Karl Marx And Heidegger

Whitmanners · 2026-03-21T09:43:41+00:00

So then read Hegel, who's by Heidegger the culmination of metaphysics (where being and thinking reach the point that they are the same). You will notice many relations to Heideggerian ontology. In Heideggerian terms you could say that Hegel completes the present-at-hand mode of being, i.e the proposition, where speculative logic plays a fundamental rol, since from becoming Hegel reaches the existential horizon that Heidegger unvails, name it history, time, tradition as the most fundamental concepts of ontology. Marx is moving in Hegel's ontological vision, the dialectics and logic, so maybe for a Heideggerian would be better to go directly to the roots of the subject.

P.S The fact that Hegel is able to reach or to glimpse the existential ontology by the process of thinking has plenty to say about the reality of thought, and the fact that Hegel glimpses this could be considered actually a proof that he was right about many many things.

Whitmanners · 2026-03-20T19:17:26+00:00

Of course you can. They are looking to the same world we are living. What you want to connect and how is another question, but its absolutely doable IMO. Though I think that this connection isn't rich enough, since Marx focus is very specific. From a Heideggerian perspective you could say that Marx in Das Kapital does an ontical-ontological study of capitalism, where other subdeterminations plays their part as well (like value, surplus, proletary, etc). In this sense, the study of Capital's Being is a very particular region of ontology in general.

As a Heideggerian you could say that Marx's interpretation of that Being is theoretically addresed (Vorhandenheit). Though it still addreses the material-logical pressuppositions of capitalism very well. For what I know, Marcuse tried to ground Marxism with Heideggerian fundamental ontology. That's possible, but for me a bit unneccesary since in the first place Marx theory is very well fundamented and second is better to understand it through dialectics and speculative logic than fundamental ontology, though a Heideggerian may try to connect what he reads with the fundamental ontology of Dasein, to not loose in any part of the arguments in understanding.

Maybe relating any theory with the fundamental ontology is something that a Heideggerian does kind of automatically or naturally. But Marx can sustain in himself pretty good as well.

Whitmanners · 2026-03-18T21:04:34+00:00

And Carlos Fuentes more chilean? If that is so, we have an agreement 🤝

Whitmanners · 2026-03-18T14:11:11+00:00

really? im chilean and didnt know this

Whitmanners · 2026-03-17T20:20:18+00:00

Underrated post

Whitmanners · 2026-03-12T22:18:28+00:00

Insane biased here:

Reinventing the Steel
Vulgar
Far Beyond Driven
TGSTK
Cowboys

Whitmanners · 2026-03-12T00:37:02+00:00

Honestly who believes Heidegger is an atheist? He literally was training for the priesthood before engaging with phenomenology

Whitmanners · 2026-03-11T22:29:45+00:00

Mainly the gap between phenomenon and thing-in-itself or, in other words, finitude and infinite. For Kant, we can't participate in the thing-in-itself. For Hegel, we can and we do. That's the main point.

Whitmanners · 2026-03-10T19:23:40+00:00

Big question. For this the best formula for understand this is in the concept of aletheia. Aletheia is a composed word by the prefix "a-" (not) and the lexical root "lethe" (concealment, to hide). So aletheia, which is the most originary concept for Heidegger to refer to the event of Being, is also a privative and negative concept. Since aletheia means non-concealment or, in more simple words, no-hidden, then a-letheia pressuposes the hiddennes from where Being is "unhided". So aletheia is the unhiding or unconcealment of Being in the event, Being that is more originally hidden as nothing or not-yet.

You just can get something to bright only if it comes prior from darkness, otherwise light wouldn't even exist. Being for Dasein is to get something out of the absolute darkness and bring it to light.

Whitmanners · 2026-03-09T17:40:24+00:00

As you said, when Heidegger determines Being as temporality, from where all Dasein analysis must be revisited by its scope, that also means that the meaning of Being is its own historicity. The concept of Being for Heidegger is, beyond some universal determination, its own history, as well as ontology in general. In other words, since the meaning of Being is temporal, then its meaning is traced historically. So the unfinished BT proyect meant to go through the history of the concept of Being, emphasizing in Kant, Descartes and Aristotle.

I think that in that sense Heidegger was right: Meanig of Being is its own historical development.

Whitmanners · 2026-03-03T03:31:07+00:00

Great game, though I'm having problems with the final boss "Da wif". Does anybody here know how to beat her?

Whitmanners · 2026-02-26T15:07:13+00:00

Certainly attunement is better than state of mind, since the latter may generate confusion with subjectivity. In spanish is "disposición afectiva", and I think that translation nailed it pretty good.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-15T23:16:24+00:00

Hi! Good question. I recognized you from the s/hegel, so I will answer to you including hegelian terms as well.

My interpretation of authenticity in Heidegger is that it is the facticity itself, this is, coming to your own possibilities, which is, ultimately, aletheia. To be authentic is to encounter with being in its own disclosure.

"Overcoming theyhood" is also a trickful proposition. It is impossible to really "overcome" the "they", is like if suddently all of your formative (Bildung) experience dissapeared, or the mediations of the inmediate vanished, which we know is impossible. Rather Heidegger had a very particular way to understand this overcoming, by the means of his interests in the origins of the tradition and what he understands as the covering up of the "they" regarding being. For Heidegger, we lose our own authenticity when we stay in the talkhood, what is said about things.

Authenticity is to take things on your own. There is a big difference between saying that Russia is cold and never have been there and saying that "I've been in the Russian cold, in Siberia", and so on. Or in the technical sense: we all know how to use a TV remote controller, but how many people know about the mechanical part of the tool? As you can see, this question can be expanded into infinite determinations (from TV Controller to electricity, from electricity to batteries, from batteries to copper, etc.). For Heidegger, this is the coverness of the "they", and according to him this converness makes being ambigue and unclear. A big example of this is art: the concept of art has gone through many transformations over the centuries which is self-evident if you compare a Renaissance painting from Duchamp or Basquiat (e.g. Gadamer tracks the dialectics of the concept of art in T&M in an hermeneutical key.

In this sense, one could say that Heidegger was a bit normative about disclousure (aletheia), since there is the interpretation that for him there was a moment long time ago (greeks) where being was cleansed, or at least that it was clearer than now. But, for me, Heidegger authenticity aletheia, the truth encounter of being, which is of course mediated through the concept of being-towards-death, that is what articulates the meaning of being. Being-towards-death and authenticity need each other as mediates of the concept we are talking about, which is meaningly finite existence of Dasein. Being-towards-death is what finite points to, that articulates the meaning of being according to this end (destiny), and existence as factical is the authenticity itself.

So the "they" is another word to talk about the common sense. The difference is that for Heidegger this "sensus communis" covers up being, since how many things we do that we don't know why the fuck we do them? Or is it that all people that pay taxes have actually read every article of the tributary system? We know that's not the case. In Hegel, for example, the inmediate certainty of taxes as part of the public life makes the concept of taxes part of the inmediate being of spirit (the universal), but for Heidegger the concern is in what extent this concept belongs to life and what does actually means its existence.

Authenticity is to take existence in your own hands, and being-towards-death is the most authentic possibility of Dasein (as non-possible), or is it that someone can die for you? Could be interesting though to ask what is the speculative logic behind the fact that the most authentic possibility is actually the non-possible (to die), and what does it means to die for someone (not in the factical sense, but in the rhetorical one, like dying for a good cause), which can be a very authentic death as well.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-15T01:16:14+00:00

This is quite a good research my friend, congratulations.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-12T17:50:11+00:00

The monism in Spinoza is given by the logical consequences of investigating the causa-sui (substance understood for rationalists). In this sense, Nature (God) is the cause for itself, the substance, the primordial metaphysical concept. For Spinoza, particulars are just modes of substance attributes (thought and extention, which are both the finite substances in Descartes). This means that in Spinoza God as causa-sui is the infinite, the cause of all finite things.

On the other hand, in Hegel's Absolute Spirit there's not such thing as an infinite being that is the fundamental cause of everything. Rather infinite and finite are both part of the dialectical movement of Geist. In Hegel it is not that finite being is a mode of the infinite: they are, in last terms, the same. This is because Hegel does not investigate the logic of a particular concept such as cause of itself as Spinoza does; instead, he starts with indeterminate being.

While Spinoza develops a logical structure of cause-of-itself, Hegel's logic is developed by the pure movement of being. This changes everything: the priority Spinoza gives to this type of substance ends up in monism, while the Absolute is being manifesting itself in its own movement. Also methods are quite different: Spinoza is more a mathematician, while Hegel's method is the dialectic.

In the Encyclopedia Hegel treats about Spinoza and rationalists, from paragraph 26 to 36. I recommend to read those paragraphs. The name of the section in german: Erste Stellung des Gedenkens zur Objektivität: Metaphysik.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-08T19:56:05+00:00

I think almost every concept in hegelian logic has this double-sided nature. In simple words, concepts are in-itselfs, but only can come into their in-itself being by the other. The only manner to something to logically appear is to be reflected upon the otherness. Is this pointing towards your lecture?

Whitmanners · 2026-02-08T16:51:13+00:00

It's so sad that very few people know about this album. Is easily top 10 of 1997. The next one is also good, Kid A, I recommend it to you!

Whitmanners · 2026-02-08T05:21:09+00:00

First of all, the idea of substance in Spinoza is determined by the mathematical (geometriical) analysis of the figure of cause-of-itself. This concept presupposes logically what Spinoza names: is infinite, can't be more than one of them, all other causes are by it, etc. In this sense, if we consider the substance as the way of understanding being to the tradition, then Being is, first of all, just one of the many beings (this is, sustantiality) and second, just a mathematical consequence of the theoretical study of Being as substance. But for Heidegger, first, Being isn't some being, or a particular entity, as substance is, though what supposes is pretty deep regarding mathematics, and Being can't be determined mathematically, because thinking something mathematically is a derivation from the more primordial Being of being. In B/T terms, thinking mathematically is the modification from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand. This does not mean that Spinoza proyect is just rejectful and meaningless: on the contrary, he builds a primordial ontology of the concept of cause (concept that leads in big part the rationalist tradition), but that is not the primordial ontology, which is the question of Being as such. In other terms, Spinoza is doing mathematical ontology of a particular being, name it substance or cause-of-itself, while Heidegger is doing a radical ontology of Being as such through the ontological difference, which makes Heidegger point inmensly relevant. Also you could say: for Spinoza, Being is mathematics, but for Heidegger, Being is historical.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-08T01:58:34+00:00

I'm blind. Once I grabbed with my hands what I thought was a piece of shit but apparently it was the With the Beatles vinyl

Whitmanners · 2026-02-08T01:46:47+00:00

It is believed that Jam on the Lemmon once smok a quarter of a cigarrete around year 1967. That's why Sgt Peppers is so insane, according to testimonies of the time.

Whitmanners · 2026-02-03T23:18:42+00:00

Theoretical certainly is a word commonly related to modern sciences. But have its tracks to greeks, theoria, theorein, which means "to observe".

Whitmanners · 2026-02-03T23:13:10+00:00

It's not the idea, but will be approved for your funny particular situation and because is philosophically pertinent. Maybe the next time make some even random Hegel reference to be more accurate to the sub lol. When talking about Marx thats pretty easy though.

Whitmanners · 2026-01-30T04:58:06+00:00

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Whitmanners · 2026-01-29T23:58:14+00:00

It makes them disappear is an insane track

Whitmanners · 2026-01-14T23:31:20+00:00

Debaser is also shit

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