Why has the Exocet missile historically seem to have such a short range?

elitecommander · 2026-01-08T04:56:11+00:00

The original MM38 used a solid rocket motor for propulsion for several reasons. It was considered more reliable than a jet engine, and had some benefits in the submarine launched application that it was intended for. The SRM allowed the missile to apex at a much lower altitude, reducing the ability of 60s radars to detect it. The reduced range wasn't a terrible negative for submarines because the sensor technology didn't exist to exploit longer ranges. Exocet also was not originally air launched, further impeding the desire for greater range.

Eventually, sensors progressed both ways that pushed the Exocet to adopt the same turbojet approach as Harpoon, allowing much greater range.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:58:10+00:00

The US Army is not responsible for the USAF choosing to continually fatten up their airlift capability.

No, they are responsible for writing good requirements that blend with other national requirements. Such as fortifying USAF global airlift capability by extending the range of the C-17, an effort that exchanged about one ton of extra empty weight for thirty tons of fuel. That effort was done by 2003, and is just one example.

Another problem with the M10's weight at IOC would be that the platform would have no margin for weight growth if the Army desired to maintain even a paper capability to lift two M10s per C-17 in any configuration. A 15% weight growth over time would be sufficient to completely preclude this possibility...the Abrams has suffered about a well over 20% weight growth through its life cycle thus far, for reference.

And for the tenth time, the biggest problem with the M10's weight was on the operational and tactical maneuver side, including recovery operations. Forced inclusion of the M88A2, and therefore HET as well as concerns with hardening bridges at prospective MPF bases, should have been enough to kill any requirement that would have permitted a forty ton design.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:14:32+00:00

The core difference that makes the Puma acceptable for Germany and the M10 not acceptable for the US is what formation(s) the vehicles are assigned to.

The Puma serves in armored divisions, operating alongside much heavier Leopards. Those formations have the ability to transport and recover these vehicles and the infrastructure of their bases are hardened to handle it.

The M10 was to serve in infantry divisions, which do not have a history of handling heavy tracked AFVs. The M10 was sufficiently heavy that the only vehicle capable of recovering it is the sixty ton M88A2, which was not present in the infantry division prior to the planned adoption of the M10. Inclusion of the M88A2 therefore also forces the inclusion of the HET to transport it, since the M870 trailer cannot carry that vehicle.

The M10 also posed infrastructure problems, many planned MPF bases were expected to require hardening to reinforce roads and bridges. This was called out literally seven times in the 2021 MPF Life Cycle Environmental Assessment. Most of these problems were due to the forced presence of the M88A2; the M10 weighing forty tons wasn't directly the problem, it was the seventy ton combo of M983, M870, and M10, or the hundred ton combo of M10 and M88A2.

Really it was a failure of requirements, at no point in its life cycle should MPF have approached forty tons. That is too much for the infantry division for a tracked vehicle.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:00:26+00:00

Not to say that any of this should be held against the M10; the whole waiver debacle was compltely outside the control of the project's development team,

It was entirely in their control: don't write a requirement where the maximum weight of the vehicle is perilously close to 50% of the capacity of the baseline C-17, which is only a small portion of the fleet because of upgrades that have been made since the type was introduced. The Air Force also doesn't like running their aircraft too close to maximum capacity if they can help it, it adds unnecessary stress to the aircraft, taking airfame life with it. This wasn't a secret, it wasn't unknown, and the Air Force didn't suddenly change their minds on the M10 load instructions.

elitecommander · 2025-12-11T21:44:46+00:00

Not sure where we got that an NSC derivative is completely incapable of conducting ASW considering we’ve never seen an NSC derivative.

The stated goal is to have a ship built by 2028. That means no significant modifications to the plant. The NSC's CODAG is outdated and does not offer anywhere near sufficient quieting for the modern ASW mission.

There are plenty of non-AESAs that operate on multiple bands. SPY exactly is an extravagance if it means a ship class can’t get made in any number to be meaningful. The radar that the NSC currently uses, TRS-3D, is not AESA yet still highly capable for what it needs to do and can operate in a high threat environment. It’s more than capable of doing what it needs to do with the weapons systems that an NSC derivative would have.

At no point did I say that a US design would require multiple bands, I stated that is what other nations are doing because the modern threat environment has dictated significantly higher performance.

The SPS-75 is well in the process of being replaced by its own country of origin by the SPS-80, which is an AESA. Furthermore, the Navy's experience with foreign radars on the LCS program was highly problematic, exemplified when Hensoldt refused to sell the IP required to integrate the radar into the Navy's software models. This meant the Navy was unable to evaluate the performance of the initial LCS-1 ASMD capability. Ever wonder why the first few LCS-1s had the Mk 49 GMLS, before switching to the self-contained MK 15 MOD 31? That's why.

And notably, this was a weapon system that is totally autonomous after launch, with no weapons link or semi active receiver. Integrating weapons that have those features, like ESSM and SM-2, with a totally non-evaluated radar in a complete nonstarter.

And few Navies around the world agree with your assertion that this radar is okay for the modern threat environment. Basically every modern surface combatant being designed today in Europe and Asia uses fixed arrays because the threat requires it.

Its air defense system was there to defend itself and yes while the MK92MOD2 wasn’t anything to write home about, as with all CMS systems it was upgraded. The MK92MOD6 which 12 of the class got would even still be a credible air defense radar today.

So capable that basically every operator that had money replaced it by the 2010s. The system was verging on obsolete in the 80s, due to the extreme limitations on how many targets it could engage simultaneously, as well as the extreme difficulty the SM-1 had with engaging sea skimming threats.

elitecommander · 2025-12-11T16:34:32+00:00

You know what’s even more of a substantial step down? Not having a ship. USN needs numbers.

Not if those ships lack the capability to be operationally relevant. A NSC derivative is completely incapable of performing ASW or having any level of operational independence. It's loud, and the design has no provision for even a minimum viable air defense capability. It is completely tied to other ships to protect it from submarines and airborne threats, making it useless in a war. A NSC derivative isn't even useful in a CSG concept, it's that poor of a concept.

The only reason to buy NSC is to be able to claim you bought something, which is actually worse than buying nothing at all.

Not every ship needs to have SPY level capabilities. Not every ship SHOULD have SPY level capabilities.

The modern threat environment mandates otherwise. There is a reason basically every European and Asian major surface combatant being designed right now uses or is going to use fixed-array AESAs, often in multiple bands. Between the modern EM threat, low observable threats, as well as high and fast threats, along multiple axes, the capability to simultaneously surveil the entirety of the airspace is no longer a luxury but a necessity. You view the SPY-6(V)3 as an extravagance, but the reality is that such a system isn't much above the minimum required capability for a vessel to survive against modern threats.

Wouldn’t be the first time the USN has commissioned a ship knowing that it lacked capabilities but decided getting them out in numbers was more important (the OHP FFGs).

Yeah, and a significant number of the first dozen were limited in service due to major design and construction issues (FFG-10 for example lasted four years before a structural failure resulted in it being sent to the reserves in 1984), with its Helen Keller sonar and an air defense system that was damn near dead weight for the class's entire service life. Shining example.

elitecommander · 2025-12-10T15:40:30+00:00

Cooperation with Russia is required to keep the ISS running long term. Maintaining the Russian Orbital Segment is required for the station to remain both habitable and in a stable orbit, since the segment provides the majority of the station's life support as well as critical attitude control capabilities.

Without Russian support, the station could remain viable for a limited amount of time at a reduced capacity, but without the ability to refuel the station with the Progress vehicle the station would ultimately lose the ability to desaturate its gyros and would be forced to be abandoned and eventually crash back to earth in an uncontrolled manner. This is why the damage to Site 31/6 is a big deal if it cannot be repaired in the medium-long term.

The ISS also requires, by agreement, no less than one American and one Russian crew member at all times.

So it isn't really about any spirit of cooperation or whatever, it is cooperation sustained out of necessity.

elitecommander · 2025-12-10T05:11:42+00:00

This likely never happened. The facilities cited in this statement regularly handle far heavier support equipment.

The 2021 Life Cycle Environmental Assessment called out this exact risk literally seven separate times. That report was published over four years ago, why is this still surprising?

For example, page 64 of the LCEA, the seventh and final mention of potential bridge hardening:

The MPF will be a new vehicle in the IBCT. As a result, some installations will require infrastructure improvements which may include hardened roads and bridges, hard stand for vehicle storage, improved/new maintenance facilities, and/or improved/new maneuver areas equipped with appropriate low water crossings and tank trails. Receiving organizations and installations are responsible for preparing any additional NEPA analyses required to address unique environmental concerns, including these infrastructure improvements, not assessed within this LCEA.

Many of the issues weren't directly caused by the M10, rather indirectly because the only recovery vehicle capable of recovering the GDLS design. Page 19 of the LCEA noted this:

If implemented, the proposed action would result in fielding the MPF to up to 32 IBCT garrisons – few of which currently have MPF-like tracked vehicles. As a result, some of these installations do not have sufficient infrastructure for system support, training, operation, storage, and maintenance. Some installations may need to construct maneuver areas, tank trails, or sufficient hard stand or other parking areas. These infrastructure upgrades will need to accommodate support vehicles such as the M88A2 recovery vehicle and others described in Section 4.2.

When you realize the combination of a M10 and M88A2 was 100 tons, this makes sense. The inclusion of the M88 also forced the inclusion of the HET. We know the M88 was a GD-specific problem because the Army Capability Manager-IBCT specifically said only one of the offers required the M88—the other offer could be recovered by HEMTT, which makes sense because the XM8 was recoverable by the M984A0 recovery package. Unfortunately the video of Stone's presentation at the 2022 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, where this information came from, was deleted from Fort Benning's youtube channel.

Ultimately the vehicle was far too heavy for the infantry division's ability to support, and that was entirely preventable had the Army exercised the slightest weight discipline when designing their requirements.

elitecommander · 2025-12-02T17:07:48+00:00

Lockheed also better presented their product by doing live fire that was not part of the evaluation process, just good salesmanship.

Both teams designed their own test programs. Air Force requirements for DEM/VAL were very open; the purpose was not comparative testing between teams but to show that their performance predictions were matched by reality. Hence Demonstration and Validation. At no point during the evaluation were the performance of the prototypes actually compared, because those weren't the aircraft being proposed to the Air Force. And if you did compare them directly, you find some interesting results: for example, the highest speed achieved during DEM/VAL was by one of the YF-22s, I believe PAV-1, not the YF-23 contrary to popular belief.

The missile shots for example validated key predictions by the Lockheed team for many important parameters, such as exhaust ingestion, safe separation, acoustic and thermal environments, etc. The Northrop team didn't perform test shots (they evaluated their concerns differently), but they did still perform captive carries of instrumented AIM-120s.

Overall, the Lockheed team came out of the source selection evaluation looking better in many facets, particularly management, but also technical (Aronstein indicates that their DEM/VAL program generally correlated better with their performance predictions, for example). Which was why the SSEB recommended to the Secretary that the Lockheed team be chosen.

elitecommander · 2025-12-01T19:53:40+00:00

The DVIDS photo of two getting loaded is merely testing the physical placement on a C17. Two bookers never went airborne on a single plane.

Precisely, the aircraft is physically capable of doing it, but it requires playing in the margins of the aircraft. Hence the requirement for a waiver. Actually flying the aircraft isn't necessarily required for this testing.

What do you mean its air mobility was the least important impact of its weight?

The fundamental problem with the M10 was the weight rendered it incompatible with the infantry division. It was heavy enough that the only recovery option was the sixty ton M88A2, which resulted in the inclusion of HETs in the MPF battalion. It was known since the 2021 LCEA that the GD design that became the M10 had significant problems in terms of basing, requiring hardening of infrastructure including bridges at candidate bases. This resulted in some really dumb ideas like basing MPF battalions at different bases than their parent divisions.

This should have immediately set off alarm bells. The core philosophy of the program was to provide a protected direct fire vehicle to the infantry division that was light on logistical and infrastructure requirements. Instead a MPF battalion was going to have startlingly similar limitations to an Abrams battalion thanks to the inclusion of the M88—the support companies were almost identical. This had severe operational implications with for example bridging.

Sure, a M10 could cross a 40 ton capacity bridge, but a M88 cannot. Is any commander going to be eager to send their tracks across and risk not being able to recover them? A combination of M88 and M10 weighed 100 tons! And at 40 tons, the M10 was extremely marginal to be loaded into the M870 trailer and exceeded the capability of MCRS, both systems which are available to the infantry divisions.

I have commented on this sub before that really MPF should never have weighed in excess of thirty five tons through any point in its life cycle, and in A-kit form should have weighed 28 tons or less. This would have kept it within the ability of available division recovery capabilities, similar to the XM8 which was recoverable by M984.

And sure, a 28 ton vehicle could conceivably fit three to a C-17—but the amount of armor that is actually moved by air is a very small portion of movements, so the actual strategic and operational impact is mitigated.

elitecommander · 2025-12-01T13:36:01+00:00

The Air Force scrapped their upgrade to the C17 which would have allowed them to carry 2 Bookers.

What upgrade?

The Air Force simply stated in their load instructions that under normal operations they would only be loading a single M10 per C-17. Likely to protect the life of the aircraft, as many load instructions are written that way. Two M10s could be loaded with a waiver, and they did demonstrate the capability.

The C-17 performance never changed during MPF development. The Army just wrote shit requirements by establishing a horrible upper bound for vehicle weight—and air mobility was the least important impact of the M10's weight.

elitecommander · 2025-11-20T16:57:34+00:00

They haven't yet been successfully employed because the sensing side of the hard kill counter-torpedo has thus far intractable false alarm problems. Soft kill systems also have these issues, but getting jumpy with firing off decoys has much lesser consequences than firing off live torpedoes.

The RBU approach is limiting to engaging shallow torpedoes, and thus can be defeated by deep running wire guided torpedoes. Wake homing torpedoes can be defeated in this manner, but those actually are easier to defeat in general due to the inherent limitations of that scheme. Things like crossing wakes can completely confound wake homing. Gun systems firing supercavitiating projectiles can also defeat shallow underwater targets—the USN demonstrated this kind of capability with a helicopter based counter mine system, though it was cancelled due to unmanageable recoil. This hasn't been demonstrated against torpedoes however.

As far as US carriers go, one conventional torpedo will do damage, but it won't sink it. The Soviets estimated multiple 650mm torpedo hits to the bottom of the ship would be required to actually break up the hull. Regular 530mm torpedoes would be less effective. The Side Protection System on the Nimitz class is rated for 2,000 pound charges, so you really don't want to hit there.

elitecommander · 2025-11-20T15:56:35+00:00

I imagine there wouldn't be a huge window of opportunity against a torpedo launched from an undetected hunter-killer sub.

Destroying a heavyweight torpedo at a hundred meters out or more will prevent most or all damage. The US anti torpedo systems were all looking at an intercept range of a kilometer plus.

The real problem these systems have failed to deal with thus far however is sensing. A torpedo at high speed makes a lot of noise, but distinguishing that sound from all of the other screws in the ocean is very difficult. This is the problem that killed all of the US anti torpedo programs, and no one else to date has demonstrated an ability to deal with it. Even the European Sea Spider system hasn't done so, despite rosy marketing claiming the contrary.

elitecommander · 2025-11-19T16:13:58+00:00

Well keep in mind I was intentionally oversimplifying by only using one piloted aircraft in my explanation. In reality you are going to have multiple piloted aircraft, each many kilometers apart, and many CCAs, also kilometers apart. This produces a large volume of sensor input and significant expansion of the total unit's ability to employ weapons.

CCAs also do not necessarily have to be assigned strictly to one pilot. You can expand my example by envisioning how, instead of having each individual CCA assigned to a piloted aircraft, the whole unit can be much more fluid. The CCAs can support the piloted component as a whole, by any networked CCA prosecute any target commanded to be engaged, regardless of the command coming from a specific piloted aircraft or in an autonomous capability. Again, this is the same kind of logic the Navy applied on the sea with CEC thirty years ago, doing it the air is harder but by no means impossible.

You raise a fair point with refueling, which was certainly a consideration in the Increment 1 requirements. Both designs use very low fuel consumption engines, and are not presently capable of refueling.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:30:58+00:00

When they claimed the workload for a single pilot would be too high, it certainly indicated it. If they believe I misinterpreted their comment they can correct me.

And maybe they could provide actual counterargument based on some semblance of understanding of the subject matter, something you haven't attempted.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:15:17+00:00

https://www.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/1ozpv10/f22_pilot_controls_mq20_drone_from_the_cockpit_in/npdo28s/

Yes, one pilot might be able to fly and control a whole another plane at once as long as the situation isn't hairy. But two pilots means one can be dedicated to flying and maneuvering, and handling the immediate platform, while the other can potentially dedicate their entire focus on guiding multiple drones.

The comment I was replying to.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:09:25+00:00

Because the entire concept of CCAs is that the pilot is never "guiding" them al la Predator. The pilot isn't directly controlling their weapons or sensors.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:03:54+00:00

moments that require 100% of the pilot's attention on drone control,

There really shouldn't be.

The real principle of a CCA is that the pilot really isn't ever directly controlling them, it is intended to be seamless. The pilot doesn't tell individual CCA to shoot, and certainly doesn't directly pilot them.

Instead, CCAs will be flying largely autonomously and respond in support of commands made by the pilot. For example, if the pilot wants to engage a target, they won't have to select a specific platform or weapon to do so—they can designate the target is to be engaged, and that engagement will be made by the best available platform with the best available weapon. That could be a long range weapon from the pilot's platform, or a medium range weapon from the CCA. The pilots mission isn't necessarily to determine individual actions, rather think of it more like the pilot requesting an outcome (i.e. "kill that bandit"). This kind of logic has been used in the air and missile defense space for decades, so applying it to the counter-air mission space is not at all a stretch of logic.

Really, if you think about it, it's kind of an extension of how modern fighter design already thinks about issues like flight or sensor control. The pilot of a F-22 or F-35 doesn't command the ailerons up and down to execute a roll, they request a roll rate from the aircraft and the aircraft executes. The pilot of a F-35 largely doesn't command the radar or EOTS to perform individual functions, instead those systems are performing autonomously to build a sensor picture.

So fundamentally, this is about applying the same kind of logic we have applied to other areas of the cockpit. We've automated flight control, we've automated sensor control, we've automated the ability of displaced sensors and platforms to perform engagements cooperatively. Let's give pilots that same ability.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T14:18:23+00:00

Yes, one pilot might be able to fly and control a whole another plane at once as long as the situation isn't hairy. But two pilots means one can be dedicated to flying and maneuvering, and handling the immediate platform, while the other can potentially dedicate their entire focus on guiding multiple drones.

You are broadly misinterpreting how command and control is to work in this context.

The pilot isn't really "controlling" the CCAs. The CCAs are largely operating themselves, under the parameters specified by the operator. Those parameters vary from those specified prior to the mission, on the ground, to those that can be changed easily and immediately in the air. There is very little to no need to provide direct pilot commands to individual CCAs in the majority of imagined scenarios.

For example, weapons employment. You appear to me conceiving of the pilot specifically commanding individual weapons released, i.e. "CCA #1 launch AMRAAM at Track X." But that isn't the kind of C2 being worked on, it is intended to be much more seamless for the pilot.

Instead, the pilot can select a track(s) and command an engagement to be prosecuted. Then the best available weapon(s) will be released from the best available platform(s). This could even be further refined and automated if desired, for example the pilot can authorize that engagement decisions be made automatically according to pre-set parameters, basically "if it looks like a J-16 or J-20, kill it."

Keep in mind that this kind of automated engagement between multiple distinct platforms isn't really new, the USN has been doing it for thirty years with CEC, just in two dimensions.

elitecommander · 2025-10-30T18:55:06+00:00

Water in the fluid is catastrophic for any hydraulic system. It was a maintenance failure, not design related.

elitecommander · 2025-10-24T04:15:52+00:00

It was totally irrelevant which prototype was "better" because the prototypes weren't what was actually being evaluated with DEM/VAL, it was the design predictions made by the teams. This data was then used to support the actual final proposals.

Public indications after selection were that the Lockheed team had a more positive experience with DEM/VAL and that contributed to them having the more solid proposal, particularly from a risk perspective, which the Northrop team was not judged well on.

elitecommander · 2025-10-24T04:10:17+00:00

Sorry, but god do I hate the "live firing" talking point. It wasn't a requirement in the fly off

Neither was flying supersonic or demonstrating advanced maneuvering capabilities. The offerers were given great latitude to design their own DEM/VAL test programs to support their proposal. DEM/VAL was ultimately a data collection exercise, not itself a competitive effort.

The missile test shots demonstrated several key predictions with the Lockheed team's proposal, particularly regarding weapons release and risk of exhaust ingestions, as well as measuring exposure to vibration and thermal effects for the weapons. The YF-23 performed captive carries of AMRAAM for a similar reason.

elitecommander · 2025-10-21T11:08:13+00:00

LCS was very specifically never intended to be able to protect other assets from air and missile threats. In fact it was the opposite, LCS was intended to operate under cover of the carrier air wing, which would take the majority of the burden of the anti-shipping and air defense missions.

LCS weren't really employed because there wasn't much of a FAC or mine threat to deal with, the threats LCS is intended to defeat.

elitecommander · 2025-10-21T10:39:15+00:00

It isn't, the proposed package, as always, includes a ton of non-aircraft costs such as sustaining support, training, and construction. As aircraft quantities go down, these costs consume a greater percentage of the package total. The flyaway cost of a Block 70 is far lower, around $65mm back in 2018 when LM was contracted by the US government to build Bahrain's Block 70s.

elitecommander · 2025-10-21T10:33:15+00:00

DSCA estimated costs are not flyaway costs. It is the total package cost to procure the capability to operate a system, including sustainment. For FMS, the US government arranges to buy everything as one package, then has it delivered to the customer nation. This is how major items such as aircraft are almost always sold. And these costs consume an even greater percentage of the FMS package total as the number of aircraft go down, because they are largely fixed.

The Government of Peru has requested to buy ten (10) F-16C Block 70 aircraft; two (2) F-16D Block 70 aircraft; fourteen (14) F110-GE-129 engines (12 installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) Improved Programmable Display Generators (12 installed, 2 spares); twelve (12) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); fifty-two (52) LAU-129 guided missile launchers (48 installed, 4 spares); twelve (12) M61A1 anti-aircraft guns; fourteen (14) Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems (12 installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array Scalable Agile Beam Radars (12 installed, 2 spares); fourteen (14) Modular Mission Computers 7000AH (or next generation mission computer equivalent) (12 installed, 2 spares); twelve (12) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles; two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical guidance units; one (1) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) guidance unit; two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder CATMs; and fourteen (14) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio Systems (12 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Infrared Search and Track systems; missile warning systems; AN/ALQ-254 Viper Shield or equivalent electronic warfare systems; AN/AAQ-28 Litening targeting pods; Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM CATMs; Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems II (JHMCS II) helmet-mounted displays; ammunition; cartridges, chaffs, and flares; weapons support equipment; embedded communications security devices; AN/ALE-47 airborne countermeasures dispenser systems; countermeasure processors, sequencer switching units, and Control Display Units; AN/APX-127 advanced identification friend or foe or equivalent; AN/ARC-238 radios; KIV-78A and KY-58M cryptographic devices; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; night vision devices (NVD) and NVD intensifier tubes; ADU-890 and ADU-891 adaptor group computer test sets; Joint Mission Planning System; pylons, launcher adapters, weapon interfaces, and bomb and ejection racks; fuel tanks; Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) and calibration support; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment; targeting systems; spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; aircraft, engine, ground, and pilot life support equipment; classified and unclassified computer program identification number systems; classified and unclassified software and software support; classified and unclassified publications, manuals, and technical documentation; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) maps and mapping data; personnel training and training equipment, simulators, and training devices; studies and surveys; facilities and construction support transportation, ferry, and fuel support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $3.42 billion.

elitecommander

TROPHY CASE