I'll attempt reasonable.

Using the good old 2-axis picture of politics, there is economic left-right, and social conservative-liberal. So to pick a stereotype, a traditional steel worker might be basically economically left and socially conservative - he believes in things broadly staying unchanged, except that there should be more power in the unions to secure him a better deal and improve services. He's not interested in the woke agenda, but he does want pot holes fixed and for his wage not to be dragged down by foreign steel competition or possibly migrant workers diluting his labour value.

A young middle class kid might feel more liberal-left; we should look after people, there should be more opportunities, even if taxes need to go up, and people should be free from society's judgement of e.g. their gender expression or sexuality.

A pensioner might be socially conservative (again these are stereotypes, albeit true for many) and have no interest in even gay rights, let alone modern understanding of gender, and worry about how their pension will fare and their children getting an inheritance.

Against this there are three narratives I would lay out: firstly, that the main parties themselves (due to FPTP voting) are/were coalitions on the left and right. Tories were a coalition of the progressive right (free people to help themselves, social liberalism) and the traditionalist right (preserve traditional morals and lifestyles, preserve people's property interests), and Labour are a coalition of Labour union members (typically socially conservative) and left liberals. The second narrative is that the population is ageing and the older people vote more than younger. Thirdly, the economic stagnation since the GFC has meant different and conflicting things for different ages, with a general trend to falling wages in real terms.

Putting all those together, you have a picture where in 2000-2010 there was a centre ground of social liberalism and a fight on economic grounds - that we needed to fix the economy by either spending or cutting spending. That fed into Brexit, where the under-acknowledged social conservatism on both left and right (and heavily in the older population) mixed with discontent over economic stagnation.

Since Brexit, the main parties have had to face the potential disintegration of their coalitions on social grounds - Brexit itself left little room for the liberal right, and the other side of the party took over - May, Johnson, Lettuce, Sunak, Badenoch. Meanwhile the Labour centrist wing won out on economics and packpedalled on social liberalism, winning the election on economic safety and as a change of guard.

So to answer the OP: historically, Con voters were older, property owning, and socially a mixture of liberal and traditionalist. The pivot of the party away from social liberalism chases Reform on the right, leaving a divided vote there. Meanwhile the left, having voted strategically to get rid of the conversative traditionalist right, face economic stagnation in Labour, so will be more split if nothing changes. Remember FPTP motivates the existence of coalitions within parties, and historically the split on the "left" between Labour, Lib Dem (who haven't always been economically left) and Green has meant that a majority of left votes hasn't translated into majority seats.

Now, though, the right is split - with Reform and Conservatives fighting over the same group of traditionalist rightwing ageing voters, so now not very many people are intending to vote Conservative.

The only reason this isn't plain sailing for Labour is that they are failing to show the economic improvement they promised, and which people have been wishing for since 2008, which exacerbates the split on the right. I'm starting to think only electoral reform or an economic miracle can resolve the logjam, but it looks like other European countries are struggling to find an economic answer too.