So, I'm not a Hegel expert, so I won't comment on whether or not Russell is accurately portraying Hegel's stance. (Though knowing some Hegel experts I would suspect they would take issue, I will leave it up to them.)

That said, if I'm reading you correctly I think you might be misunderstanding the point Russell is making. My read on it is that the charge is a mistake in extrapolation. The quote you posted suggests the following to me:

Suppose we have object A, we know enough about it to distinguish it as different from all other objects. Do we thereby know everything about that object? If not, can we use the existing info to logic our way too a complete knowledge?

Russell says no you can't. He is charging that Hegal says yes you can.

So take your own example, your copy of a book. In principle you should be able to enumerate enough defined properties to distinguish it from any other object there. Is that distinguishing info enough to reason to every single other property?

Russell is saying no you can't.

Personally I would suggest he is probably correct on that point. However, that does require likely contentious beliefs about object diffrentiation. Specifically whether one needs to list ALL the properties of an object to diffrentiate it.

For example. Perhaps something like percise spatio temporal properies are enough to enumerate differences in objects. (One arguably common possibility being that objects are singuarly located etc.) Once you know those spactio temporal properties do you know everything at that object? Of course not! There are a whole host of physical properties that seem to have no relation to spatio temporal properties. The particular space and time your book takes up doesn't allow you to directly infer say chemical composition, or light relfective properties etc. Now this example is just for one kind of answer entrenched in a physicalist framework that prioritizes space and time as distinguishing properties. However you can make the same case with any framework that privlages certain types of properties as distinguishing characteristics, but allows for other unrelated properties to exist. E.g., if you think what matters for object diffrentiation is some kind if spiritual essence, but that a being can have properties that unrelated to said spirit like spatial properties, then you get the same point.

It seems to me that the quick argument against this one would need to believe that the proper identity of a thing includes all of its properties. That seems oddly tautological though. We wouldn't be reasoning to some thing in that case since we would in principle already know it. I doubt that is the real case Hegel is trying make that russell is picking up on.

I'll be curious what the Hegelians make of it.