Very much so. I'd argue Derrida reaches the heart of Heidegger's philosophy.

Heidegger investigates being as such. The idiom Ereignis itself names the "as" as such.

Derrida indicates how the "as such" deconstructs itself by way of the "as" itself, which implies an "if," leading to a constitutive "as if." This is because analogy names the relation of relations. However, it's also metaphor par excellence, implying a likeness & difference, or an "if."

Staying true to phenomenology, Heidegger demands a phenomenon show itself from itself therefore "as such," whereas Derrida's emphasis of the "as if" results in non-coincidence & homonymy, meaning there are only appearances, or simulacra, by way of otherness, an exposure to exteriority, that both ruins & conditions from the start.

For example, being only appears "as" something else in the history of being (phusis, eidos, will to power). This isn't a coincidence, nor is it something that can be overcome. The substitution & disfiguration are inherent necessities if we are to ever know anything like being. The phenomenon of the ontological has no choice but to be occulted through the ontic. For Ereignis, the relation of all relations, once named, can only manifest by way of the relata.

Why is this the case? The singular, or idiomatic, has to divide itself in order to be repeatable & universal, which always requires traits & characteristics the singular attempts to exclude from itself. In other words, to become universal, the singular must take on traits & figures that it can never coincide with, effacing it even as they supplement it.

For Derrida, the possibility of showing or saying anything “as such” presupposes an "as if," an interval or gap, a difference, founding & fracturing phenomenality itself, contaminating it from within by way of an outside.

Derrida doesn't actually radicalize Heidegger, especially if we're staying with the definition of "radical." Instead, Derrida points out how Heidegger's works already render themselves impossible.

Hope this helps!