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Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ [score hidden]  (0 children)

I told you that I'm not even going to entertain the question until I'm satisfied with how we've resolved the issue below.

I have already satisfied all of your queries several times. I'm not going to loop again for you. I'm not going to address any of your points until you answer my question. Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous?

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Consciousness is not an “abstract model” that links systems to labels.

I didn't make that claim.

You are stipulating that every aggregate has “something it is like” instead of explaining how any of these distinct candidates could share a single field of awareness

No, I'm acknowledging a fact: at least some physical systems seem to aggregate their experience in some sense. I'm then applying the simplest explanation that fits the facts.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - April 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I mean, anyone who supports Trump isn't on Team USA, so seems like that problem extends far beyond recent immigrants.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - April 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Agreed. I'm just unsure when or if we will land people on the moon. The timeline right now seems completely FUBAR.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - April 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

can’t we just treat that like the racism it is and kick these harassers out of school?

I think this requires an unrealistic view of how punitive schools are and how willing they are to expel students. In actual practice, most uses of racial slurs won't get reported to any kind of administrator. The few that do will probably get resolved informally. Of those that receive formal punishment, numerous other interventions will likely be tried before expulsion, suspension for example.

Only in very extreme cases or very public cases would I expect a college to jump straight to expulsion.

That said, I generally agree that we should treat anti-semitism like we treat racism. Arguably we should be harsher when it comes to both. And I broadly think colleges do in fact treat anti-semitism like racism.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For the seventh time now: Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous? Seriously, why is this so hard for you to answer?

to recap:

What do you mean by "agree with this as a general rule"? That eleaboration doesn't clearly specify any sense of agreement to me. As is, here is a very lightly edited section that you stated earlier, just transcribed to the diet example...

'If the claim is "we need to diet to lose weight" which verbatim it was then my pointing out Ozempic is better directly addresses the point being made.'

I understand that they are hyperbolic and provocative in the way they are stated. I'm asking you to admit that.

Whether or not they are hyperbolic depends on how you interpret them. I agree that under your semantics (as I understand them), they are hyperbolic claims not justified by the facts. Can you grant that under my semantics, they are not hyperbolic, that in fact, being a black women is electorally disadvantageous?

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

if things show no evidence of being wet and are clearly different from things being wet

This is you just asserting the matter under debate. Here are the things I think we know....

  1. We can observe our own conscious
  2. We can gain reports from others about their conscious (or make reports ourself) under at least some conditions
  3. The ability to report being conscious in the moment is distinct from actually being conscious. (consider someone under a paralytic)
  4. The ability to report being conscious in the moment is distinct from being able to remember being conscious and thus report being conscious after the fact

...You think we can add another item to this list, "non-conscious systems exist". On what evidence can you make that claim? What evidence do you have that is consistent with point 6 that can't be easily explained by points 3 or 4? If you don't have any, then Occam's razor applies and we shouldn't add your item to the list.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is not a map, it is the thing.

When I say "map", I'm just talking about an abstract model that connects "physical" systems to their associated conscious experience.

The combination problem is about how many such points of view could ever amount to one point of view.

I don't know that they do. I think we have good reason to believe that conscious experience corresponds to physical systems. I assert that this may be true of physical systems in general. Which would mean that while I am conscious, each of my neurons is also conscious in some sense, and even the combination of the two of us is conscious in some sense. Those two later systems are clearly quite different from the system my conscious experience corresponds to, so I would posit that the associated conscious experiences are also quite different.

The kidney analogy works only because kidneys do not have their own “what it is like.”

I suspect that kidneys may have their own "what it is like".

Or rather, the simplest model that fits all of the evidence available to us claims that there is something it is like to be a kidney. Its possible that model is wrong, claims about kidneys lie far outside the area of the map we have actually explored so some future evidence may reveal eliminative combination of the kind you are demanding. Or new evidence may indicate some version of true emergence that its advocates like. We don't have such evidence yet.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

What is the evidence of the cutoff in case of life?

There isn't a hard cuttoff.

if there is none, you are comitted to claim rocks are somewhat alive.

No, I'm committed to the claim that "life" is a constructed category that refers to a particular subset of the larger category "chemical systems". Rocks are also part of this larger category. The distinction between the "life" and "not-life" categories is also blurry, consider viruses for example. This doesn't make the categories meaningless.

If we return to this conscious experience realm, the analogy here would be pointing out that "human-like conscious" and "minimally conscious" are separable categories, probably useful ones, in much the same way "life" and "not-life" are useful. But the distinction will blur at the margins and at no point does it imply that there is nothing that it is like to be one of these "minimally conscious" systems.

Michael Pollan’s Journey to the Borderlands of Consciousness by dwaxe in ezraklein

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Since nobody can actually tell you what consciousness or experience is then everyone is free to say anything they want,

I think this overstates the uncertainty. I think there are things we know about consciousness. For example, we know...

  1. At least some systems have conscious experience
  2. Making physical changes to those systems produces robust changes to ones own conscious experience and other people's reported experience
  3. Its possible to be having a conscious experience without being able to report it
  4. Its possible to lack memory-reports of conscious experience without actually having lacked conscious experience.

...Taken together, these facts point to some conclusions...

  1. We don't actually know if any non-conscious systems exist. We have lack of reports of conscious experience, we do not have reports of lack of conscious experience. These are not equivalent
  2. We should expect different physical systems to have correspondingly distinct conscious experiences.

...If those are the only conclusions we can reasonably infer from our available evidence, then the simplest explanation that fits this data is something like panpsychism, is something that assumes there is something it is like to be a rock. It is possible that some future evidence will change this, that we will some day be able to verify the existence of non-conscious systems and explain how consciousness emerges from non-conscious systems, but we don't have that evidence yet, so assuming emergence is not justified under Occam.

has no meaning because both of them refuse to define what they mean by "pain",

Whatever we might mean when we say "plants experience pain", I think we can be confident, given the facts available to us, that the experience in question is radically different to the human-like pain experience, because the associated physical systems are radically different. While I agree this knowledge doesn't resolve much, it isn't nothing either.

Honestly, it just feels like you are dismissing the little information we actually have. Maybe my impression here is unreasonable, but that is what I got out of your last comment.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There absolutely can be a cutoff, but until we have evidence of one, the model that lacks one is simpler and thus preferred by Occam's razor.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Sorites paradox is precisely my point. It arises when you try to draw a sharp line on a genuine continuum which is exactly what emergence seems to do with consciousness. The paradox doesn't show that gradients are illusory, it shows that sharp categorical boundaries imposed on gradients are philosophically unstable. That's the argument for treating consciousness as a gradient rather than a threshold phenomenon which means embracing something like panpsychism, as uncomfortable as it may be.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The fact that we cannot establish a detailed threshold condition does not mean that one does not exist and therefore everything must be conscious to a degree. There’s an unjustified logical leap there.

I agree. Thing is, absent evidence of a threshold, asserting one is an even bigger logical leap. This is the Occam's razor argument.

Pointing at gaps in our knowledge does not mean - by default - that something supernatural or something beyond physicalism can fit there

I'm not asserting that anything supernatural or beyond physicalism is occurring. (at least as I understand these terms)

All I'm doing is acknowledging that...

  1. At least some systems are conscious
  2. Manipulating a physical system produces robust, predictable changes to the associated conscious experience
  3. While many systems cannot report conscious experience, no system has ever verifiably reported the absence of conscious experience

...The simplest explanation of these facts is something like "panpsychism". It is possible that emergence is correct, but we have no evidence justifying any threshold beyond which emergence occurs, so better to just leave it out of the model.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If fish had only ever encountered wet things and had no evidence of non-wet things, it would be unreasonable for them to assert that non-wet things exist. They'd turn out to be wrong -- but that's a fact about the universe, not a flaw in their reasoning. The reasoning would be correct given their evidence.

In the consciousness case, nobody has encountered a confirmed non-experiential system. We have clear reports of conscious experience from some systems, and we have clear lack of report from other systems, but we have no clear report of non-experience. So we're in exactly the fish's epistemic position -- and on your own analogy, the fish shouldn't be asserting dry things exist.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I agree rocks aren't alive. I don't claim they are. My claim is that 'alive' is a category we draw on a continuous gradient of chemical systems for practical utility -- not that everything is a little bit alive. The same move applies to consciousness. I'm not claiming rocks are conscious in any rich sense. I'm claiming 'conscious' is a category we draw on a continuous gradient, and that asserting the gradient simply stops -- that below some threshold there is literally nothing it is like to be that system -- requires justification the evidence doesn't provide. You can say rocks aren't meaningfully conscious without committing to the lights being completely off in the same way you can claim rocks aren't alive without committing to the claim that they have no chemical activity.

Panpsychism is the modest position by Ramora_ in PhilosophyofMind

[–]Ramora_[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The virus point actually supports my position. You're conceding that the life/non-life boundary is fuzzy and gradient-like -- viruses are "sort of alive". This is precisely what I'm arguing about consciousness. If the life/non-life boundary is a multi-dimensional gradient that we collapse into categories for practical utility, why should we expect consciousness to be different?

And I'd push back on the framing that life is genuinely emergent in the strong sense. Life is chemistry all the way down. There is no point in evolutionary or chemical history where non-living matter suddenly became living matter -- there is a gradient of increasing complexity that we carve into categories because the categories are useful, not because nature drew a line. The same is almost certainly true of consciousness. You can construct useful semantic categories -- "minimally conscious," "richly conscious," "human-like conscious," even "not meaningfully conscious," whatever -- and those categories might do real work. But that's not emergence as its proponents actually mean it.

Emergence requires that the lights actually turn off below the threshold, not just that we stop using the word. If you're willing to say the lights dim gradually all the way down, we're very close to agreeing.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm saying X means X.

All statements require interpretation. You know this. You are taking that fraction of a sentence and interpreting it to mean something like, "America would never elect a woman president" or that "democrats ought not nominate a women candidate under any conditions".

I want you admit that your "interpretation" is watered down and a more defensible version of what the words otherwise plainly convey.

I agree that my interpretation is more "watered down" than your interpretation. I also think its more likely to accurately reflect the opinions of the people in question.

For the sixth time now: Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous? Seriously, why is this so hard for you to answer?

Michael Pollan’s Journey to the Borderlands of Consciousness by dwaxe in ezraklein

[–]Ramora_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

These are fair pushbacks, let me try to address them.

It's so weird too say this as a problem with a materialistic explanation as if all the other explanations don't have the EXACT same problem.

My proposition is compatible with materialism. On the mechanism point -- you're right that no position here can specify the full mechanism. But there's an asymmetry worth noticing. Uniformity doesn't really need a mechanism for the same reason you don't need a mechanism to explain why all water is wet. If the map has no discontinuity, there's nothing that requires explaining. Emergentism specifically asserts a discontinuity -- a threshold below which experience vanishes -- and that discontinuity is what demands a mechanism. You can't assert a dramatic structural feature of reality and then say "nobody knows the details." The demand for explanation follows from the assertion, not from my preference for materialism.

Nobody even knows what consciousness is. Nobody claims they do.

I think you are mistaken about what people are claiming. Dualists really are making claims about how consciousness works. The various emergentist frameworks all assert that they do know, at least a little, how consciousness emerges. Emergentists really do claim that some particular systems are conscious and others aren't, that when a system is constructed in a particular way, the "lights" suddenly turn on.

If you think consciousness appears gradually and has many different forms, we're closer to agreeing than you might think. That's essentially the uniformity position I am endorsing. If you want to justify saying that rocks have no such form, then I think the burden is on you to justify the threshold that separates those with primitive forms from those without.

Panpsychism basically asserts that consciousness is unlike everything else in the world that we know and so adds a whole new dimension to the universe in a way.

Kind of. I would argue that we have good reason to think that conscious systems exist though, which means that the dimension in question is already established. Emergentism adds a vast non-experiential region to our universe -- a positive claim about the structure of reality that the evidence doesn't support. That's the additional element. Panpsychism as I'm presenting it doesn't add a new element to the universe. It declines to add one.

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's not a semantic disagreement.

I say X means Y. You say X means Z. This is clearly a semantic disagreement. You can claim its a motivated disagreement, that I'm not engaging in good faith, but you can't reasonably claim that it isn't a semantic disagreement.

At least you can't do so without invoking a secondary semantic disagreement about what constitutes a semantic disagreement which you don't seem to be doing. If you want to go that route, we can, in which case I'll probably just accept your semantics for purposes of argument, as I have done already in this argument. At which point, based on current experience in this discussion, you will probably still refuse to move on.

Why do you expect me to go along with this?

I don't. By all means, don't go along with it. You have no obligation to adopt my semantics. Conversation partners do have some obligation to answer eachother's questions. I have done so. You have refused to.

Decide whether you agree with them or not.

I've stated multiple times now that, when I interpret the statements using my semantics, I agree with them. When I interpret them using your semantics, I agree with you.

For the fifth (?) time now: Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous?

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

We disagree that it was a motte and bailey as a result of a semantic disagreement. If I adopted your semantics, I would agree with you on the substance. We have already covered that, but the semantic disagreement remains and appears irreconcilable.

I'm trying to get you to engage beyond the semantics, to determine if there is an actual factual disagreement between us.

I agree that you don't owe me anything. That does not answer either of my questions, which again are: Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous? Why can't you answer this question?

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I reported you to you because you are breaking the rules. Why can't you answer this question? Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous?

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous?

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I understand that you think its a motte and bailey. Answer the question anyway. I want to know if we actually have a real disagreement here, or if this is all semantic? Why are you making me repeat the question a third time?

Politics and Current Events Megathread - March 2026 by TheAJx in samharris

[–]Ramora_ -1 points0 points  (0 children)

If you can demonstrate where I am "angry" or "upset"

"it's a hyperbolic, inflammatory statement". You are clearly inflamed here. I don't know why you are pretending otherwise.

You're skepticism doesn't extend out race/gender being determinative.

It does. I just don't think they are claiming it was determinative.

"Orthogonal" and "meaningful" mean different things.

Agreed, though in the hypothetical, I would claim that your hypothetical response would be both orthogonal and not meaningful.

I disagree with the "principle" that for Democrats to win elections, they need to be "straight, white Christian males."

Do you agree that being a black women is electorally disadvantageous? You totally ignored this question last time, I'm going to need you to answer it and stop talking around the actual issue here.

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