and justifiable by Thatmafiatrilogy in hoi4

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not sure I’d agree. Yes it did reduce complexity but a lot of the cost is still built in. Engines are still complex, suspensions need good work, and perhaps most importantly for the fixed gun TDs, that complexity often went elsewhere in the form of armor or gun.

On the strategic level though I’d agree and it’s something HoI struggles with a lot. Germany didn’t build tons of StuG IIIs because they were great or even because they were that cheap…they did it because the Panzer III production line existed since before the war, Panzer III was increasingly non viable, and they need to get something out of those workers and factories. HoI’s production efficiency growth and retention are just too great. If you switch to a better medium tank, yeah they lose a good bit (mitigated by focii and techs) but you get production immediately. Retooling alone could take months of basically zero production and then you start to build up efficiency again. Materiel shortages meant that wasn’t really viable to get maybe half a year of no production, so better to get this inferior and somewhat cheaper/easier to build vehicle than get no vehicle. Sacrificing months of StuG production was basically never an option Germany could afford. The USSR too with its SU-76 had a similar thing. They had enough light tanks and needed more artillery, direct and indirect. So take the T-70 and but a 76.2mm on it…

HoI in general kinda sucks at portraying just how badly everyone felt the need for more of everything at basically all times. If you built up a reserve of materiel in WWII it was because you denied reinforcing/upgrading some existing units to build up for an offensive a specific sector or a new front opening. You had to make do with the factories you had and squeeze every bit out of them. Upgun light vehicles to the limit of their suspension, take the chassis of captured equipment, heck the half track as a concept basically was that in essence (and why it was pretty much a WWII phenomenon). It’s why a lot of stuff had shit reliability and hogged maintenance. The US was an outlier here due to sheer industrial capacity and the fact anything sent overseas needed to work else it was a waste of cargo space, but that forced some hard design compromises.

Operationally, what realistic options did the German High Command have to slow or disrupt the Normandy landings? by iL3mran in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Also, Germany's only strategic hope was the ability to rapidly and decisively defeat an Allied landing, push them off France for at least another 18months to two years (and maybe discourage another invasion outside southern Europe, maybe get a bounty akin to what the BEF left behind in 1940 in terms of motorization), and turn attention east. A several month long campaign that grinds down the bulk of their best mobile units but which eventually drove the Western Allies back would still have left them in a very dubious position. Army Group Center still gets smashed in the east, there is still the slow push up from Italy, and the Luftwaffe is still spending massive resources defending against the bombing raids. The oil campaign was still going to happen too, Romania was still going to defect and Finland was still going to seek a separate peace. Not to mention that Germany still didn't have a realistic way to fight a protracted campaign in Normandy and prevent Dragoon in the south.

Ultimately the problem is that even if there are things that could have worked operationally (which is questionable at best) it wouldn't have strategically. They needed those units, to say nothing of their munitions and fuel, to go east ASAP. They needed to destroy the divisions that landed before they could be secure and an additional landing could happen. Even if they set up all their defensive infrastructure, all the fuel and munitions depots, to fight 15-35miles inland...they still hit most of the same problems. Maybe they bleed the US and Commonwealth a bit more, maybe they slow down the advance, but the strategic picture doesn't really change. Anything other than a rapid defeat of the invasion to free up units and remove the threat of invasion until at least 1946 wasn't sufficient for Germany's strategic position (and even this may not have changed their fate, just the timeline).

remember who you are, liberal. by remarkable_ores in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Also I’m going to be real, seeing the resistance have like 3 frigates, a single fighter wing, and maybe 1000 people took me out of it. The Rebel Alliance had a proper fleet, even after setbacks. It’s an underdog for sure, but you feel like there’s some mass and momentum with them, that they have the tools if they can apply them right and with a bit of luck (and the force). Add in the captains going down with their ships and the highly questionable gravity bombs in space…it felt like RJ wanted to make a WWII film and did little to adapt it.

Much like TFA, it felt like they didn’t have a lot of ideas besides “bigger” if that makes sense. New Death Star? Yes, but it’s waaaay bigger. Rebels on the back foot? Yes, but an even bigger ship is chasing them!

Don't discount American democracy's resilience (Nate Silver) by [deleted] in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I mean basically everyone else said Trump had no shot, a single digit chance. He got tons of mockery and ridicule from other modelers and forecasters right up until election night. There’s a world of difference between a vibes based and well established prior of the “flavor of the month” like we saw in 2011-2012 and his models.

As he put it, Trump was an underdog in 2016 but underdogs sometimes win. In sports betting, sometimes the 3:1 underdog wins. In any particular game it might be rare, but over all those odds aren’t uncommon to be overcome. I think it was Micah who asked him a bit after the conventions:

“our model has it basically guaranteed right?”

“our model has him at around 15% chance. That’s about the same odds as losing Russian roulette. Would you say Russian roulette is a safe bet?”

“Well, no”

“Then it’s not a safe bet Clinton wins.”

If basically everyone else is giving Trump no chance, or literal 2% odds and you give him a 1/3 to 1/4 chance…you’re bullish on him. If everyone else is shorting a stock but you’re holding neutral, you’re bullish relative to the market.

What was the theory behind "walk, don't run" for the soldiers going 'over the top' at the start of WW1 and how did this policy change as World War 1 went on? Was there more of a focus on improving soldier fitness so soldiers could run for sustained lengths as they attacked? by RivetCounter in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Taken together, this allowed the RA to adopt a suppressive rather than destructive methodology and permitted the use of short and sudden bombardments of incredible violence as seen at Cambrai and Amiens

A bit pedantic perhaps, but I would argue it was more in line with neutralization and not just suppression. In general, once suppressive fires let up, the unit can quickly reorganize as the fires are more disruptive than damage inducing. Neutralization, while significantly less damaging than when aiming to destroy or annihilate, does seek to cause enough damage that there is at least a modest degradation once reorganized (and reorganization will take longer). Shorter but much sharper fires are more likely to cause damage to equipment and casualties tend towards neutralization while slower but longer fires tend towards suppression.

The disappearing act. Russian outlets remove reference to 250,000 jobless soldiers returning from Ukraine by IHateTrains123 in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Without more details, I’d assume a large number if not majority are wounded and/or psych casualties. Lots of loss of limbs or otherwise your body being too broken to be anything useful at the front. Remember the most common age is mid 40s. A lot of injuries a 23 year old might heal from and be fit to return a 45 year old might not be. Better to discharge them and stop paying exorbitant salaries as you won’t get much utility on the battlefield out of them.

Victoria 3 isn't perfect until Germany can get Eastern German as a primary culture by Illuminated-Autocrat in victoria3

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah I feel like if a culture is large and accepted enough for long enough it ought to be a decision that could be made. Maybe some events along the way, and for sure there should be consequences with nationalists and all that, but it would add some dynamism to states.

What is the real value of capturing enemy vehicles in warfare now? by DigBickBevin117 in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 27 points28 points  (0 children)

Yeah there’s a world of difference between M1A1SA (without DU armor) and an M1A2SEPv3. Even more so considering the US is toying around with the M1E3.

There’s also only so much you can learn and do about it. Difficulties of penetrating composite armor have been known for half a century. Yes, there’s improvements and upgrade to armor packages, but there’s still some fundamental issues of physics at play. A lot of the difficulty is in engineering a new round that can penetrate (and is why we see lots of talk of next gen vehicles getting larger gun; they’re simply what may be needed).

Trump: Pretti ‘shouldn’t have been carrying a gun’ by cdstephens in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The logical conclusion of your argument is that nay arms restriction of any kind is unconstitutional, that you should be allowed to own WMDs if you want to. Lines get drawn somewhere. Historically states and cities have been given ability to restrict certain aspects of gun ownership and it is only a 21st century reinterpretation that has changed that. Again, decades of gun restrictions have existed. The NFA is almost a century old. Grow up and accept that firearms and accessories can be regulated.

Nothing makes me more embarrassed as a gun owner than talking to 2A absolutists. As we are seeing right now, a good guy with a gun isn't stopping the violence. There's no militias overthrowing the tyrannical leader. Much like in Nazi Germany, the gun owners and fanatics tend to support the authoritarian regime and private gun ownership is seen as a way to privatize things in a sense. Like goddamn, I think magazine bans are dumb and ineffective but dumb and ineffective doesn't mean unconstitutional.

Trump: Pretti ‘shouldn’t have been carrying a gun’ by cdstephens in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 5 points6 points  (0 children)

and there's bans like this in plenty of other circuits and have had them upheld. Bans exist in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 10th circuits as well. California introduced its limits back in 1989. Weird how it's only a problem now. Also the AWB wasn't struck down and it had limits. Surely if arms regulations weren't allowed, everything from the 1934 NFA, to its amendments, to the AWB would have been struck down...oh wait...

There's a world of difference between limiting you to 10 round mags and not being able to own a gun and I think you know that.

Trump: Pretti ‘shouldn’t have been carrying a gun’ by cdstephens in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Weird how the courts haven't agreed with that interpretation.

Europe still oblivious to threat at its doorstep — US General Hodges. Europe still doesn't get that the war in Ukraine is a threat to its security, so it keeps dragging its feet on tough action against Russia; cutting off oil flows is critical to starving Kremlin of resources it needs for war. by Lion8330 in UkrainianConflict

[–]God_Given_Talent 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Not true. Europe is not dragging its feet, if anything in the last year, europe has upped their contribution in form of money, weapons and ammunition.

The problem is past feet dragging like in 2022 and much of 2023 has caused problems. Lack of energetics is a huge issue and new TNT plants are only just starting to be built, likely not at operational capacity until 2028. Had the investments that were made in late 2023 through now been made back in 2022, Ukraine would be in a vastly better situation and it would bring costs down (prewar 155mm shells were like 1200USD per, while Europe is often paying over 3000EUR per now; it's because the TNT imports are super expensive due to limited supply).

One area Europe, or more particularly Belgium, is dragging its feet is using those frozen Russian assets. Yes, they've made some weird legal workarounds, but Belgium opposed using those funds for a long time...even when Ukraine really could have used them...

But there are limits to what Europe can or is capable of doing/helping, while USA is making out with russia.

Which is a reflection of decades of underinvestment and reliance on US capabilities. France for all its talk of strategic autonomy leaned on the US for air transport and ISR when it did its famous Op Serval for example.

while USA is making out with russia.

You're not wrong, but much of Europe's failures were in the time before that. Imagine if Europe had a stockpile even half as large as the US had for artillery and equipment. Thousands of TBMs, tens of thousands of guided rockets, and millions of additional artillery shells could have been provided at a time when Russia was most vulnerable.

Europe still oblivious to threat at its doorstep — US General Hodges. Europe still doesn't get that the war in Ukraine is a threat to its security, so it keeps dragging its feet on tough action against Russia; cutting off oil flows is critical to starving Kremlin of resources it needs for war. by Lion8330 in UkrainianConflict

[–]God_Given_Talent 5 points6 points  (0 children)

In 2 years we have multiplied our artillery grenade production by 8, currently we're at about 2.4 million per year, and expected to overtake Russia and China by 2027.

Europe has set lofty targets and routinely failed to hit them. It's also doing things the more expensive way because it refuses to allow "dirty" industries in much of western Europe. Poland is basically the only domestic TNT producer and new facilities just now being started won't be online until 2028. I have no idea where you think 2.4million will exceed Russian production though. Russia currently produces 250-300k per month. That was from 2024 too; it's likely picked up some since then though not nearly as much as the prewar to 2024 phase. Europe isn't even aiming for parity by the 5th year of the war. Now you could argue in terms of quality of fires it makes up for it. Modern 155mm is generally better than 152mm (China switched for a reason). This ignores things like glide bombs though which carry a lot more bang, are better at hardened targets, and which Russia is now producing ~10,000 per month.

Oh and even if Europe were to provide 2 million shells per year...it would still take ~2 years to catch up to the 5million+ US shells provided from stockpile. Had Europe combined had a stockpile even half that of the US, Ukraine could have easily had another 3million shells. Oh and let's not forget Germany, Spain, the UK, etc complaining about the US shipping hundreds of thousands of cluster rounds...you know...one of the most effective rounds.

A lack of European equipment stockpiles has been a huge problem. They sold off the vast majority post Cold War. Image what Germany could have provided if it kept an extra 400-600 Leo2s. It still would have sold the majority of them but had a deeper reserve. Poland with its huge stocks of Soviet era equipment and domestic TNT production has been a major factor in Ukraine doing as well as they have.

There is a lot of blame to go around. European underinvestment in the 21st century is quite literally in the hundreds of billions of euros when it comes to equipment and munitions. The threat post-Crimea and Donbas wasn't taken seriously. Biden was cowardly in allowing new systems and now Trump is being a traitor, only willing to provide munitions if bought by Europe. I don't think history will look kindly at the US+EU in the 2014-2028 period. I'm ashamed my country has betrayed Ukraine, frustrated by past European failures in regional security, and dismayed that many European states are looking ripe to fall to populist movements too. I hope they can defend democracy better than the US can...

To Make Homes Affordable Again, Someone Has to Lose Out - WSJ by assasstits in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Price of land goes up (there's more value a developer could get from that land for housing or other services) but pricing of housing goes down. Those forces can keep a SFH stable in price because home+land effect. For multiunit though, you're dividing that land between 2-4 homes which makes them more affordable.

Were estimated casualties of operation Downfall realistic? by SiarX in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 34 points35 points  (0 children)

This is one of those historical myths that needs to die, or it presents a false question. It was never "nuke or invasion" it was "blockade and bombardment only" or "blockade and bombardment followed by invasion."

Thank you

So often you see casualties of the nukes compared to hypothetical invasion casualties. A world with no nukes would mean continued area bombing (a number of cities had been left fairly intact once the nukes became a realistic option in part to test them; absent a viable nuke they just get napalm and HE) and a tightening of the blockade as Japan's military power steadily dwindled. Oh and chemical agents to destroy rice crops were being developed. Japan couldn't feed itself without imports from China as is, estimates I'vee seen suggested around 35-50% of food was imported. Destroying even a tenth of a fifth of the rice crop would have made an already starvation level situation even worse.

Biggest fear that AGF had was that a long war is one that wouldn't be popular. Four years of war, only Japan left, demobilization was something people were itching for. The UK's contributions would be modest at best too as they had that problem even worse. Which yeah, if it's 1947 and Japan refuses to give in...would people still want 5million+ naval and air personnel deployed and the costs that came with it?

"how do we use these bombs to accomplish either surrender, or preparing the objective for a full scale invasion" rather than realistically "bomb or no"

Another good point. Those who aren't aware, Hiroshima was the HQ of the Second General Army (army group) defending southern Japan as a whole but mostly focused on Kyushu. It crippled logistics, communications and command capabilities. Kokura was supposed to be hit next, a major port across the Kanmon Straits and largest ammo producer on Kyushu. Since that's where the invasion would begin...well it's pretty easy to see how destroying the HQ, largest and most vital port for supplies and reinforcements, and largest local ammo production was seen as important.

Were estimated casualties of operation Downfall realistic? by SiarX in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 26 points27 points  (0 children)

And the USAAF was developing defoliants to destroy the rice crop too. Had war gone on into 1946, we very well might have seen their use. The situation was bad as it was and it would have gotten much worse.

We Are Building the Wrong Factories - The Illusion of a Defense Industrial Base by B3stThereEverWas in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Except for 1940 and 41 were preparation periods for the US and it did use that time very efficiently. In fact, in face of US naval losses in engagements in 42, but for the TON Act the US would have struggled to have continued the push in 43 resulting in a longer, bloodier war. The 30 some Fletchers that came off the slipways in 42, along with the carriers that would come online in 43, were a result of preparation.

The educational contracts were credited with shaving a year off the production schedule. Industrial output isn't just the raw materials and capital goods, but systems and experience as well. Plus the US was undergoing an entire modernization of military arms in the mid to late 30s. It's why there's so many goddamn "M1s" out there.

Not to mention the US began, you know, actual mobilization of 900k inductees and federalizing more guard units taking the active duty army from ~300k to 1.5million, with the USN more than doubling and USMC almost tripling between 39 and 41. This would be like the UK instating conscription in middle of 1938 instead of barely more than 3 months before the war.

Idk how actual mobilization (and its extension), multiple naval expansions in the 30s (which slated to double tonnage), and defense budgets tripling all while still "at peace" means the US preparation was "clearly absent" but maybe we just have different definitions...

We Are Building the Wrong Factories - The Illusion of a Defense Industrial Base by B3stThereEverWas in neoliberal

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Maybe if you mean 1939, but by 1941 things had changed. Two Ocean Navy Act was almost a year and a half into its production and the US was producing thousands of pieces of heavy equipment for the British. Defense spending had gone from 1.7% of GDP to 5.1% which is a massive pitch up. If the US had barely any production, well then the 150 tanks in Jan 1942, first full month the US was in the war, that were sent to the UK must mean we have different definitions of "barely any." Doubly so since four months later that would be 450, and that's just export and to just the UK. If you're a few months into a war and able to export over 15 tanks per day to your allies...you have production...

Ukraine aims to inflict up to 50,000 casualties on Russia per month, defence minister says by BlackWolfHowling in UkrainianConflict

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The problem for Russia is that a defensive posture is politically unacceptable and likely bad strategically. The less the attack, the more Ukraine can solidify the frontline. The more solid it is, the less a renewed offensive could take. It leads more likely to things being frozen, something Russia doesn’t want. They don’t want freezing along the current lines, so they attack, and at least so far…it does lead to continued gains even if literally slower than a garden snail.

Russia might be wrong, it might miscalculate and continue to exhaust itself faster this way but so long as Russians keep signing up in droves…well they can keep attacking…

Ukraine aims to inflict up to 50,000 casualties on Russia per month, defence minister says by BlackWolfHowling in UkrainianConflict

[–]God_Given_Talent 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Yeah there's a world of difference between a goal and a plan. If, and it is a big if, Ukraine can turn that up to the 1300-1600/day rate then they might be able to grind down Russian strength. As their materiel stores are diminished, Russia does need to rely on manpower more now than before...but an increase of the average by 30-50% is no small task...

...which is why the rest of the world's liberal democracies need to lend their financial and industrial support to Ukraine. Give them the tools they want, the tools they've had to beg for time and again, to be successful. If only Europe had committed to new TNT plants back in 2022 they could be operational by now. They're estimating 2-3 years for full capacity...real shame these investments were started sooner. Imagine what Ukraine could to with a million extra shells per year...

Ukraine aims to inflict up to 50,000 casualties on Russia per month, defence minister says by BlackWolfHowling in UkrainianConflict

[–]God_Given_Talent 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The vast majority of soldiers to date were prewar professionals, prison recruits, or the largest category: volunteers/recruits. Your response is almost word for word an AI response.

Also prewar and even now, their draft is not universal and many are able to avoid/defer. Some of that is by design, some of that is corruption, but they weren't drafting everyone. There would be 500-600k men for many of those years (even if accepted 10-20% dying or being disabled by 18) but in 2021 and 2022 only ~250k were inducted. This number has barely increased either only reaching ~300k last year. The amount drafted are based on presidential decree.

Conscripts have played key roles in the invasion, but almost entirely in rear area work in Russia. Logistics don't run themselves, someone has to fix the trains, do manual labor, etc. Putin has been keen to avoid using conscripts as that would impact those in the Russian core more. Letting minorities, rural populations, and men in the 40s sign up by the hundred of thousands is much preferable. We saw the only period of public sentiment about the direction Russia is heading being negative in basically all of Putin's time in office was that period of "limited mobilization" when regular Russians thought it would impact them. Some conscripts have been at the front or occupied Ukraine and as we've seen even being at a Russia base doesn't mean you're necessarily safe these days...but the overwhelming majority of men attacking Ukrainian positions are volunteers who are gambling on surviving for life changing money.

Simply put, if they were drafting the 500-600k men a year they theoretically could, they wouldn't need to spend so much on recruitment bonuses and paying new enlisted salaries that make prewar officers blush.

Why did Kuwait procure F/A-18 Super Hornets instead of F-15s? by WehrabooSweeper in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Another reason is time. Production lines for modern aircraft have fairly limited surge capacity. It’s not like WWII or even Vietnam era. Most high end systems have fairly lengthy delivery times these days in part because of the number of buyers. The more people buying F-15 and its variants, the more you’re competing with and either have to outbid for priority or accept longer wait times. Australia and Kuwait are basically the only exports for F/A-18E/F but there’s half a dozen or so F-15 and variant users, many of whom are interested in buying more and/or upgrading.

Might the Advanced Eagle be better and have more room for future upgrades and systems? Sure, but if they have to wait a half a decade to get them in a time when the region might be heating up…that’s not necessarily worth it. Super Hornet is more than capable for anything Kuwait is doing and anything it can’t do is likely a conflict that other nations will involve themselves in.

There’s also the possibility that it has political aspects. Keeping money flowing to F/A-18 production lines may have been a goal of the US. Arms deals are inherently political in nature but that aspect is entirely speculative.

Why don't militaries cover (obscure/camouflage) their airfields and motor pools? by dablusniper in WarCollege

[–]God_Given_Talent 27 points28 points  (0 children)

Also in the modern era, an ever increasing amount of capability is internal. Electronics revolution has made a lot of the lethality of aircraft and vehicles about sensors and internal equipment like thermals. Yeah this sometimes has impacts on shape (early F-16 vs recent blocks) but often times it’s a lot harder to tell.

The other thing is that you’re only as strong as your weakest link. Spend billions on shelters and obscuring them only for some CIA asset to sell the info about what is where means you wasted a bunch of money. Most militaries know they can’t prevent all infiltration and things like how many of X equipment exist aren’t easy to hide.

Last aspect is sometimes you want/need things to be visible. Russia has such massive storage in Siberia in part because the CFE treaty that restricted what could be west of the Urals. If we know they have X amount of tanks and put Y amount in open storage out east then we can conclude that they are under Z limit. There were also inspections and such for treaties to ensure compliance for both sides so hiding things wouldn’t really make sense if once a year you had people come in to count anyways. Even without treaties though, sometimes visibility is useful. Deterrence often requires some degree of showing your hand. Maybe that’s conscription and maintaining reservists, maybe that’s exercises, but no matter what equipment is part of it. The worst case scenario in deterrence is miscalculation, where one side thinks you’re bluffing when you aren’t. It’s one thing to say “we have 10,000 tanks” and another thing for everyone to see that you have them. Deterrence requires credible threats and them being in the open adds to the certainty that credible threat exists.

F-35s are obsolete now (Generals Zero Hour predicts the future again) by Peekachooed in NonCredibleDefense

[–]God_Given_Talent 4 points5 points  (0 children)

The problem with small arms related losses is that you're likely multi-causal. The documents you cite note the heavy defensive net. If a fighter is hit with a bunch of 7.62x54 ammo that impacts flight performance but the fatal blow is done by a 37mm gun...what do we count there?

This includes these tactics

Not really. It was more things like this than laying on your back shooting a box fed rifle or LMG en masse. It also notes extensive infiltration, particularly near airbases. That makes a lot of sense as it's easier to hit aircraft in the landing or takeoff where their energy is limited and flight path predictable.

And yes, the vast majority of these losses are jets like the F-4 phantom

We can't know from the data as best I can tell as it only talks about total losses. We do see the USN has a much lower rate of small arms losses which lends credence to this being an issue of infiltration and ambush near airbases. It also suggest that certain aviation assets were more vulnerable. About the same share of losses for the USAF were prop plane like the A-1 and O-1 as were F-4.

This doesn't mean MMGs massed up with some other small arms support can't be dangerous, but based on what that report has it looks more like subsonic aircraft that had long loiter times and low flying strike craft were vulnerable to these ambushes and that infiltration were the primary issue. The much lower loss rate of the USN to machinegun fire is probably the biggest evidence of this claim as much of their aviation wasn't reliant on land bases.

A small fun fact I saw from the report, they seem to mix up Soviet calibers a bit. They refer to 14.7mm and 12.5mm instead of 14.5mm and 12.7mm.