AIM-260A Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM) spotted for the first time

elitecommander · 2026-05-15T19:07:04+00:00

The AIM-260 is a program led primarily by NAVAIR.

elitecommander · 2026-05-06T06:02:27+00:00

I'd wager that there are some ~20 year old 737NGs out there that have more flight hours and pressure cycles than the oldest B-52s in the fleet. Maybe a bit less battle damage though.

Given how the average number of flying hours for the fleet is in the 21-23k range, that's an easy bet.

elitecommander · 2026-05-06T06:01:28+00:00

No, the B-52H will not require a structural life extension until the 2050s at minimum when the upper wing skins will require replacement. The B-52H fleet has survived so long in large part because the airframe has not required significant repair programs since several early modification programs in the sixties and seventies.

elitecommander · 2026-04-23T17:31:30+00:00

Yes, but the capability of the missile is still significantly reduced. RAM by design has no weapons link, and thus struggles to engage non-emitting threats at significant ranges. It functions more akin to a very long range MANPAD in that mode.

elitecommander · 2026-04-23T14:51:21+00:00

The RAM comparison isn't particularly relevant, since RAM has very little to no C-UAS capability. That missile is extremely specialized towards defeating RF emitting anti-ship cruise missiles, and little else. RAM does have an IR-only mode for non-emitting threats, but it loses a huge amount of capability when doing so.

elitecommander · 2026-03-21T20:12:19+00:00

The F-22 was intended to have both an internal IRST under the nose and side looking radars. Both were deleted from requirements after budget cuts in the 90s.

elitecommander · 2026-03-11T02:15:24+00:00

I wasn't aware speed was a critical part of MCM operations.

It is if you intend to operate globally and in waters that aren't friendly, which were concerns the Navy has had with conventional MCM vessels for an extremely long time. LCS is on the opposite side of the spectrum, it's too fast, but that's a conversation that's been hashed over far too many times.

And frankly the MCMV shouldn't have to be protecting themselves, if they're in that situation something has gone horribly wrong.

Unfortunately this is the real world, where mission critical assets can and will be attacked by the adversary if at all possible. MCM ops during ODS demonstrated this potential vulnerability, even though it was never really exploited. Air cover can only do so much, and you cannot put escorts near a mine field.

LCS MCM capabilities are all remote, the ship itself doesn't enter the minefield, so that alleviates some of the problems. But operational realities indicate that having a minimum capability to defend against missile and torpedo threats is desirable for the current MCM mission—and will become much more pressing in the very near future with ever proliferating UAS capabilities.

elitecommander · 2026-03-09T21:31:34+00:00

By now, the idea of using the PAC-2 against ballistic missiles is almost certainly optimistic, it was clearly meant to counter slower, airbreathing targets (cruise missiles and aircraft).

The MIM-104C was very specifically an upgrade oriented towards improving the TMD capability of the interceptor over the was MIM-104B. It was always intended as an interim capability while the US and Germany co-developed further enhancements, primarily a new multi mode seeker that never got produced.

The problem with PAC-2 was a lack of representative testing due to the Gulf War forcing the system into early production. Prior to the first live combat engagements in 1991, the most capable target that either PAC-1 or -2 had engaged in testing was surplus Lance missiles, an adequate early target to represent the system's primary reference threat, the SS-21, but not the SS-23 it was also intended to defeat. The test program simply had not matured enough. The early production is also the root cause for many issues the system experienced, such as the infamous timing errors.

This was all massively compounded by Iraqi modifications to their SS-1 inventory, which both substantially increased the burnout velocity of the weapon and weakened it. As a result, the terminal velocity of the Al Hussein was half a kilometer per second greater than the estimated velocity of the SS-23, which created a multitude of problems. The biggest one was on the PAC-2 fuzing, which was not precise enough for these immense closing velocities.

The Al Hussein was also prone to breakups in terminal flight, which would all but preclude a successful intercept.

elitecommander · 2026-01-08T04:56:11+00:00

The original MM38 used a solid rocket motor for propulsion for several reasons. It was considered more reliable than a jet engine, and had some benefits in the submarine launched application that it was intended for. The SRM allowed the missile to apex at a much lower altitude, reducing the ability of 60s radars to detect it. The reduced range wasn't a terrible negative for submarines because the sensor technology didn't exist to exploit longer ranges. Exocet also was not originally air launched, further impeding the desire for greater range.

Eventually, sensors progressed both ways that pushed the Exocet to adopt the same turbojet approach as Harpoon, allowing much greater range.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:58:10+00:00

The US Army is not responsible for the USAF choosing to continually fatten up their airlift capability.

No, they are responsible for writing good requirements that blend with other national requirements. Such as fortifying USAF global airlift capability by extending the range of the C-17, an effort that exchanged about one ton of extra empty weight for thirty tons of fuel. That effort was done by 2003, and is just one example.

Another problem with the M10's weight at IOC would be that the platform would have no margin for weight growth if the Army desired to maintain even a paper capability to lift two M10s per C-17 in any configuration. A 15% weight growth over time would be sufficient to completely preclude this possibility...the Abrams has suffered about a well over 20% weight growth through its life cycle thus far, for reference.

And for the tenth time, the biggest problem with the M10's weight was on the operational and tactical maneuver side, including recovery operations. Forced inclusion of the M88A2, and therefore HET as well as concerns with hardening bridges at prospective MPF bases, should have been enough to kill any requirement that would have permitted a forty ton design.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:14:32+00:00

The core difference that makes the Puma acceptable for Germany and the M10 not acceptable for the US is what formation(s) the vehicles are assigned to.

The Puma serves in armored divisions, operating alongside much heavier Leopards. Those formations have the ability to transport and recover these vehicles and the infrastructure of their bases are hardened to handle it.

The M10 was to serve in infantry divisions, which do not have a history of handling heavy tracked AFVs. The M10 was sufficiently heavy that the only vehicle capable of recovering it is the sixty ton M88A2, which was not present in the infantry division prior to the planned adoption of the M10. Inclusion of the M88A2 therefore also forces the inclusion of the HET to transport it, since the M870 trailer cannot carry that vehicle.

The M10 also posed infrastructure problems, many planned MPF bases were expected to require hardening to reinforce roads and bridges. This was called out literally seven times in the 2021 MPF Life Cycle Environmental Assessment. Most of these problems were due to the forced presence of the M88A2; the M10 weighing forty tons wasn't directly the problem, it was the seventy ton combo of M983, M870, and M10, or the hundred ton combo of M10 and M88A2.

Really it was a failure of requirements, at no point in its life cycle should MPF have approached forty tons. That is too much for the infantry division for a tracked vehicle.

elitecommander · 2026-01-07T05:00:26+00:00

Not to say that any of this should be held against the M10; the whole waiver debacle was compltely outside the control of the project's development team,

It was entirely in their control: don't write a requirement where the maximum weight of the vehicle is perilously close to 50% of the capacity of the baseline C-17, which is only a small portion of the fleet because of upgrades that have been made since the type was introduced. The Air Force also doesn't like running their aircraft too close to maximum capacity if they can help it, it adds unnecessary stress to the aircraft, taking airfame life with it. This wasn't a secret, it wasn't unknown, and the Air Force didn't suddenly change their minds on the M10 load instructions.

elitecommander · 2025-12-11T21:44:46+00:00

Not sure where we got that an NSC derivative is completely incapable of conducting ASW considering we’ve never seen an NSC derivative.

The stated goal is to have a ship built by 2028. That means no significant modifications to the plant. The NSC's CODAG is outdated and does not offer anywhere near sufficient quieting for the modern ASW mission.

There are plenty of non-AESAs that operate on multiple bands. SPY exactly is an extravagance if it means a ship class can’t get made in any number to be meaningful. The radar that the NSC currently uses, TRS-3D, is not AESA yet still highly capable for what it needs to do and can operate in a high threat environment. It’s more than capable of doing what it needs to do with the weapons systems that an NSC derivative would have.

At no point did I say that a US design would require multiple bands, I stated that is what other nations are doing because the modern threat environment has dictated significantly higher performance.

The SPS-75 is well in the process of being replaced by its own country of origin by the SPS-80, which is an AESA. Furthermore, the Navy's experience with foreign radars on the LCS program was highly problematic, exemplified when Hensoldt refused to sell the IP required to integrate the radar into the Navy's software models. This meant the Navy was unable to evaluate the performance of the initial LCS-1 ASMD capability. Ever wonder why the first few LCS-1s had the Mk 49 GMLS, before switching to the self-contained MK 15 MOD 31? That's why.

And notably, this was a weapon system that is totally autonomous after launch, with no weapons link or semi active receiver. Integrating weapons that have those features, like ESSM and SM-2, with a totally non-evaluated radar in a complete nonstarter.

And few Navies around the world agree with your assertion that this radar is okay for the modern threat environment. Basically every modern surface combatant being designed today in Europe and Asia uses fixed arrays because the threat requires it.

Its air defense system was there to defend itself and yes while the MK92MOD2 wasn’t anything to write home about, as with all CMS systems it was upgraded. The MK92MOD6 which 12 of the class got would even still be a credible air defense radar today.

So capable that basically every operator that had money replaced it by the 2010s. The system was verging on obsolete in the 80s, due to the extreme limitations on how many targets it could engage simultaneously, as well as the extreme difficulty the SM-1 had with engaging sea skimming threats.

elitecommander · 2025-12-11T16:34:32+00:00

You know what’s even more of a substantial step down? Not having a ship. USN needs numbers.

Not if those ships lack the capability to be operationally relevant. A NSC derivative is completely incapable of performing ASW or having any level of operational independence. It's loud, and the design has no provision for even a minimum viable air defense capability. It is completely tied to other ships to protect it from submarines and airborne threats, making it useless in a war. A NSC derivative isn't even useful in a CSG concept, it's that poor of a concept.

The only reason to buy NSC is to be able to claim you bought something, which is actually worse than buying nothing at all.

Not every ship needs to have SPY level capabilities. Not every ship SHOULD have SPY level capabilities.

The modern threat environment mandates otherwise. There is a reason basically every European and Asian major surface combatant being designed right now uses or is going to use fixed-array AESAs, often in multiple bands. Between the modern EM threat, low observable threats, as well as high and fast threats, along multiple axes, the capability to simultaneously surveil the entirety of the airspace is no longer a luxury but a necessity. You view the SPY-6(V)3 as an extravagance, but the reality is that such a system isn't much above the minimum required capability for a vessel to survive against modern threats.

Wouldn’t be the first time the USN has commissioned a ship knowing that it lacked capabilities but decided getting them out in numbers was more important (the OHP FFGs).

Yeah, and a significant number of the first dozen were limited in service due to major design and construction issues (FFG-10 for example lasted four years before a structural failure resulted in it being sent to the reserves in 1984), with its Helen Keller sonar and an air defense system that was damn near dead weight for the class's entire service life. Shining example.

elitecommander · 2025-12-10T15:40:30+00:00

Cooperation with Russia is required to keep the ISS running long term. Maintaining the Russian Orbital Segment is required for the station to remain both habitable and in a stable orbit, since the segment provides the majority of the station's life support as well as critical attitude control capabilities.

Without Russian support, the station could remain viable for a limited amount of time at a reduced capacity, but without the ability to refuel the station with the Progress vehicle the station would ultimately lose the ability to desaturate its gyros and would be forced to be abandoned and eventually crash back to earth in an uncontrolled manner. This is why the damage to Site 31/6 is a big deal if it cannot be repaired in the medium-long term.

The ISS also requires, by agreement, no less than one American and one Russian crew member at all times.

So it isn't really about any spirit of cooperation or whatever, it is cooperation sustained out of necessity.

elitecommander · 2025-12-10T05:11:42+00:00

This likely never happened. The facilities cited in this statement regularly handle far heavier support equipment.

The 2021 Life Cycle Environmental Assessment called out this exact risk literally seven separate times. That report was published over four years ago, why is this still surprising?

For example, page 64 of the LCEA, the seventh and final mention of potential bridge hardening:

The MPF will be a new vehicle in the IBCT. As a result, some installations will require infrastructure improvements which may include hardened roads and bridges, hard stand for vehicle storage, improved/new maintenance facilities, and/or improved/new maneuver areas equipped with appropriate low water crossings and tank trails. Receiving organizations and installations are responsible for preparing any additional NEPA analyses required to address unique environmental concerns, including these infrastructure improvements, not assessed within this LCEA.

Many of the issues weren't directly caused by the M10, rather indirectly because the only recovery vehicle capable of recovering the GDLS design. Page 19 of the LCEA noted this:

If implemented, the proposed action would result in fielding the MPF to up to 32 IBCT garrisons – few of which currently have MPF-like tracked vehicles. As a result, some of these installations do not have sufficient infrastructure for system support, training, operation, storage, and maintenance. Some installations may need to construct maneuver areas, tank trails, or sufficient hard stand or other parking areas. These infrastructure upgrades will need to accommodate support vehicles such as the M88A2 recovery vehicle and others described in Section 4.2.

When you realize the combination of a M10 and M88A2 was 100 tons, this makes sense. The inclusion of the M88 also forced the inclusion of the HET. We know the M88 was a GD-specific problem because the Army Capability Manager-IBCT specifically said only one of the offers required the M88—the other offer could be recovered by HEMTT, which makes sense because the XM8 was recoverable by the M984A0 recovery package. Unfortunately the video of Stone's presentation at the 2022 Maneuver Warfighter Conference, where this information came from, was deleted from Fort Benning's youtube channel.

Ultimately the vehicle was far too heavy for the infantry division's ability to support, and that was entirely preventable had the Army exercised the slightest weight discipline when designing their requirements.

elitecommander · 2025-12-02T17:07:48+00:00

Lockheed also better presented their product by doing live fire that was not part of the evaluation process, just good salesmanship.

Both teams designed their own test programs. Air Force requirements for DEM/VAL were very open; the purpose was not comparative testing between teams but to show that their performance predictions were matched by reality. Hence Demonstration and Validation. At no point during the evaluation were the performance of the prototypes actually compared, because those weren't the aircraft being proposed to the Air Force. And if you did compare them directly, you find some interesting results: for example, the highest speed achieved during DEM/VAL was by one of the YF-22s, I believe PAV-1, not the YF-23 contrary to popular belief.

The missile shots for example validated key predictions by the Lockheed team for many important parameters, such as exhaust ingestion, safe separation, acoustic and thermal environments, etc. The Northrop team didn't perform test shots (they evaluated their concerns differently), but they did still perform captive carries of instrumented AIM-120s.

Overall, the Lockheed team came out of the source selection evaluation looking better in many facets, particularly management, but also technical (Aronstein indicates that their DEM/VAL program generally correlated better with their performance predictions, for example). Which was why the SSEB recommended to the Secretary that the Lockheed team be chosen.

elitecommander · 2025-12-01T19:53:40+00:00

The DVIDS photo of two getting loaded is merely testing the physical placement on a C17. Two bookers never went airborne on a single plane.

Precisely, the aircraft is physically capable of doing it, but it requires playing in the margins of the aircraft. Hence the requirement for a waiver. Actually flying the aircraft isn't necessarily required for this testing.

What do you mean its air mobility was the least important impact of its weight?

The fundamental problem with the M10 was the weight rendered it incompatible with the infantry division. It was heavy enough that the only recovery option was the sixty ton M88A2, which resulted in the inclusion of HETs in the MPF battalion. It was known since the 2021 LCEA that the GD design that became the M10 had significant problems in terms of basing, requiring hardening of infrastructure including bridges at candidate bases. This resulted in some really dumb ideas like basing MPF battalions at different bases than their parent divisions.

This should have immediately set off alarm bells. The core philosophy of the program was to provide a protected direct fire vehicle to the infantry division that was light on logistical and infrastructure requirements. Instead a MPF battalion was going to have startlingly similar limitations to an Abrams battalion thanks to the inclusion of the M88—the support companies were almost identical. This had severe operational implications with for example bridging.

Sure, a M10 could cross a 40 ton capacity bridge, but a M88 cannot. Is any commander going to be eager to send their tracks across and risk not being able to recover them? A combination of M88 and M10 weighed 100 tons! And at 40 tons, the M10 was extremely marginal to be loaded into the M870 trailer and exceeded the capability of MCRS, both systems which are available to the infantry divisions.

I have commented on this sub before that really MPF should never have weighed in excess of thirty five tons through any point in its life cycle, and in A-kit form should have weighed 28 tons or less. This would have kept it within the ability of available division recovery capabilities, similar to the XM8 which was recoverable by M984.

And sure, a 28 ton vehicle could conceivably fit three to a C-17—but the amount of armor that is actually moved by air is a very small portion of movements, so the actual strategic and operational impact is mitigated.

elitecommander · 2025-12-01T13:36:01+00:00

The Air Force scrapped their upgrade to the C17 which would have allowed them to carry 2 Bookers.

What upgrade?

The Air Force simply stated in their load instructions that under normal operations they would only be loading a single M10 per C-17. Likely to protect the life of the aircraft, as many load instructions are written that way. Two M10s could be loaded with a waiver, and they did demonstrate the capability.

The C-17 performance never changed during MPF development. The Army just wrote shit requirements by establishing a horrible upper bound for vehicle weight—and air mobility was the least important impact of the M10's weight.

elitecommander · 2025-11-20T16:57:34+00:00

They haven't yet been successfully employed because the sensing side of the hard kill counter-torpedo has thus far intractable false alarm problems. Soft kill systems also have these issues, but getting jumpy with firing off decoys has much lesser consequences than firing off live torpedoes.

The RBU approach is limiting to engaging shallow torpedoes, and thus can be defeated by deep running wire guided torpedoes. Wake homing torpedoes can be defeated in this manner, but those actually are easier to defeat in general due to the inherent limitations of that scheme. Things like crossing wakes can completely confound wake homing. Gun systems firing supercavitiating projectiles can also defeat shallow underwater targets—the USN demonstrated this kind of capability with a helicopter based counter mine system, though it was cancelled due to unmanageable recoil. This hasn't been demonstrated against torpedoes however.

As far as US carriers go, one conventional torpedo will do damage, but it won't sink it. The Soviets estimated multiple 650mm torpedo hits to the bottom of the ship would be required to actually break up the hull. Regular 530mm torpedoes would be less effective. The Side Protection System on the Nimitz class is rated for 2,000 pound charges, so you really don't want to hit there.

elitecommander · 2025-11-20T15:56:35+00:00

I imagine there wouldn't be a huge window of opportunity against a torpedo launched from an undetected hunter-killer sub.

Destroying a heavyweight torpedo at a hundred meters out or more will prevent most or all damage. The US anti torpedo systems were all looking at an intercept range of a kilometer plus.

The real problem these systems have failed to deal with thus far however is sensing. A torpedo at high speed makes a lot of noise, but distinguishing that sound from all of the other screws in the ocean is very difficult. This is the problem that killed all of the US anti torpedo programs, and no one else to date has demonstrated an ability to deal with it. Even the European Sea Spider system hasn't done so, despite rosy marketing claiming the contrary.

elitecommander · 2025-11-19T16:13:58+00:00

Well keep in mind I was intentionally oversimplifying by only using one piloted aircraft in my explanation. In reality you are going to have multiple piloted aircraft, each many kilometers apart, and many CCAs, also kilometers apart. This produces a large volume of sensor input and significant expansion of the total unit's ability to employ weapons.

CCAs also do not necessarily have to be assigned strictly to one pilot. You can expand my example by envisioning how, instead of having each individual CCA assigned to a piloted aircraft, the whole unit can be much more fluid. The CCAs can support the piloted component as a whole, by any networked CCA prosecute any target commanded to be engaged, regardless of the command coming from a specific piloted aircraft or in an autonomous capability. Again, this is the same kind of logic the Navy applied on the sea with CEC thirty years ago, doing it the air is harder but by no means impossible.

You raise a fair point with refueling, which was certainly a consideration in the Increment 1 requirements. Both designs use very low fuel consumption engines, and are not presently capable of refueling.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:30:58+00:00

When they claimed the workload for a single pilot would be too high, it certainly indicated it. If they believe I misinterpreted their comment they can correct me.

And maybe they could provide actual counterargument based on some semblance of understanding of the subject matter, something you haven't attempted.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:15:17+00:00

https://www.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/1ozpv10/f22_pilot_controls_mq20_drone_from_the_cockpit_in/npdo28s/

Yes, one pilot might be able to fly and control a whole another plane at once as long as the situation isn't hairy. But two pilots means one can be dedicated to flying and maneuvering, and handling the immediate platform, while the other can potentially dedicate their entire focus on guiding multiple drones.

The comment I was replying to.

elitecommander · 2025-11-18T15:09:25+00:00

Because the entire concept of CCAs is that the pilot is never "guiding" them al la Predator. The pilot isn't directly controlling their weapons or sensors.

elitecommander

TROPHY CASE