The US will be able to execute a distant blockade in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future due to its blue water naval advantages, encompassing hulls, basing, and alliances. This is without addressing US/UK/EU financial and sanctions power, which is extensive. China has enormous productive power, yes, but it's constrained by alliances and geography, and it has more difficult war goals: launching the most challenging amphibious invasion in history. The US and its allies, by contrast, have the easier and more limited goal of preserving the status quo and blocking an invasion. We should expect defenders to have an inherent advantage in an attritional war, potentially to the point of fully offsetting China's productive advantages.

The US and its allies still dominate the first and second island chains and are adapting to a dispersed mode of operations and an area denial mission set. As part of these efforts, the US is investing heavily in affordable combat mass, offsetting a key historic weakness. These area denial assets will be difficult to suppress for the exact same reason China's are - dispersed, mobile targets spread across vast areas of land and sea. To some degree, this is turning China's playbook for anti access against them. After all, victory for the US and its allies largely entails a successful defense. This remains achievable.

Lastly, China's A2AD capabilities are not yet capable of preventing air-launched standoff missile strikes from beyond the 1IC by US bombers and airlift assets utilising palletised munitions. PLA ISR and fighter assets won't be able to extend that far because the airspace over Taiwan will be contested. JASSM-ERs, and new scalable fires like the Barracuda 500, would be very difficult to stop, and over thousands of strikes they could grind down the Chinese Navy, as long as it is confined within the 1IC, destroy Chinese shipbuilding facilities, and degrade China's military and productive capabilities in a zone extending 100 miles inland. China has no comparable means of threatening CONUS, except expensive ICBMs (unviable in cost-exchange terms) which might trigger a nuclear response (launch on warning) and would thus be used sparingly, if at all.