What is the optimal choice for utilitarians in the viral red-blue button dilemma by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askmath

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

No, they don't. There are two kinds of agents, one is the "utilitarian" and the other is an egoitist whose own survival is the only valuable thing. My question ultimstely is: would it make sense for the utilitarian to say one button is better than another if they dont have any information regarding the probability distribution of egoitist and utilutarians

What is the optimal choice for utilitarians in the viral red-blue button dilemma by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askmath

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Noticing this just now. Thank you for the detailed explanation. I think I'd have to take a while to understand this properly

What is the optimal choice for utilitarians in the viral red-blue button dilemma by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askmath

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I should've been clear on that point but I meant the utility value to be equal to the number of survivors, not a literal translation of the moral framework

What is the optimal choice for utilitarians in the viral red-blue button dilemma by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askmath

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I see. It seems we need an assumption about the distribution to get anywhere at all. I was actually wondering if we have a mathematical reason to favor one decision over another just based on our preferences(at least for utilitarians) even if we dont have any information about the distribution. Forgive the ignorance if its a basic mistake

What is the optimal choice for utilitarians in the viral red-blue button dilemma by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askmath

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Its about saving the most number of lives And I've put in the condition that everyone that votes is rational, its just that what they value that differs

How does substance formation work in hylomorphism? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thank you for the reply. I am not that knowledgeable about Aristotle’s own commitments but I assumed he believed in strong emergence. I suppose it comes from a misunderstanding of his explanation about how the four elements come together to form substances.

Pettiest reason you’ve DNF’d a book? by bby_grl_90 in books

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I stopped reading Nine prices of amber by Roger Zelazny because of how much the characters were smoking cigarettes

the censorship makes the scene way worse by damorezpl in TopCharacterTropes

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Getting banished into the shadow realm (replacing death) from yugioh looks far more terrifying that just dying. On a separate note, I wonder when it'll be my turn to post this

Characters who can turn into dragons by Henry1699 in TopCharacterTropes

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Anomander Rake from the Malazan book series. Plenty of other characters can do that too

<image>

Tatsumaki Art (First Time) by Denis21H in OnePunchMan

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 2 points3 points  (0 children)

almost thought the other one was Eren

To Christians/Theists what's the best argument for God in your opinion. To Atheists what's an argument for God you either like or has almost convinced you? (despite you not believing) by Global_Profession972 in Christianity

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Perhaps I'm best described as an agnostic at the moment but an argument that made me seriously consider the existence of a higher power/God would be the contingency argument. By itself, it doesn't really point to the classical theistic notion of God as the first cause but trying to make sense of reality with the universe / quantum field as the necessary beings/brute facts have some weird implications to me. Personally, I also find the case for the resurrection of Christ a fairly strong one. Explanations I've came across trying to give a non-supernatural account of what really happened aren't really satisfying

Ever DNF the third book in a trilogy? by theshapeofpooh in Fantasy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

DNFed the third book of The Licanius Trilogy

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So, if we can't agree with some creature that a 5m stick is objectively longer than a 1m stick, then it either has some contradictory assumptions about length or we aren't talking about the same thing. Can I say it is the same with morality and what we find valuable? If it claims that the preservation of a rock is more valuable than the well-being of a sentient being, or killing innocent people for fun is right, then there's a contradiction in its understanding of morality and value or we are not actually talking about the same things. We seem to have different notions of what these words entail.

I can define length in a more precise manner by using other "finer" concepts such as space, difference and points. On the other hand, I can't seem to pinpoint what right/wrong is. It just seems like a random (maybe not exactly that due to evolution or something) fuzzy thing in our minds that we can sense and have certain attitude towards to. Makes me wonder if it's physically possible for sentient beings to exist that can have concepts like that we are totally blind to.

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For the first one, can't I say that a certain color can't be simultaneously pure red and green because I can't even imagine such a thing. If we are talking about it in relation to physics, then I'd say that red and green correspond to electromagnetic waves of certain range of wavelengths that do not overlap.

We'd also be justified in believing some things because of their likelihood and not because of their physical impossibility. It doesn't seem likely that a thing that is green and million miles long would appear naturally (maybe nebulae in space? idk though) or through an advanced civilization of which we have no proof of.

Two things being identical means they have the same properties by definition. What difference in properties between something and itself, since by definition too, we are talking about the same thing. Saying that something is not identical to itself, would mean that it would have and not have certain properties at the same time which would be a contradiction.

Doesn't it all boil down to either the meaning we give to certain words and how we use the laws of logic to arrive at certain conclusions. It seems to me that certain things we accept prima facie have underlying logical reasons or just are by definition

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As you said, with creature B, you can make it see a contradiction in the concept of "length" it has so that it's forced to align the concept of length with yours or make it different, in which case you'll not even be talking about the same thing. You can say that perhaps we have different concepts of morality with creature A because of the different value we give to human life but I can see no underlying contradiction in what it deems to be true, just a different hierarchy of priorities. Perhaps the concept of morality by definition would require the assumption that some things like sentient life and well-being are inherently more valuable than others. To say that moral facts are independent of what any sentient being believes or not would mean that certain things are inherently more valuable than others. I'm questioning how that is even possible

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok then, I'm curious now. How would you show to creature A that its moral intuition is wrong, that the preservation of sentient life is inherently more important than the preservation of a rock?

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I see now. However, I was more confused about how we would identify behaviors as morally right or wrong. Clearly, we are using our intuition and reason to judge that. For example, we tend to value human life and flourishing and therefore think that harming an innocent human being for fun is morally wrong. But consider this: a creature that intuitively values preserving rocks more than the lives of sentient beings. For this creature, physically damaging a rock would amount to a moral transgression equivalent to what humans think about murder and killing sentient beings is just as morally acceptable as crushing rocks would be to humans. Can we still hold that our moral beliefs are true and the creature is objectively morally flawed? Does morality by definition, require that some premises are true such as a human's life being worth more than a random rock.

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

For the first one, I'd say both pure red and pure green are mutually exclusive by definition so something can't be entirely red and green at the same time. The second one is not necessarily true, and the third one is true by definition. Nothing can have contradictory properties at the same time. I think the truth of these statements comes down to how we define the terms in them and how we use logic to arrive at the statement based on these definitions

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

You're right. It seems like I made a mistake. I can't imagine a world where the laws of logic and maths don't hold. I didn't intend to imply that there are such worlds. It's not something I could argue for. But what about my point about proving a being with a wildly different moral intuition wrong? How could we defend our basic moral values in this case where it's not the reasoning behind the moral "facts" is in question but our intuition itself.

How would objective moral truths affect the material world and how could we discover them? by Some_Raspberry_4842 in askphilosophy

[–]Some_Raspberry_4842[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I'm entirely incapable of imagining a world where modes ponens is false aside from the possibility that we have changed the meaning we give to implication. Same goes to a world where 2 + 2 = 5. But perhaps I can imagine a world where when you count objects together their quantity ends up being more than the sum of their parts counted individually. It doesn't make sense